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ABSTRACT
THE AURALITY OF RHETORIC: A CRITICAL HERMENEUTIC OF CAPE
BRETON’S RHETORICAL MUSIC COMMUNITY
FEBRUARY 2016
GREGORY J. DORCHAK, B.A., SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY
M.A., SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY
J.D., NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Stephen Gencarella

Although the field of rhetorical studies has expanded from the notion that rhetoric only
applies to speeches, there has been little attention paid to the rhetoric of sound. This
project focuses on the rhetoric of sound, specifically the musical rhetoric of the
community of Cape Breton Island, in Nova Scotia, Canada. Cape Breton has a long
history of maintaining a traditional music community, with its origins in Scotland. The
fiddle music of Cape Breton is renowned as a genre of Celtic music. This project looks at
the rhetorical acts of the musicians and investigates how these acts of vernacular rhetoric
help develop the community. It shows how the individual musicians are conditioned by
the history and community they are born into, but also how these same musicians affect
and change that community. This cycle allows for the community’s understanding of its
own musical properties and style to change through time. This project seeks to dispel
the notion that the change in a community’s culture over time is the result of
inevitability. Change comes from rhetorical acts by rhetorical actors. Influential
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musicians enter the community, and make a mark. Their influence is picked up by other
musicians, who themselves add their own mark.

This project focuses on the notion of judgment as the locus for this change. The
Cape Breton musical community provides spaces where musicians are able to
gather and publicly exercise judgment. These judgments are not guided by a
blueprint of preconceived action, but rather by a practical judgment, wherein the
musician holds themselves accountable to the community. As such, drawing
from hermeneutical theory, this project highlights the distinction between
practical judgment and technical judgment. This project is a critical one, because
it seeks to raise to the forefront the prejudices that allow judgment take place,
and as such it is also a hermeneutic one. The critical focus concerns the
possibility that practical judgment can be dominated by technical judgment. This
project stands to guard against notions of essentialism and romanticism of
culture that, if given enough credence, could disrupt the possibility of practical
judgment in everyday life.
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CHAPTER 1
THE CASE FOR AN AURAL RHETORIC
In the early 1990s, the success of the pop-culture phenomenon Riverdance,
alongside movies such as Braveheart, inspired a broad interest in Celtic music.1 This
brought new audiences to the music, creating markets for Scottish, Irish and Cape
Breton musicians to tour across the world. As part of these new audiences, individuals
with no previous contact desired to learn to perform Celtic music. In many cases, these
aspiring Celtic musicians already performed classical music and simply wanted to apply
their instrument to this newly discovered traditional music.
These musicians’ aspirations to shift to a new music were not always met with
success. While the musicians might have had mastery over their instrument, the attempt
to perform a new genre revealed that musical performance requires musicians to make
judgments. While the musicians’ knowledge of the instruments aligned to the needs of
the new music, the ability to make new judgments did not. Products targeting classical
musicians emerged during this ‘pan-Celtic’ renaissance that attempted to teach Celtic
music via books and videos. These products purported to provide rules for “how to play
Celtic music.”2 But this notion that this music could be codified, ignores how traditional

The 1990s experienced a surge in the interest of all things Celtic, from the music of
Riverdance to the words of Frank McCourt. See Dan Barry, “From Poets to Pubs, Irish
Imports Are in Demand,” New York Times, March 17, 1997, accessed January 4, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/17/nyregion/from-poets-to-pubs-irish-importsare-in-demand.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
1

These products are targeted towards a diverse audience, from musicians who already
know how to play an instrument to beginners picking up their instrument for the first
time. The authors range from musicians established within the traditional music
community to those unheard of within the traditional communities. As these books are
2

1

musicians actually make judgments during a performance.3 While performing,
traditional musicians usually make judgments not by applying a set of rules, but by
applying a number of ‘rules of thumb.’ The traditional musician’s fluid judgment could
never be fully captured by a tune-book presented to the classical musician.
1.1. The Case for Aural Rhetoric
A trend of scholarship within American rhetorical studies focuses on the
rhetorical capacity of the visual as a part of both oral and written communication.4
While this visual movement opens space to consider rhetoric once unthinkable, other
rhetorical paths away from the written and spoken word still exist and are still

often commissioned by music publishers such as Mel Bay, they follow a similar format.
They might first provide a background on the author, then present the sheet music to a
number of tunes commonly performed by the musician. The musician may or may not
provide commentary or notations as to how they might perform the particular tune. In
other cases, the book might present sheet music for traditional Celtic tunes, but targeted
at musicians playing instruments not traditionally used in the Celtic vernacular, such as
Appalachian Dulcimer, the Viola, or the Harmonica. See, for example, Michael
Hoffheimer, Fiddling for Viola: Traditional Irish and American Fiddle Tunes Arranged for
Viola (Pacific, MOL: Mel Bay, 2000).
As indicated in footnote 2, often the authors of the tune books are indeed respected
musicians within the genre. But the very medium of the tune book closes possibility for
the consumer to receive more than some commentary on the tune, so the range of
possibilities as to how the musician actually do interpret the tune in practice is ignored.
3

For more on visual rhetoric, see Linda M. Scott, "Images in Advertising: The Need for a
Theory of Visual Rhetoric," Journal of Consumer Research 21, no. 2 (1994) 252-273; Mary E.
Hocks, "Understanding Visual Rhetoric in Digital Writing Environments," College
Composition and Communication 54, no. 4 (2003); Hanno H. J. Ehses, "Representing
Macbeth: A Case Study in Visual Rhetoric," Design Issues 1, no. 1 (1984) 53-63; John
Lucaites and Robert Hariman, "Visual Rhetoric, Photojournalism, and Democratic Public
Culture," Rhetoric Review 20, no. 1/2 (2001) 37-42; Charles A. Hill and Marguerite
Helmers, Deﬁning Visual Rhetorics (London: Routledge, 2004); Lester C. Olson, Cara A.
Finnegan, and Diane S. Hope, Visual Rhetoric: A Reader in Communication and American
Culture (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2008); Lawrence J. Prelli, Rhetorics of Display
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2006); Robert Hariman and John
Lucaites, No Caption Needed: Iconic Photographs, Public Culture, and Liberal Democracy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
4

2

overlooked. Recognizing visual rhetoric created new possibilities for rhetorical theory
but also created an artificial tension presenting the oral as a contrast to the visual;
ignored here is the overall goal of exploring what we should acknowledge as rhetoric.5
This artificial gap hides links between oral rhetoric and visual rhetoric, one such link
existing in aural rhetoric: the rhetorical capacity of sound.6 This dissertation focuses on
showing the possibilities for an aural rhetoric.
Admittedly, a focus on ‘sound’ could refer to a spectrum ranging from
dissonance to orchestration. Thinking of sound as rhetorical can disorient scholars
because sounds carry rhetorical properties that themselves baffle words.7 Rather than
attempting to theorize all possibilities for aural rhetoric, this dissertation focuses on one
genus of aural rhetoric, the rhetoric of music, and specifically the species of the rhetoric
of traditional Cape Breton music.
I am not implying that rhetoricians have ignored the rhetorical capacity of music.
But rhetorical scholars have dabbled in music like Americans dabbled in the metric

In the Introduction to Rhetorics of Display (2006), Lawrence Prelli refers to visual
rhetoric as becoming the most dominant rhetoric of our time. Throughout this
introduction, Prelli refers to visual rhetoric as that which conceals and reveals. He
presents the idea that visual rhetoric only ties to the verbal when the verbal invokes
visual, or vice versa. This points to a tension where, even though the two might have a
relationship, they are here seen as separate. While one form of rhetoric might assist the
other, Prelli conceives of the two forms as separate.
5

6

This is not to say that aural rhetoric represents the only link between visual and oral.

The eighteenth-century elocutionary movement within rhetorical studies did flirt with
the idea of sound in regards to orality. But, as pointed out by Dana Harrington, these
rhetoricians’ role as theorists was dismissed and they were seen primarily as teachers.
Dana Harrington, “Remembering the Body: Eighteenth-Century Elocution and the Oral
Tradition.” Rhetorica 28 (2010).
7
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system.8 Rhetorical studies of music tend to deviate little from standard rhetorical
criticism; scholars apply methods of rhetorical criticism to the lyrics or composition of
song as they might to a speech, or scholars might examine the emergence and
maintenance of a musical genre as constitutive rhetoric. These strategies of examining
musical rhetoric with methods designed for speech criticism might succeed in quelling
resistance from rhetorical scholars who shudder at the very idea of musical rhetoric and
also might succeed in revealing some rhetorical properties of music. But by not seeking
new methods to address musical rhetoric, rhetoricians have failed to address the full
rhetorical capabilities of music. To engage musical rhetoric more rigorously, rhetoricians
need to locate musical performance within cultural and social contexts. The ephemeral
quality of music may lie just beyond the grasp of articulation, yet music is still capable of
being understood. Focusing on such understanding provides a possible foundation for
approaching musical rhetoric. By beginning with the position that music, however
ephemeral, is capable of being understood, this dissertation relies upon hermeneutic
theory to develop a new possibility for examining the rhetoric of music.
1.2. Gaps in Musical Judgment
I return to my opening anecdote of the performance of Celtic music to show how
hermeneutic theory would inform a rhetoric of music. Again, the performance of Celtic
music by classical musicians reveals that musicians can be distinguished not only by
their instrument or genre, but by how they make judgments within a performance.
Musicians’ use of judgment first depends on the activity the judgment is guiding, and

8

In Chapter 2, I elaborate on scholarship linking rhetoric and music.
4

can be placed onto a spectrum spanning from practical judgment to technical judgment.9
Musicians performing notes guided by technical judgment replicate a specific sound,
informed by a mental blueprint.10 Prior to the performance, the musician already knows
what notes they will perform, and how they will perform it. To contrast, musicians
performing notes guided by practical judgment have no blueprint of how any particular
performance will unfold. While they have an idea of what will happen, each individual
performance will be unique. They will make judgments within a performance,
improvising in a way that attempts to balance the expectations of their audience with the
musician’s own expression of creativity.
The distinction between the notes within these two performances—the technical
and the practical—cannot be heard within the music itself, at least not within a single
performance. Over multiple performances, though, one can observe differences between
these performances based on judgment. A performance with its notes informed by
technical judgment might sound the same in the tenth performance as it did in the first.
A performance with its notes informed by practical judgment, however, might evolve as
the musician adapts to various audiences and explores new creative insights.11

As I will more fully elaborate later, the mode of judgment used to guide any particular
action should not be seen in black and white but in shades of gray. Any act guided by
technical judgment might also contain elements of practical judgment and vice versa.
Any attempt to describe an act as purely technical or purely practical without
recognizing the complexity needed to discuss judgment would also lack the needed
sophistication to take the subject seriously.
9

Note that I am referring to notes. I am not suggesting that all of the musician’s actions
will be informed by a blueprint, only the selection of notes.
10

Yes, performances of classical music do evolve. It is important to understand that I am
not saying that classical music is devoid of practical judgment. On the contrary, classical
music fosters practical judgment, but in different ways that traditional music fosters
practical judgment. The distinction being that practical judgment for classical musicians
11
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To explore the distinctions between the two modes of judgment, within this
dissertation I focus on the music community of Cape Breton, Nova Scotia. Highland
Scots settled the island of Cape Breton in the early nineteenth century bringing their
traditional customs, including traditional Highland Scottish music and dance. Due to a
number of factors, including the island’s isolation, this community maintained these
traditional practices. Over time, the island’s music, which began as a transplanted
Scottish music, developed into its own unique Celtic music style. The music of Cape
Breton sits within the broader family of Celtic music, sharing many traits with other
Celtic musics such as Irish music and Scottish music.12
While I have casually referred to several traditional musical genres, to label any
of these distinct musics as a homogenous sound would distort the complexity inherent
within each. The driving rhythm of an Irish fiddler from Donegal contrasts sharply with
the ornamental flavor of an Irish fiddler from Galway.13 Even as these regional styles

might not necessarily relate to the choice of notes. It will guide other choices, though.
More so, individuals in different roles within classical music have different
opportunities to exercise practical judgment. I will discuss this more in depth later, but
recognize that orchestras are led by a conductor, and the conductor makes many
practical decisions concerning the sound of a performance, both within the performance
it and beforehand. The conductor relies on the musicians to follow his instructions in
regards to these judgments. In these cases, the conductor exercises practical judgment
and relies upon the musicians to exercise technical judgment in following instructions.
Due to the nature of traditional music, which I will explore later, Cape Breton music
also shares traits with musics such as American and Canadian Old Time, Bluegrass, and
Danish traditional musics.
12

For example, contrast the music of the late Larry Reynolds who exemplifies the
Galway fiddle style and the music of Liz Doherty, representing the Donegal fiddle style.
See “ComhaltasLive #243 – 6: Session with Boston Fiddler Larry Reynolds”, Comhaltas,
last visited June 4, 2015,
http://comhaltas.ie/music/detail/comhaltaslive_243_6_session_with_boston_fiddler_l
arry_reynolds/lang/lang/ga; and, “Liz Doherty – Reels”, YouTube, last visited June 4,
2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2z31H_g0_6o.
13
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become clear, individuals within regions sound distinct from one another as musicians
hold different influences, teachers, and tastes. There is an idea of regional distinctions,
but these are not set in stone. Musicians interpret how to perform informed by their own
individual tastes as determined by these different inputs, but this interpretation is also
anchored to the musicians’ understanding as shaped by community.14
Traditional musicians generally learn their music aurally by listening to other
musicians within their community.15 This aurality brings with it a lack of codification—
an absence that creates both possibilities and limitations. In this environment, a young
musician learns music by listening to musicians already performing within the
community; by listening to these musicians, the young musician begins to understand
the possibilities for music within the community. When a traditional musician hears
new musical ideas, she assesses them in how they fit into her understanding of
possibilities; she judges whether the community will accept this new idea or reject it.
Her judgment is based on her own practical understanding of the community’s values,
as again, the community has no codified set of rules. Musical ideas from outside a
community might become part of the community in this way. One musician hears a
musical idea elsewhere and judges it as compatible within his own community. The

This balance between individual style and community expectations gives insight into
how musical styles evolve. As certain stylistic elements infiltrate individuals’ sense of
style, gaining popularity within the community, other formerly popular elements begin
to fade away; the community expectations evolve and the community’s sound as a
whole slowly changes.
14

Cape Breton musician Alistair MacGillivray compiled a collection of mini-biographies
of Cape Breton fiddlers in 1981. Each profile documented which fiddlers each particular
fiddler grew up listening to. While this information itself offers an interesting musical
genealogy, the immediate take away is that every single fiddler in the compilation grew
up listening to fiddle music. See Alistair MacGillivray, The Cape Breton Fiddler (Sydney:
College of Cape Breton Press, 1981).
15

7

musician would begin incorporating it into his own performances. Community values
are constantly tested and reformed with each individual performance. This logic dispels
the myth that innovation within a community must emerge from nothingness.
Innovation can be tied to an individual musician’s understanding of the community’s
sense of acceptability.16
Classical orchestral musicians contrast with traditional musicians in that the
classical community relies on a more rigid notion of rules and limits the opportunity for
musicians to exercise practical judgment when it comes to deciding what notes to play,
and how and when to improvise.17 This is not to say that classical musicians lack
opportunity to exercise interpretation, but rather that those opportunities are confined
and regulated.18 Orchestra members rely on reading a musical score during a

An example can be heard in the piano playing of John Morris Rankin. Rankin grew
up, not only listening to the many Cape Breton piano players within the community, but
also listening to country music. He incorporated into his accompaniment of Cape Breton
fiddle, chords and rhythmic syncopations not before heard within the genre that he had
‘picked up’ from country music. But these “innovations” made their way into Rankin’s
performances, not because of any attempt to change the community, but because to his
sense of understanding the music, these chords and syncopations simply fit and would
be heard as acceptable.
16

I am not making a value judgment against classical musicians. Nor am I saying that
those individuals who are classical orchestral musicians are incapable of practical
judgment. Nor am I saying that classical music itself is devoid of the notion of practical
judgment. On the contrary, most classical music performances do indeed exhibit
instances of practical judgment. But the very nature of orchestration requires that who
can exercise this practical judgment is limited. All I am doing in this section is pointing
out that the two communities should be distinguished not only in how the communities’
music might sound, but also by looking how judgment works within the community.
17

I am not implying that there are literal rules and regulations in force, monitored by
some notion of a classical music police. But due to the very nature of an orchestra
requiring coordination between many musicians, the opportunities for a single musician
to deviate and exercise individual judgment are limited. As a result, there is a more
limited notion of acceptable behavior. The policing, in this sense, takes the form of a
18

8

performance, while one would rarely find a traditional musician reading music during a
performance.19 When reading a score, the page tells the solo classical musician exactly
when to perform softer or louder and exactly when to perform faster or slower. The
score provides the musician with prompts for decisions; the solo musician interprets
these prompts. Many classical musicians grow up taking part in competitions where
judges rate performances based on how faithfully the musicians interpret a piece.20
But even this opportunity to exercise interpretation is thrown out the window in
an orchestral setting where the classical musician cedes musical judgments to the
conductor. In conducting the musicians, the conductor dictates the tempo, dictates how
loud and how soft musicians will perform, and makes every decision compelled by the
musical score. Orchestral musicians are valued in their ability to follow the conductor’s
instructions. Here we see a distinction between an orchestral musician and a traditional
musician. The orchestral musician is accountable to the classical music community for
how well she follows another’s instructions. The traditional musician, to contrast, must

concertmaster’s frown—a scolding that during my own time within a classical orchestra
I received on more than one occasion.
In the thousands of traditional music performances I have personally seen, I have
never seen a single traditional musician perform with sheet music. It has been noted that
on occasion Winne Chafe, a violinist living in Cape Breton has performed in traditional
venues using sheet music. But Chafe came to traditional Cape Breton music as a classical
musician, having performing in symphony orchestras in both the United States and
Canada, and she teaches classical music.
19

Here there can be extreme degrees of faithfulness that an orchestra must aspire to. In
my own high school symphony, while performing a Beethoven piece in a competition,
because our symphony lacked a bassoon player, we substituted a baritone saxophone
into the part of the bassoon. The two instruments shared the needed notes on the scale,
and were close enough in sound for our director to make the judgment that the
substitution would be acceptable. Our symphony lost within the competition because a
judge deemed the substitution unfaithful to the Beethoven piece.
20
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himself decide both what to perform and how to perform, without a page to prompt
when to make decisions, and what type of decisions to make. The traditional musician is
held accountable to his community for his ability to make musical decisions that align
with the community’s standards, whereas in an orchestra, that burden shifts from the
musician to the conductor.21
Because traditional and classical musicians have differing opportunities to
exercise musical judgment, they draw from very different forms of knowledge. When a
traditional musician makes decisions, she must apply her understanding of musical
theory within each performance. A traditional accompanist, for example, when
following a melody player,22 must understand how chords work; she must understand
the possible chord substitutions available within a chord progression and apply that
knowledge when deciding what chords to use during a performance.23 A classical

This is not to suggest that a classical musician and a traditional musician cannot shift
between worlds. But that shifting is a matter of coming to understand a new
community, not a matter of simply learning musical techniques.
21

An accompanist ‘follows’ a melody player, because the melody player determines the
tunes that will be played. Usually these determinations are made during the set itself. A
fiddler will string together anywhere from three to as much as a dozen or more tunes in
a row without stopping. The fiddler might call out key changes to the accompanist if the
tunes move from one tonal center to another (i.e. if one tune is in G major and the
following tune is in A minor, the fiddler might call out “A”). But the accompanist must
listen to the tune itself to follow along as to where chord changes occur.
22

A melody contains a structure, usually set within a particular musical scale. The
structure of the notes within a particular melody help indicate the “proper” chord for a
given measure. For example, a particular section of a tune might contain the notes ‘A’,
‘D’, and ‘F sharp’. These are also the notes that make up the D major chord. But this does
not mean that the D major chord is the only acceptable chord to play. One might chose
to play a “D major 7” chord, or begin with a D major and switch to a “B minor 7”,
because these chord qualities align with the notes of the structure. These various
chording possibilities are called ‘substitutions.’ As I will elaborate later, the art of
determining when to make a substitution is a key area where the accompanist exercises
practical judgment within a performance.
23
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musician might have a more formal understanding of musical theory, but because he is
performing notes from a score and interpreted by a conductor, is limited in applying this
formal knowledge.24
The classical virtuoso demonstrates an alternative to conceiving of the classical
musician as operating solely through the technical application of rules.25 The virtuoso
exhibits tremendous skill, and is valued by the classical music community precisely for
exhibiting an ability to make musical decisions without rules to guide. These musicians
have reached such a high skill level—and by virtue of this skill level can achieve
possibilities with their instrument that others cannot. Classical music communities value
these musicians for their individuality and agency, distinguished from how the
community values orchestral members for their contributions to the collective sound of
an orchestra. To say that classical music communities deny agency or practical judgment
would be both false and overly simple. More precisely, these communities value agency,
but restrict who may exhibit it, and when it may be exhibited. The virtuoso exhibits
agency. The composer exhibits agency. More often than not, the conductor organizing
the orchestra exhibits agency. Beyond that, little room exists within classical music

One might compare this to language learners: on the one hand is the person who
learns a foreign language immersed completely within a community and who speaks
the language without the aid of books, on the other hand is the person who learns a
foreign language completely through the use of books and without the contact of a
community that speaks this language. The book learner might understand the formal
use of subjunctive verbs or past participles, but might not draw from that
understanding. The person who learns within the community might not have the formal
understanding to label a verb as subjunctive, but might have a better applied
understanding of how to use that type of verb.
24

Again, my point is not to lump all musicians playing classical music as robotic
automatons. Rather, the role of a musician within an orchestra is one of limited
judgment. The orchestra director makes the practical judgments and dictates these
judgments to the orchestra members, who then follow these instructions.
25
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communities for other musicians to develop the faculty to make practical judgments
within performance.
While a musician might self-identify as being a traditional musician, they would
be disappointed that self-identification alone does not anoint one a traditional musician.
Traditional musicians must also interact with a community. It is not unheard of, for
example, that a musician would take a few fiddle lessons learning some Cape Breton
tunes, and then proclaim herself to be a Cape Breton fiddler. Here the musician
understands the performance of music as applying a technique—the musician tries to
precisely replicate the sound she has learned. When she performs her ‘Cape Breton’
music it is not actually informed by the Cape Breton community, and thus lacks
accountability.26 The traditional musician’s performance requires more than
understanding how to apply a technique to elicit a particular sound. This traditional
musician understands the fluid changes within the community—that the makeup of the
audience creates different expectations. Rather than informed by the desire to replicate a
sound, the traditional musician’s performance is informed by an understanding of
individuals in the community.

Rather than be seen as a straw man, I am not referring to any one specific individual.
But this characterization represents an archetype of a type of person who is encountered
in traditional sessions. This person will self-identify as being a Cape Breton fiddler, but
will identify as such because they've bought four or five Natalie MacMaster albums and
learned every tune on the album. Granted, this person might play Cape Breton tunes,
but their limited exposure to a single musician familiarizes this musician with neither
the Cape Breton community, nor a session community in general. If these musicians
frequent the session, they can, and often do, ‘grow out of it’ as they begin to acclimate to
the community, and are held accountable by that community. I have seen examples of
musicians emblematic of this archetype showing up at a session, and at every
opportunity, beginning a set by playing "all the hits"--the flashy fiddle tunes that are the
traditional music equivalent of an overplayed pop summer hit. While most sessions will
tolerate a few instances of this behavior for newcomers, it is done with much eye-rolling.
26
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To be fair, the classical musician's performance is also informed by an
understanding of individuals within his community. But pay attention to this notion of
accountability. When the classical musician performs, the norm is for that musician to be
held accountable to the conductor. The conductor makes the majority of decisions for the
musician, and the musician is held accountable based on how the musician follows the
conductor's guidance. Here, I want to briefly frame "who" the classical musician is that
I'm talking about, as this will help illustrate the notion of accountability.
The majority of classical musicians, at least in the United States, are not members of
major symphony orchestras. They are members, or former members, of high school
orchestras and local symphonies. These classical musicians begin learning their
instrument around the fourth grade, and play through high school, and perhaps college.
Rather than being seen as an elite class based institution, these classical musicians are
drawn from all classes, and, in some cases, are a student's only chance to learn music
within their grade school. Often, when this student graduates high school, the
opportunity to perform music disappears. But perhaps five to ten years later, this former
musician is sitting in a bar, and hears a group of people sitting in the corner playing
traditional music. He sees a violin. He knows that he can play the violin. So the
following week, he brings his violin, and sits down to join this group.
Think for a moment about how this student's decisions had been made for him as a
classical musician. The conductor told him what music to play, how to play that music,
and how to act. His practical judgment, when he could exercise it, was limited, and
anchored to the accountability of this classical music community. Odds are, if he acted
inappropriately, his conductor would smack him in the head with a rolled up score of
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sheet music. But in this new environment, there is no single person to tell the musician
what to play or how to play it. There is no one to tell him how to act. This musician is
entering a new community, with new values, and a new system of judgment. But there
is nothing to overtly indicate all of these differences to this musician.27 To enter this
community, this musician must adapt to the nuances of the conversation.
I must deviate for a moment to talk about community, and how the term will be
used within this dissertation. Most importantly, place does not equal community.
Likewise, a group of people is not necessarily a community. Instead, community needs
to be seen as a conversation occurring between individuals. Individuals can enter this
conversation. But just as importantly, individuals leave this conversation. Community
needs to be seen as a process, and less as a ‘thing.’28 Throughout this dissertation I draw
on ‘conversation’ as thought through by Hans Georg Gadamer.29 Gadamer sees
conversation a process that presupposes a common language while also creating a
common language.30 Neither language and meaning are understood as static.

I am not implying that this musician cannot enter this new community successfully.
Further, I am not implying that this musician can't successfully straddle both worlds.
Like anyone entering a new social system, this musician can recognize and adapt to the
differences within each community. But he could also remain oblivious to these
differences and not adapt.
27

It would be too simple to say that community is a verb and not a noun. But it would
be equally wrong to say that a community is solely a noun. It would be better to say that
community is the act and state of a constituted group. The people might fall into and out
of community. Simply because they are a constituted group, does not make them a
community. Instead, acting as a community requires communication practices. I will
elaborate more on this within a later section.
28

Here I use ‘conversation’ as Gadamer elaborates within Truth and Method, which I will
cover at length later. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer &
Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 2004).
29

Ibid., 371. Gadamer further elaborates: “…reaching an understanding on the subject
matter of a conversation necessarily means that a common language must be first
30
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Conversation is not limited to oral speech, but concerns language. The focus being
not on the form a conversation takes, but on the process of “coming to an
understanding.”31 Traditional musicians hold themselves accountable to an audience
and other musicians through conversation using musical performance to communicate.32
This musical language emerges within a performance, changing with each performance,
but at the same time the presupposition of a common musical language exists at the
outset of the performance.

worked out in the conversation. This is not an external matter of simply adjusting our
tools: nor is it even right to say that the partners adapt themselves to one another but,
rather, in a successful conversation they both come under the influence of the truth of
the object and are thus bound to one another in a new community. To reach an
understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward and
successfully asserting one’s own point of view, but being transformed into a communion
in which we do not remain what we were.” Ibid.
“Conversation is a process of coming to an understanding. Thus it belongs to every
true conversation that each person opens himself to the other, truly accepts his point of
view as valid and transposes himself into the other to such an extant that he
understands not the particular individual but what he says.” Ibid., 387.
31

I am referring to a non-oral notion of the word ‘conversation.’ Simply put, musicians
have conversations through music. Both non-musicians and beginner musicians often
fall into the trap of assuming that the musician’s primary concern when performing is
the music that he himself produces with his own instrument. A competent musician is
more actively engaged with listening than a concern for his own sound. Listening occurs
on a few different levels for the traditional musician. The traditional musician is
listening to the other musicians performing with her. The musician is also listening to
the audience who react to performances both verbally and non-verbally. As a
conversation, musicians respond to the others’ actions with their performance. Applying
Gadamer’s quote from footnote 31 to music, let’s say a fiddler is playing a reel in a
somber mood, but the accompanist is chording to it upbeat. In a musical conversation,
the two musicians are listening to each other to recognize their disparity, and they begin
to perform in response to the other. They might swing one way or another, or find
common ground in the middle. In this case, they have performed in such a way that
they are open to the other musicians’ point of view, and exhibit empathy in adapting
their performances to the other. They have done so through a musical communication.
32
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When traditional musicians began to perform outside of their local community, new
audiences saw the music in isolation from community, they saw only single musical
performances.33 To classical musicians in this new audience, nothing indicated that the
performance of traditional music required anything more than the technical knowledge
of the instrument—technical knowledge these musicians already possessed. Nothing
indicated that an understanding of community guided the traditional musician’s
performance. This is also not to accuse classical musicians of lacking community. Rather,
this is to say that the classical musicians, while themselves a product of a community
that guided their own judgments, did not recognize that the traditional musicians’
community would influence the traditional musician’s own judgments, and further that
it was this notion of judgment which made the musical style unique. It is likely that these
musicians did not even recognize their own community’s influence on their own
judgment within a musical performance.34 The clash of musical communities does not
emerge when a classical musician sits down to participate in the traditional music
community. The clash arises when any musician enters another community failing to

Here, specifically, I am returning to my anecdote of Celtic music within the 1990s. But
this could refer to numerous other examples. Another instance could be seen when The
Clancy Brothers toured America in the 1960s. These were concerts that Irish-Americans
flocked too, yet some would leave disappointed because the Clancy Brothers didn’t sing
“Danny Boy”—a song popularly identified in America as representing Ireland, whilst in
actuality it is a song written in England in 1910, and popularized in America by the likes
of Bing Crosby and Judy Garland. See Pete Hamil, “Forward” The Irish Songbook: The
Clancy Brothers and Tommy Makem (Macmillan Publishing, 1969), available at,
http://clancybrothersandtommymakem.com/ip_1969_sb.htm.
33
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These musicians are simply mistaken—not evil.
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recognize that this new community possesses different values and practices than their
own.35
Eliminating community from traditional music eliminates a form of knowledge that
informs performance, and thus informs rhetoric. Traditional musicians act as epideictic
rhetors, aurally proclaiming community values for community members to judge. This
allows musicians to change the community’s value rhetorically through music. Because
practical judgment does not operate through strict application of rules, it allows for the
possibility of newness.36 Traditional communities’ values and practices change when
musicians both understand their audience’s expectations, and then push upon that
understanding.37
Because my project’s focus is to outline how rhetorical theory can better conceive of
aural rhetorics, I will first cover rhetorical scholarship that discusses music. From this I

One could argue that a musician from one community does in fact understand that
other musicians possesses different values. She recognizes that the style of the music is
different, and therefore the traditional community values a different style of music than
their own. But these understandings of value concern the form of the music. The values
and practices not recognized are those that cannot be observed superficially. These
unrecognized are values and practices concern the mechanisms of how the community
works, which is not solely determined by how the community sounds.
35

If rules become the guiding post for judgment in any community, the community has
the potential of slipping into dogmatism. This can be seen in traditional folk revivals
that seek to revive a traditional practice. These revivals often base their resurrection
upon sets of rules that guide the new participants. Here the revivals are better seen as
museums mimicking a form of the traditional folk practice, not revivals of traditional
communities.
36

Classical musicians act as musical rhetors in the same capacity. The argument I am
making is not that classical musicians are lesser, and therefore not rhetorical. I am
attempting to illustrate that the rhetorical agent is limited in the classical music setting.
Your rank and file orchestral member has no opportunity to exhibit agency through
exercising practical judgment. Your virtuoso and maestro do. These roles can exercise
judgment by pushing community boundaries.
37
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will discuss how an aural rhetoric needs to take into account theories of community,
beginning with notions of the vernacular and the everyday. I argue that the mechanisms
of judgment are a key distinction between communities, hence, a key distinction
between aural rhetorics. Therefore, I will spend time focusing on judgment, and how
judgment relates to communities. Finally, I will discuss the community of Cape Breton
itself, reviewing scholarship that has focused on music within the Cape Breton
community.

CHAPTER 2
THE STATE OF MUSICAL RHETORIC
While the concept of aural rhetoric has yet to be breached by rhetorical theorists,
there is somewhat of an acknowledgement of a rhetoric of music within rhetorical
theory.38 Yet this is a topic that has not been taken seriously. You can sometimes find a
single panel that broaches musical rhetoric at the major rhetoric disciplinary
conferences, and you might find solitary presentations on musical rhetoric scattered
amongst other panels. A possible reason for such a bereft showing is the sheer difficulty
in writing about sound in the first place, let alone attaching properties to that sound.
Few published studies investigate the relationship between rhetoric and music, and of
those that have, most focus on lyrical analysis of a song, using speech criticism to

I say “somewhat” here, because, while I am about to point out a series of articles
devoted to the relationship between rhetoric and music, not all rhetoricians have
accepted that music is rhetorical. The reviewer of a recent chapter submission of mine
that discussed the effects of musical rhetoric pushed back against my claim that music
could be rhetorical, pushing for me to instead say that music is like rhetoric. This
experience is not unique.
38
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analyze lyrics. But using these traditional methods of rhetorical criticism, and equating
music’s rhetorical properties to the rhetorical properties of the written and spoken word
might be the very reason that a more comprehensive aural rhetoric has not emerged.
The square peg of lyrical criticism might fit into the round hole of musical rhetoric, but
with enough gaps that leaves the experience unsatisfying. While relevant, given the
sparse nature of rhetorical studies of music, such lyrical investigations do not
correspond with the focus of my project because traditional Cape Breton music lacks
words. Rather than concerning myself with the potential message of any one particular
tune, my project looks to investigate the rhetorical mechanisms behind a genre of nonlyrical music.
That being said, I do not wish to dismiss the contributions to the rhetoric of
music already conducted, since these authors have had to struggle with the difficulty of
writing about music and its rhetorical properties. An honest discussion of aural rhetoric
must begin with this existing work in order to understand what has worked as well as
what has failed. As previously mentioned, rhetorical scholarship has focused on lyrics,
and indirectly how the music shapes the meaning of the lyrics. Political lyrics of protest
music have been the obvious targets of such rhetorical criticism.39 Other studies look at
the social impact of songs, such as Michael McGuire’s analysis of Bruce Springsteen’s
lyrics as a medium promoting the virtue of responsibility. 40 Robert Root describes the

See, for example, Stephen King’s examination of how the Reggae music sung by
Jamaica’s poor as protest music became usurped by the nation’s tourism industry to
market the island abroad. Stephen A. King, Reggae, Rastafari, and the Rhetoric of Social
Control (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2007).
39

Michael McGuire, “’Darkness on the Edge of Town’: Bruce Springsteen’s Rhetoric of
Optimism and Despair,” in Medhurst & Benson (eds.), Rhetorical Dimensions in Media: A
Critical Casebook (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1984), 233-250.
40
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relationship between rhetoric and music as composed of three elements—speaker,
subject, and audience—tracing the development of ethos, pathos, and logos within a
song, using a neo-Aristotelian method of speech criticism.41 Beyond looking at the lyric
as an artifact, 42 other rhetorical studies have shown how lyrics create and maintain
musical genre, appealing to authenticity within that particular genre’s audience, such as
Theodore Matula’s investigation of how the band ‘the Pixies’ fit within the punk music
scene.43 This scholarship represents the bulk of studies focused on music and rhetoric.
While they are strong in their own right, in adapting traditional modes of speech
criticism to the lyrics of music and treating songs as artifacts, they are limited in this
focus on lyrics.
Showing the potential for a rhetorical focus that moves beyond lyrics, Deanna
Sellnow and Timothy Sellnow find a rhetorical capacity in the intersection between
lyrics and musical arrangement.44 The Sellnows briefly explain the rhythmic, melodic,

Robert Root, “A Listener’s Guide to the Rhetoric of Popular Music”, Journal of Popular
Culture 20 (1986), 15-26.
41

Studies investigating the rhetorical dimension of lyrics include Robert Walser,
“Rhythm, Rhyme and Rhetoric in the Music of Public Enemy” Ethnomusicology 39 (1995),
193-217; G.P. Mohrman & F. Eugene Scott, “Popular Music and World War II: The
Rhetoric of Continuation” Quarterly Journal of Speech 62 (1976), 145-156; Elizabeth Kizer,
“Protest Song Lyrics as Rhetoric” Popular Music and Society 9 (1983), 3-11; and Mark
Booth, “The Art of Words in Songs”, Quarterly Journal of Speech 62 (1976), 242-249.
42

Theodore Matula, “Contextualizing Musical Rhetoric: A Critical Reading of the Pixies’
‘Rock Music’”, Communication Studies 51 (2000), 218-237. Other studies looking at
musical genres include Edward Armstrong, “The Rhetoric of Violence in Rap and
Country Music,” Sociological Inquiry 63 (1993) 64-78; Robert Francesconi, “Free Jazz and
Black Nationalism: A Rhetoric of Musical Style,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 3
(1986) 36-49.
43

Deanna Sellnow & Timothy Sellnow, “The ‘Illusion of Life’ Rhetorical Perspective: An
Integrated Approach to the Study of Music as Communication”, Critical Studies in Media
Communication 18 (2001), 395-415.
44
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and harmonic structures of music—a necessary component that any rhetorical analysis
of music should contain. But the explanation they provide contains some ethnocentric
assumptions of Western music: “[O]ur minds tend to crave metric order. Hence, music
grouped in predictable duple patterns (as in a march) or triple patterns (as in a waltz) is
calming and representative of release rather than intensity.”45 This represents one of the
many generalizations made by the Sellnows that treats the rhetorical properties of music
as universal. Contrary to the Sellnows’ assertion, a waltz and a march are quite capable
of carrying their own intensity, depending on the community and context where the
particular form develops.46 While notable in their attempt to explain rhetorical
properties beyond lyrics, my own project differs in that it does not treat the rhetorical
properties of music as a given. My goal is to show how rhetorical properties of music
develop within musical communities.47

45

Ibid., 403-404.

Marches in particular being the best example to counter the Sellnows’ description in
the form’s ability to build both intensity and release. The march is a form used in
military music to actually lead an army on a march into battle. The form of many
marches does nothing save build anticipation, and for some, dread. The mistake the
Sellnows make is being overly deterministic regarding any one musical attribute. It is
the interplay of a number of factors of an arrangement that will determine the rhetorical
effect a particular piece of music might have, and this will also depend on the particular
context of any given performance.
46

The Sellnows hint at recognizing how different musical genres might contain different
properties when they state that, “a good deal of Rap music uses syncopated patterns and
might be more representative of intensity when compared to much of folk music, which
tends to rely on consistent duple or triple beat patterns.” Ibid., 404. This recognizes a
distinction between genres, but again, over-generalizes. I am not sure what they mean
by “folk music”, but if they are referring to the more modern American “folk” music of
Bob Dylan or Pete Seeger, the duple patterns of both Seeger’s Which Side Are You On,
and Dylan’s Subterranean Homesick Blues connote intensity. Meanwhile, I have heard
early underground recordings of the Wu-Tang Clan played as background music at a
coffeehouse in Corktown, Detroit, where the syncopation of the Wu-Tang Clan’s rap
served as a calming backdrop. I understand that they qualify their characterization of
each genre, but even this qualifier is unfair to the diversity of rhetorical musical
47
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The lack of engagement with both music theory and non-lyrical music is a
limitation in the literature coupling rhetoric and music. Much like the study of oratory
devolved from practical skills into technical examinations of elocution48, the study of
rhetorical music arrangement paints a picture of Western art music as shifting from a
practical art to a technical art, where composers would dip into prescribed musical
clichés in order to achieve desired effects. Gerard LeCoat49 suggests that during the
Baroque and Classical periods of music, composers based rhetorical appeals solely on
compositional techniques. LeCoat argues that these composers saw musical devices,
such as pitch modulation, as appealing to moods. When composers wishes to elicit
particular moods, they would draw from a prescribed set of musical figures. 50 Also

techniques within each community. The goal of distinguishing these communities
should not be to stereotype musical genre, but to understand how these genres develop
unique rhetorical mechanisms.
Warren Guthrie outlines this transformation within “The Development of Rhetorical
Theory in America 1635-1850—V The Elocution Movement—England.” Here he
examines the rhetorical treatises circulating during the Eighteenth Century, and their
focus on delivery. For example, the anonymously written Art of Speaking in Public,
devotes considerable time to gesture: “Use little gesture at the opening of a speech.
Don’t clap your hands, beat your breast, etc. Use the right hand only for gestures. Don’t
strike your breast, but place your hand gently upon it. Move all gestures from left to
right. Never lift the hands higher than the eyes.” Warren Guthrie, “The Development of
Rhetorical Theory in America 1635-1850—V. The Elocution Movement—England”,
Speech Monographs 18 (1951), 17-31.
48

Gerard LeCoat, “Music and the Three Appeals of Classical Rhetoric”, Quarterly Journal
of Speech 62 (1976), 157-166.
49

Other sources examine rhetoric and musical composition, including Gregory Butler,
“Music and Rhetoric in Early Seventeenth Century English Sources,” The Musial
Quarterly 66 (1980), 53-64; Carl Bryon Holmberg, “Toward the Rhetoric of Music: Dixie”
The Southern Speech Communication Journal 51 (1985) 71-82; Dietrich Bartel, Musica Poetica:
Musical-Rhetorical Figures in German Baroque Music (University of Nebraska: Lincoln, NE,
1997); Todd Borgerding, “Preachers, Pronunciatio, and Music: Hearing Rhetoric in
Renaissance Sacred Polyphony,” The Musical Quarterly 82 (1998) 586-598; James Irvine &
Walter Kirkpatrick, “The Musical Form in Rhetorical Exchange: Theoretical
Considerations,” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 58 (1972) 272-284.
50
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focusing on the Baroque and Classical period, Brian Vickers chronicles how musicians
and composers were familiar with classical rhetoric, arguing that their music was
shaped by rhetorical theory.51 But Vickers is not of the mind to refer to music as itself
rhetorical, instead arguing that the composer was only able to build analogies between
rhetorical theory and musical theory. “No doubt the general processes of creation in
rhetoric—inventio, dispositio, elocutio, pronuntiatio, memoria—could be adapted to music—
given some ingenuity—without causing a great deal of distortion.”52 Vickers
concentrates on how composers translated rhetorical figures, such as the colon and the
articulus into music. As such, he catalogs how rhetorical figures could apply to music.
The relationship Vickers paints between rhetoric and music, is a limited one, though,
and part of this might be due to an understanding of rhetoric itself limited to classical
rhetoric and elocution: “Like rhetoric, music can represent and arouse emotions, but
unlike rhetoric, which is a highly systematized linguistic discipline that can combine the
finite forms of rhetorical figures with an infinite combination of meaning... it may hope
for insight, but rhetoric is inalienably about communication, and can only use words,
and meanings.”53
My project attempts to work against the prejudice shown by scholars such as
Vickers—a blinding prejudice that prevents them from seeing music as rhetorical in its
own right. To date, the majority of rhetorical scholarship on music has centered on
music’s lyrics, for understandable reasons. But this has prevented the possibilities of
musical rhetoric being understood under its own terms. In this project, I attempt to
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Brian Vickers, “Figures of Rhetoric/Figures of Music?”, Rhetorica 2 (1984), 1-44.

52

Ibid., 18.

53

Ibid., 44.
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move beyond the rhetorical analysis of lyrics, and show the possibility of aural rhetorics.
The work of Deanna and Timothy Sellnow set the stage for acknowledging rhetorical
effects of music require acknowledging the relationship between melody, harmony, and
tempo, etc. But an understanding of how aural rhetorics work requires a practical
understanding of how music works, and more precisely, how music works upon people.
Musical effects are not universal. Instead, the rhetorical effects of music largely depend
on the community that the music is performed within. To fully understand how music
creates and shapes meaning, and aural rhetoric needs to begin with understanding
‘understanding’ itself. An aural rhetoric needs to ask how understanding occurs within
particular communities. Rather than reducing specific musical attributes to generalizable
universal characteristics and universal techniques, understanding aural rhetoric requires
acknowledging the contingency of each performance as a weave of multiple musical and
situational elements—only when seeing how these elements work together in a
community, will the rhetorical properties of the weave become apparent.
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CHAPTER 3
RHETORIC AND THE EVERYDAY
A comprehensive theory of musical rhetoric has failed partly because any
consideration of it has not highlighted that music is contingent—it operates within a
community,54 and its effects are not universal.55 This omission is ironic, because a
strength of rhetorical theory is the recognition both of the contingent and of the
communal. Rehabilitating an aural rhetoric should begin by attempting to incorporate
rhetorical theorists’ conceptions of community. This will begin to fill the gaps of an aural
rhetoric, creating a theory that recognizes musical properties can have disparate effects
on different communities.

I invoke 'community' as a concept here because the topic demands it. But the concept
of 'community' is indeed problematic. Rhetorician Diane Davis draws from both Derrida
and Nancy when she warns of using the term "with extreme caution..., and with a
vigilance against the humanist, androcentric, and anthropocentric histories with which
[it is] associated." Diane Davis, Inessential Solidarity: Rhetoric and Foreigner Relations
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 167. As I will discuss at length later,
defining a community can mask the complexity inherent in being with others. Using
'community' without regard to this complexity can destroy the concept of the individual
within the community and can destroy the very notion of agency. Conceiving of a
person as 'belonging' in a community has the danger of seeing the community as a
container that holds and defines those within it. But to take this criticism and swing the
pendulum in the other direction, rejecting any possibility of the concept of 'community'
would be equally wrong and equally dangerous. While we need to recognize the
individual, we need to recognize that individual as a being-with others. Rather than
rejecting community outright, or embracing it utterly, we need to understand
community as a set of relationships that can simultaneously acknowledge the individual
and the group. As I will show throughout this project, understanding the individual
within the group, and cautiously recognizing the 'community' that forms in this
relationship, allows for a more dynamic conception of both, and rejects the essentialism
of either.
54

Here I am referring to music in its aurality. As I have previously shown, there are
examples of scholarship on the rhetoric of music that discusses contingencies and
communities, but solely through reducing the particularity of a song to its lyrics. This
has ignored the contingency stemming from the sound of music.
55
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Rhetorical theory has always confronted questions of an audience, with early
rhetorical scholarship tying an audience to a specific text or calling for an orator to better
understand how a speech might address an audience.56 It is the recognition of the
contingency of audiences that sets the stage for rhetoric’s concern for the collective
identity of groups. In an important move to direct the focus of rhetorical theory away
from speech artifacts, Michael McGee called upon scholars to examine the relationship
between rhetoric and social processes.57 McGee traced the invocation of ‘the people’ as a
rhetorical concept, deriding how “most rhetorical scholarship presupposes a ‘people’ or
an ‘audience’ which is either (a) an objective literal extension of ‘person,’ or (b) a ‘mob’
of individuals who significance is their gullibility and failure to respond to ‘logical’
argument.”58 As an alternative, McGee presented ‘people’ as simultaneously both real
and a rhetorical fiction. The people are no more than individuals who have been
rhetorically seduced into a collective identity. This shifts seeing a people as a thing to
seeing a people as a process. In this process, the people, “are conjured into objective
reality, remain so as long as the rhetoric which defined them has force, and in the end
wilt away becoming once again merely a collection of individuals.”59

For example, Aristotle’s Rhetoric calls for the orator to understand the needs and the
moods of particular audiences. See also Edwin Black’s seminal formulation of the notion
of audience ‘personas’, which, in acknowledging how speakers can appeal to more than
one auditor within the audience of a given speech and laid the groundwork for how
speech can constitute ideology and identity. Edwin Black “The Second Persona” The
Quarterly Journal of Speech 56 (1970) 109-119.
56

Michael McGee, “In Search of ‘The People’: A Rhetorical Alternative”, The Quarterly
Journal of Speech 61 (1975) 235-249.
57

58

Ibid., 238.

59

Ibid., 242.
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While McGee doesn’t refer to a community as such, his discussion of a people
provides a springboard for rhetorical theorists to further explore collective identity and
the idea of group formation, from which a rhetorical discussion of a community might
evolve. Maurice Charland took up McGee’s call by exploring the rhetorical constitution
of the “Peuple Québécois” and explicitly invoking the idea of a community as “a term
that masks or negates tensions and differences between members of any society.”60
Focusing on the process of how collective identity rhetorically comes to be, Charland
develops a theory of ‘constitutive rhetoric’ wherein individuals become “political
subjects through a process of identification in rhetorical narratives that ‘always already’
presume the constitution of subjects.”61 Individuals here are not persuaded necessarily
to support the particular ‘talking points’ of the group they might identify with, but in
identifying with the group itself, individuals assume a role within a rhetorically
constructed group narrative.62
Charland illustrates constitutive rhetoric by focusing on a specific rhetorical
artifact, the Quebec Government’s 1979 White Paper which articulated the reasons for
Quebec’s independence. But the strength in Charland’s constitutive rhetoric is not the
power recognized within grand speech artifacts, but rather with his recognition of the
constitutive power imbued within individual’s mundane everyday events. “Persons are
subjects from the moment they acquire language and the capacity to speak and to be

Maurice Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the People Québécois”, The
Quarterly Journal of Speech 73 (1987) 140.
60

61

Ibid., at 134.

“Constitutive rhetorics are ideological not merely because they provide individuals
with narratives to inhabit as subjects and motives to experience, but because they insert
‘narratized’ subjects-as-agents into the world.” Ibid., at 143.
62
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spoken to. As such, constitutive rhetoric is part of the discursive background of social
life. It is always there, usually implicitly, and sometimes explicitly articulated.”63
The collective identity created by constitutive rhetoric is formed just as much by the
rhetorical power of our “discursive background” as it is by the rhetorical power of
specific texts. Charland implies that these background activities might have a greater
role in shaping our narratives than any single articulation. This recognition of the
background holds import for aural rhetoric. An individual’s identification with a
musical collective identity is not formed through the single performance but through
exposure to a background repetition of many performances. The narrative of musical
identity itself does not spring forth from the single composition, but is shaped over time
by many compositions and performances, and is an identity usually touched by the
hand of many composers and performers. Charland’s recognition that constitutive
rhetoric lies within our discursive background illustrates a need for an aural rhetoric to
also grapple with understanding ‘the vernacular’ within a community—the vernacular
being a locality’s background everyday discourse. Incorporating how a community’s
vernacular works rhetorically will help a theory of aural rhetoric understand how music
is capable of operating within the background of communities as a constitutive rhetoric.
3.1. The Vernacular
Recognizing the rhetorical nature of everyday exchanges departs from a classical
notion of conceiving rhetoric as an intentional form of oral and written communication.
Yet as Charland points out, our identification with groups is shaped more through
everyday background exchanges than through the single oration. The ability of
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Ibid., at 147.
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rhetorical theory to recognize the rhetoric of the everyday in part comes from the
aforementioned work of McGee and Charland, but also from the recognition that
rhetoric has both epistemic and aesthetic roles.64 After this move towards developing a

While I do not want to fall down the rabbit hole of detailing rhetorical theory’s
‘Rhetoric as Epistemic’ debate, it deserves brief recognition as it helped set the stage for
the possibility of conceiving a rhetoric of everyday existence. For lack of a better starting
point, the debate began in 1967 when Robert Scott argued that rhetoric was a “a way of
knowing.” Under this view, rhetoric itself creates and shapes knowledge. Scott’s
assertion spawned a series of challenges and defenses, with critics arguing that rhetoric
is not a way of creating knowledge, but a way of creating perspective upon an objective
reality already there. Others attempted to mediate between the proponents of rhetoric as
epistemic and those of rhetoric as perspectivism by arguing that knowledge was
consensus determined through intersubjectivity, with Barry Brummett articulating this
position thusly, “[I]f objective reality does not exist, where will we get the meanings we
have? The answer is that people get meanings from other people through
communication.” Whitson and Poulakos enter the conversation by drawing from
Nietzsche to label the goal of both the intersubjectivists and the perspectivists as an
“arbitrary fiction.” The fault of these views lie in approaching “intimate hidden worlds
with intelligible structures, the totality of which can be known if only one follows proper
epistemological procedures.” By doing so, intersubjectivity and perspectivism ignores
the aesthetic. Through Nietzsche’s eyes, epistemology is “a sub-category of art” and
rhetoric is the artistic act of “ordering the chaos of life.”
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After Whitson and Poulakos’ entrance into the debate, but through no fault of theirs, it
arguably devolved from an exchange concerning the substance of rhetoric into one
concerning the merits of Nietzsche. But both the epistemic and aesthetic views of
rhetoric that emerged from this debate helped rhetorical theory to recognize the
rhetorical nature of ‘knowing’ as well as the rhetorical aspects of everyday being. While
Charland and McGee and others investigating the constitutive rhetoric of collective
identity did not explicitly draw upon this debate, the ripples of the exchange clearly
influence theories of a rhetoric of the everyday, and should be acknowledged.
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model of constitutive rhetoric, some rhetorical theorists, such as Gerard Hauser, Kent
Ono, and John Sloop, attempted to take rhetoric’s recognition of the discursive
background of everyday talk one step further by developing models of vernacular
rhetoric.65 These models identify vernacular rhetoric through the local, recognizing that
each community operates with its own rhetorical mechanisms.
“The human world [...] is constituted by the ongoing social exchanges found in
dress, manners, material culture, popular arts, social gatherings, and the like.
Included in this extension is the rhetoric of the everyday—a ‘vernacular rhetoric’
of interaction within a discourse community that depends on local knowledge,
concerns, meanings, modes of arguments, value schemes, logics, traditions, and
the like shared among ordinary people.”66
This description intimately links vernacular rhetoric and collective identity. We share
the mundane social exchanges that operate at the background of our everyday life and
to understand how to move amongst others who share this local logic is also to
understand the vernacular rhetoric of the community.
Key to vernacular rhetoric is the question “what is a community?” Charland
hints at the possibility of shared “everyday background discourses” as the mark of a
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community, but it is not enough to refer solely to these everyday exchanges without
acknowledging that background discourses occur in our local surroundings. Also
important is the recognition that belonging to a community requires more than mere
identification with a group. One cannot simply declare, “I deem that I belong to this
community, thus it is so.” Through the lens of vernacular rhetoric, belonging to a
community requires the ability to understand and function within that group’s local
rhetoric. “We belong to a community insofar as we are able to participate in its
conversations. We must acquire its vernacular language in order to share rhetorically
salient meanings.”67 More so, a model of vernacular rhetoric recognizes that these
everyday discourses are not limited to oral, or even written exchanges. “[V]ernacular
discourse is speech that resonates within local communities. This discourse is neither
accessible in its entirety, nor is it discoverable, except through texts. However,
vernacular discourse is also culture: the music, art, criticism, dance, and architecture of
local communities.”68 Vernacular rhetoric allows us to conceive of a community defined
as a collection of individuals who share everyday rhetorical exchanges of culture.
Recognizing that vernacular rhetoric extends to cultural texts such as music and art
immediately lends itself to a theory of aural rhetoric. Conceiving of musical practice as a
vernacular discourse is not limited to recognizing a community’s discourse about music,
but to also recognize that the music itself—even non-lyrical music—exists as a form of
vernacular discourse. In addition to the import of recognizing cultural texts as
vernacular discourse, Hauser defining a community through rhetorical exchanges is
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almost as important. Through this definition, the classical musicians who take a few
fiddle lessons and listen to a few Cape Breton fiddle albums do not belong to the Cape
Breton fiddle community, despite labeling themselves as such. Self-identification with a
community does not equate to adopting or understanding the rhetorical salience of
discourse within the community—and it is the ability to understand and share in this
discourse that makes someone a member of the community. These classical musicians
might replicate the performance of a tune exactly as they have heard it on a recording,
but that provides as much understanding of the communal rhetoric embedded into the
recorded performance as a language learner might gain simply by reciting a speech from
a transcript. The mere replication of a text or performance does not give insight into the
rhetorical salience of that performance within the community that gave birth to it.
Vernacular rhetoric provides the possibility to understand how aural rhetoric functions
in an everyday background.
I have thus far delayed discussing the intimate relationship between rhetoric and
judgment. But because vernacular rhetoric focuses on how rhetoric functions in the
background, it concerns how background discourses affect judgment, and more
specifically, on the notion of communal judgment. The community judges the merit of
these background discourses, just as much as it judges the merits of formal discourses.
“Civil judgment expresses a common understanding among diverse social actors
primarily based on formal and vernacular exchanges enacted in and across public
spheres.”69 In some exchanges, the opinions of a community might reach a critical mass,
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where a large enough number of community members share a particular opinion that
the community can be said to have reached consensus.
These opinions contribute to the community’s understanding, even amongst
those who do not share in a generalizable opinion. “A public sphere may be defined as a
discursive space in which individuals and groups associate to discuss matters of mutual
interest and, where possible, to reach a common judgment about them. It is the locus of
emergence for rhetorically salient meanings.”70 Note here that common judgment does
not necessarily refer to a shared judgment in an argument’s outcome. It could just as
well refer to agreement over what is worth arguing about in the first place. Thus some
communities might be marked in the rhetorical salience of arguments that concern
fútbol while others are marked through the rhetorical salience of questions of music.
While both types of arguments are of the sort that occur formally or in mainstream
media—loci of traditional rhetoric—they are also the sort that occur around the dinner
table, corner pub, or church hall—loci of the vernacular. These judgments include the
very mechanisms of how we go about making both decisions and arguments. Shared
judgments contribute to a community’s collective identity. The commonality of
community judgments that an individual moves within, shapes how that individual
understands their own position within the world.
While the models of vernacular rhetoric of Hauser, Ono, and Sloop are notable in
their efforts to integrate local background discourse into rhetoric, the models they offer
are far from complete, and suffer from some notable flaws. I focus particularly on the
work of Hauser, because he has contributed the most in attempting to establish a model
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of vernacular rhetoric.71 I have thus far outlined three characteristics of Hauser’s
vernacular model that are foundational to a theory of vernacular rhetoric: (1) that
background discourses include cultural exchanges, such as music, art, and dress; (2) that
communities are defined by the ability to share in rhetoric; and (3) that the common
judgment formed in community exchanges contributes to a community’s identity. But
problematic to a theory of vernacular rhetoric that can truly grapple with how rhetoric
works within local background discourses is Hauser’s assertion that only the
marginalized and working class.
“The vernacular, by definition, is the aboriginal language used by the people of
a country or district. It is the nonofficial language of the working class, peasants,
certain ethnicities, and the marginalized—the indigenous general populous—
that they use, along with other indigenous symbolic forms, in their everyday
communicative exchanges. It is their symbolic resource for inventing the
quotidian. Vernacular language is distinctive because it stands apart from official
ones used for public transactions within power relations as occur in commerce,
education, governance, law, and the professions.”72
Hauser makes the mistake here of assuming that the non-working class is only capable
of speaking in official discourse. While non-working class are more likely to engage and
shape formal discourse, it is wrong to conceive that they do not engage in their own
form of vernacular; the Earl of Grantham’s rhetoric is not limited to the formal, nor is the
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footman Thomas’ speech limited to the vernacular. Briefly diverting to the vernacular
music of Cape Breton, while fiddler Donald Angus Beaton, a blacksmith, might
represent an occupation worthy of Hauser’s disempowered working class, his grandnephew, fiddler Rodney MacDonald’s résumé includes a three-year term serving as
Premier of Nova Scotia—hardly the position of peasants.73
In noting that vernacular is distinct because it does not occur within “the
professions,” Hauser ignores that within these very enumerated professions and among
the empowered elite there is both formal discourse and background
vernacular discourse. Turning a blind eye to the study of how vernacular operates
within “the professions” or among the empowered elites simply because it is not spoken
by “common folk” ignores a project worthy of critical interrogation: the question of how
the vernacular discourse of empowered experts shapes human affairs in the

Here, the obvious class based critique that recognizes the difference between the "high
class" classical musician and the "low class" traditional musician rises to the fore, but
jumping to this point would be problematic. While one might look at the stereotypes of
both the classical musician and the traditional musician and immediately see issues of
class, these issues collapse when moving past the stereotypes. Traditional music camps
featuring every type of traditional music genre exist throughout the United States,
Canada, and Europe (and presumably elsewhere). When looking at the class of those
who pay thousands of dollars to attend these camps, the distinction between 'high class'
and 'low class' begins to fall apart. Students who attend these camps must spend
thousands of dollars in fees simply for tuition, not to mention the cost of travel, and for
the adults, the cost of missing work. Further, the cost of the instrument itself is
ridiculous. A serviceable fiddle will cost around $1,000. A bow, just as much (yes, just as
much). If someone takes basic lessons, these will begin at $50 an hour. While traditional
musicians can be underemployed, they can also just as likely economically succeed and
be "well off." More so, there is an expense for the average musician to even participate.
Meanwhile, the economic environment for the classical musician is not nearly as
glamorous as it once might have been. Major symphony orchestras are folding under
bankruptcy, and the classical musician is just as likely to have to struggle for
employment as is the traditional musician. History aside, both categories of musician
more likely reflect the demographic of the NPR listener, which is also the media outlet
where both genres of music have been relegated.
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background.74 In defining vernacular, Hauser’s focus has mistakenly shifted from a
concern for a discourse’s context to a concern for a speaker’s wallet. “An account of
public opinion formation and ownership that begins with societal conversation
introduces an important shift in focus by including the dialogues among common
people, rather than those exclusively among official and empowered elites, and to
vernacular expression as their medium of exchange.”75 By taking the step of asserting
that only commoners are capable of local background discourse, Hauser borders on
romanticizing the very “peasants” he hopes to empower. Instead of focusing on who the
speaker is, Hauser needs to return the focus of vernacular rhetoric to the context of the
discourse itself: is it everyday background local speech, or is it formal public discourse?
Robert Glenn Howard sought to move vernacular rhetoric beyond the work of
Hauser, Ono, and Sloop, with his examination of amateur “Sinner’s Prayer” websites.76
Noting the limitations of the vernacular model thus far portrayed in rhetorical
scholarship, Howard drew from theories of vernacular culture discussed in other
disciplines. Prime among these was the work of Leonard Primiano, a scholar of

While Ono and Sloop implicitly acknowledge that vernacular discourse is not limited
to the working class, they make the same assumption as Hauser in asserting that the
need to critique the vernacular of oppressed communities surpasses the need to critique
the vernacular of the empowered. “Critics of vernacular rhetoric would look at
discourse that resonates within and from historically oppressed communities. This is not
to say that localized communities, generally, should not be studied, but that there is a
specific need, given historical power relations, to study communities that have
systematically ignored.” Indeed, the vernacular of the oppressed is woefully underacknowledged and deserves attention, but so too does the vernacular of the
empowered—not for praise of the empowered, but for the critical project of
understanding how the background discourse of the elite can affect the oppressed. Ono
& Sloop, “A Critique of Vernacular Discourse,” 20.
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vernacular religion, who recognized that vernacular discourse existed within
institutions, contradicting Hauser.
“In the field of communication, the vernacular approach to rhetoric has not been
theorised in ways that adequately address Primiano’s notion of a vernacular
nature in even the most formal communications. Gerry Hauser has most
famously explored the term’s meaning among scholars of rhetoric. For Hauser,
the concept helps to account for the way in which institutional publics are
influenced by everyday discourse. Hauser, however, and those who have
expanded on his ideas, continue to think of the ‘vernacular’ as simply one
influence on a traditional conception of the ‘public sphere’ of discourse. Hauser
does not seek to clearly define or explain his sense of the ‘vernacular’ as it comes
to be either opposed to or to be part of a political ‘public.’ In fact, it remains
unclear precisely how Hauser envisions the relationship between public
discourse, politics, and what he calls ‘vernacular voices.’”77
Howard did not limit this criticism to Hauser, as he also targeted Ono and Sloop:
“Focusing on communities that seemed to them ‘non-institutional,’ Ono and Sloop failed
to consider the very real vernacular characteristics of otherwise ‘institutional’
communities.”78 Recognizing that institutions are capable of producing a
vernacular discourse rightly steers the onus of vernacular rhetoric towards a concern for
the function of the discourse. By acknowledging that some agents are capable of both
everyday background discourse and formal institutional discourse, Howard’s
vernacular rhetoric accounts for the possibility that the vernacular rhetoric of an
institutional actor can influence the formal discourse of the same institutional actor.
Howard’s exposure of rhetorical scholars’ limited development of
vernacular rhetoric is of no surprise. Ono and Sloop’s contribution to vernacular rhetoric
was a shot across rhetorical theory’s bow, and succeeded in it’s goal of calling for
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rhetorical critics to engage with vernacular discourse. Hauser heeded this call by
continually returning to vernacular rhetoric. But vernacular rhetoric has advanced little
beyond these initial offerings. Part of the reason for its slow advancement is that
rhetoricians resolutely turned inward in defining vernacular, attempting to use the tools
of traditional rhetoric. Kendall Phillips’ aptly acknowledges this in his review of
Hauser’s Vernacular Voices, when he recognizes that, despite its title, Hauser’s work
touches little on actually drawing out the vernacular:
“I believe this lack of the vernacular is indicative of a deeper tension within
contemporary rhetorical theory, which has of late become increasingly interested
in “unofficial” sites of discourse. Despite recent interests in vernacular discourse,
the methodological tools and inclinations of rhetoric are still largely geared
towards the analysis of ‘official,’ dare I say ‘public,’ texts. Hauser, I believe, is
caught by this tension, interested in the voices of the everyday, but limited by
rhetorical criticism’s focus on what gets made permanent in official texts,
newspapers, government reports and the like.”79
Howard responds to these limitations by proposing for proponents of
vernacular rhetoric to turn to folklore studies, which has historically focused on
everyday background discourses. “Even the most studied and formal political debate
has, at its core, vernacular rhetorical aspects that the special focus of folklore studies can
help to elucidate. At the same time, attempting to theorise vernacular rhetoric builds a
bridge between two fields of inquiry that are deeply invested in the study of human
communication: folklore and rhetoric.”80 Supplementing rhetorical theory with folklore
studies provide vernacular rhetoric with the tools to acknowledge informal texts and
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would expose rhetorical theory to a greater understanding of everyday discourse.81
Vernacular rhetoric can look towards folklore, but do so without deviating from the
rhetorical concern for discourse, power, and judgment.
Folklore studies offers that vernacular speech applies to “the indigenous
language or dialect of a speech community.”82 This places an emphasis on locality, a trait
already acknowledged in theories of vernacular rhetoric. Folklorists also point toward
the informality of vernacular as a defining characteristic, and extends this informality to
how an individual learns to participate in vernacular discourse. Richard Bauman
characterizes vernacular thusly:
“The vernacular is a communicative modality characterized by: (1)
communicative resources and practices that are acquired informally, in
communities of practice, rather than by formal instruction; (2) communicative
relations that are immediate, grounded in the interaction order and the lifeworld;
and (3) horizons of distribution and circulation that are spatially bounded, by
locality or region. The vernacular, furthermore, can only be understood in
dynamic relation to the cosmopolitan; they are opposing vectors in a larger
communicative field. If the vernacular pulls toward the informal, immediate,
locally-grounded, proximal side of the field, the cosmopolitan pulls towards the
rationalized, standardized, mediated, wide-reaching, distal side.”83

Stephen Gencarella makes the mirror case, calling for folklorists to recognize rhetorical
theory in order to adopt a critical praxis. “A more intimate relationship between folklore
and rhetorical studies would foster a deeper appreciation of folklore’s political
investment [...]. A rhetorical perspective, as I detail, provides a reminder that folklore is
not something that a folk does; rather, it is something that, in its doing, constitutes a
folk, as both an immediate audience and a political category.” Stephen Gencarella,
“Constituting Folklore: A Case for Critical Folklore Studies,” Journal of American Folklore
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81

Leonard Norman Primiano, “Vernacular Religion and the Search for Method in
Religious Belief,” Western Folklore 54 (1995), 42. While Primiano is Professor of the
Religious Studies program at Cabrini College, he has a dual Ph.D. in Religious Studies
and Folklore, and his scholarship regularly engages with the Folklore studies
community.
82

Richard Bauman, “The Philology of the Vernacular,” Journal of Folklore Research 45
(2008), 32-33.
83

39

Bauman understands vernacular defined in part by its transmission process, a key
feature ignored in vernacular rhetoric. Also recognized is that the locality of
vernacular discourse contrasts, not with the empowered, but with the cosmopolitan.
With transmission in mind, vernacular rhetoric might grapple with the question of how
one learns vernacular in addition to the question of what vernacular looks like. And
contrasting vernacular with the cosmopolitan as opposed to the empowered allows an
understanding of how empowered elites are capable of background discourse. This
leaves us with a vernacular characterized by its place on two distinct spectrums: first,
vernacular is acquired informally as opposed to formally, and second, vernacular is local
as opposed to cosmopolitan.
Folklore studies also allows greater insight into how vernacular rhetoric relates
to judgment. While Hauser acknowledges a relationship between and communal
judgment, his analysis did not dig much deeper than offering that “Civil judgment
expresses a common understanding among diverse social actors primarily based on
formal and vernacular exchanges enacted in and across public spheres”84, a discussion of
judgment limited to the outcome of vernacular exchanges. But rhetoric has a doublesided relationship with judgment, and Hauser’s analysis only represents one side: that
of rhetoric affecting judgment. Bauman’s characterizing of vernacular by an informal

Hauser, Vernacular Voices, 74. Hauser does offer a more complete discussion of
judgment in Chapter 2 of Vernacular Voices, but in this section he engages with judgment
only in an attempt to refute Jürgen Habermas’s understanding of how judgment works
in the public sphere, not in relation to vernacular discourse. Despite the book’s title,
within Chapter 2, the word “vernacular” only appears in the final sentence, when
Hauser outlines what he will discuss in Chapter 3. The lack of vernacular in Hauser’s
book was a key feature of Phillips’ criticism of the book in Phillips’ previously cited
book review. Lest I become distracted now, I will reserve a discussion of Habermas for
when I cover judgment in a later section of this chapter.
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transmission process implicates the second relationship between rhetoric and judgment:
that of the judgment used by the rhetor in deciding how to act in a given situation.
Roger Abrahams highlights this form of judgment by acknowledging that
understanding vernacular discourse requires looking at how members of a vernacular
community act based on how they perceive their particular audience in contingent
situations.
“Vernacular cultural practices can provide insight into the ways others, and we
ourselves, operate on a daily basis and amid the most profound disruptions of
social life. Vernacular forms and practices should be approached through actual
examples of use at a specific time and place, taking into account the audience’s
expectations and the conventions of performance.”85
In learning how to engage in a locality’s rhetorically salient discourse, the vernacular
rhetor informally acquires a rhetorical judgment. This is a judgment where the rhetor
understands the community’s expectations, and judges what rhetorical acts are
acceptable based on that understanding. A vernacular rhetoric needs to account not only
for how rhetoric affects communal judgment, but also how judgment affects communal
rhetoric, and more so how that judgment is acquired.
Partly due to its informal nature, the judgment of vernacular rhetoric is dynamic
and always in flux. The informality allows for newness to enter into everyday
background discourse. Newness might arise through the use of slang, the availability of
a new ingredient, or the discovery of a new instrument. Whether these introductions
enter the vernacular through the creative agency of an individual within the community,
or via the incorporation of a foreign idea, the newness dissolves into the vernacular
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discourse as if it was always a part of it. That is to say, simply because an idea came
from outside of the community does not mean that to the locals it represents a
cosmopolitan idea.86 To truly understand what is possible in a particular vernacular
requires keeping up to date with the vernacular itself.
“In recent ethnographic studies of expressive culture, vernacularity refers to the
process by which the lowest and highest memorable voicings and revoicings are
drawn upon, residing just below the surface of consciousness, containing the
most recent slang and the most ancient and archaic turns of phrase that draw
attention to themselves. Used in this sense, vernacularity is capacious enough to
encompass the traditional and the innovative, the highbrow and the popular,
and to enable us to trace these registers that occur in various social
interactions.”87
Recognizing the dynamic nature of vernacular dynamic carries an implication not yet
overtly registered by proponents of vernacular rhetoric—vernacular communities can
themselves be internally diverse. There might be those within a vernacular community
who migrate towards the innovative while others hold fast to the established. There is
no uniformity within any particular vernacular. This spectrum further implicates the
relationship between vernacular and judgment. The informal nature of vernacular’s
transmission, combined with its residence just below our consciousness’ surface, means
that often, even when an actor is introducing newness into vernacular discourse, it
might seem to that actor as if the innovation is anything but new. The new act might

Look no further than the incorporation of the potato and the tomato into the
vernacular food of Ireland and Italy. Both are new world vegetables that became staples
of local old world communities. The banjo, now recognized as a mainstay of traditional
Irish music was originally an African creation that traveled to Ireland by way of Irish
musicians living in the United States during the early twentieth century. More recently,
look at the Rodgers and Hammerstein show tune, You’ll Never Walk Alone, that since the
1960s is traditionally by supporters of the Liverpool Football Club on match day.
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seem as if it corresponds to the logic of the vernacular discourse in such a way that it
was always at home within the community.
Aural rhetoric illustrates this hidden element of vernacular innovation nicely. It
is easy to dwell on the more overt aspects of innovation in aural rhetoric, such as Bob
Dylan’s decision to use an electric guitar at the 1965 Newport Folk Festival. The
controversy of this decision was both recognizable and understandable to even the
musical novice. But aural rhetoric offers more subtle innovations, such as the
incorporation of particular chord progressions, that might go unnoticed by the
non-musically inclined. For example, in the 1950s, traditional music in Cape Breton was
characterized by accompaniment that generally used only three chords. Local musicians
such as guitarist Dave MacIsaac and pianist John Morris Rankin, who were also versed
in performing other genres,88 would let chord progressions from those genres infiltrate
their Cape Breton repertoire. This infiltration was not the result of any conscious
decision to bring foreign ideas into the community, but was based on how Rankin and
MacIsaac understood the local music. To them, the newly introduced musical concepts
seemed a natural fit.89 These chord progressions were then adopted by the community
as a whole, both by new musicians, and long-established musicians. Innovation here did
not create any sort of disruption in the community, but seamlessly became a part of the
local style.

MacIsaac was also a notable blues guitarist who played with such notable blues
musicians as John Lee Hooker, and as a child Rankin accompanied his family, who sang
both country and Irish songs at the local pig and whistle.
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I base this on conversations with MacIsaac himself, and with Rankin’s sister, Heather
Rankin.
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Theories of vernacular provided by folklorists and other social theorists show
that the distinction between vernacular and empowered institutions made by Hauser,
Ono, and Sloop, was a distraction for vernacular rhetoric. These theories recognize that
communities are not monolithic structures, and that any locality might also allow for a
multitude of perspectives which itself allows for a more sophisticated understanding of
institutions. While Ono and Sloop limited their project to the vernacular practices of the
disempowered in order to promote a particular critical agenda, their limitation was an
arbitrary one that failed to recognize the importance of an empowered vernacular’s
effect on the disempowered. Critical legal scholar David Kennedy expresses precisely
why the vernacular of elites is worthy of a critical project:
“[T]he relationship between rulership and exclusion remains as difficult to
understand as that between global governance and the informal world of
clandestine flows. The alchemy by which inequality becomes routinized through
the vernacular of experts and hardens as law is tough to unravel, but the effects
are everywhere on view.”90
Institutions are capable having two faces, with both outward and inward sides. While an
institution’s outward actions might indeed be seen as a single formal voice, internal
discourse within the institution can develop an informal vernacular. The vernacular of
these informal internal interactions among the empowered are important for a critical
project to recognize because these interactions can solidify into the agreed upon policy
of the empowered.
In addition to the internal vernacular that occurs within institutions, the
distinction between vernacular and institutions blurs when acknowledging that
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institutional official positions are capable of influencing vernacular discourse just as
much as vernacular discourse is influences institutional official positions. Primiano notes
how this works within vernacular religion:
“Vernacular religion takes into consideration the individual convictions of
‘official’ religious membership among common believers, as well as the
vernacular religious ideas at the root of the institution itself.”91
Such an understanding of vernacular can shift vernacular rhetoric’s focus away from
binaries of both institutional vs. grassroots and empowered vs. disempowered, towards
focusing on foreground vs. background and local vs. cosmopolitan distinctions. While
the background discourse in vernacular might be united by a common rhetorical
salience, vernacular rhetoric should account for a rhetorical salience that is dynamic and
allows for a diverse array of rhetorical agents. It would also allow vernacular rhetoric to
recognize that a multitude of vernaculars can interact and influence one another, just as
background vernacular discourse is capable of influencing foreground official discourse
and vice versa.
Conceiving of the vernacular carries the danger of romanticizing and essentializing
the community discussed. This romanticization can be seen in Hauser’s limiting of
vernacular rhetoric to the everyday discourse of peasants. It is a danger also lurking
when describing any particular community’s vernacular discourse as monolithic and not
diverse. Vernacular rhetoric can guard against such a romanticization by drawing from
folklorists and other social theorists.
“The very terminology we use imprisons us, assuming for the moment that we
believe etymology is truth and predetermines the thought even of the
etymologically ignorant... The term vernacular, for its part, refers to a very
Leonard Norman Primiano, “Vernacular Religion and the Search for Method in
Religious Life,” Western Folklore 54 (1995), 47.
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particular and unprivileged mode of social identity—the language of the verna or
house-born slave of Republican Rome—and is thus hobbled by its own
particularity, since there is no reason to believe that every vernacular is the idiom
of the humiliated demanding vindication.”92
Sheldon Pollock offers this tongue in cheek commentary to counter any assumption that
vernacular exists solely within the speech of the disempowered.93 I have already
illustrated why vernacular extends to non-marginalized groups, but romanticization
extends to any essentialist description of a social group.
The danger of romanticization arises when scholars place the focus of vernacular
on the group or person involved within a particular background practice, and not
enough emphasis on the mechanisms of the practice itself. Not to dote on Hauser, but by
defining vernacular as “... the nonofficial language of the working class, peasants,
certain ethnicities, and the marginalized...” he reduces vernacular to the identity of the
person speaking and sees vernacular discourse as vernacular simply because it is spoken
by the marginalized. Pollock guides us away from the identity of the speaker and
towards to characteristics of the action itself—a shift theories of vernacular rhetoric
should readily embrace. Such a focus looks to define vernacular acts as distinct from
cosmopolitan acts.
“[M]y intention here is to think about cosmopolitanism and vernacularism as
action rather than idea, as something people do rather than something they
declare, as practice rather than proposition. This enables us to see that some
people in the past have been able to be cosmopolitan or vernacular without
directly professing either, perhaps even while finding it impossible rationally to
Sheldon Pollock, “Cosmopolitan and Vernacular in History,” Public Culture 12 (2000),
596.
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justify either. By contrast, the attempt to vindicate cosmopolitanism or
vernacularism—the production of the very discourse on the universal or the
particular—seems to entail an objectification and abstraction, and their
associated political practices, that have made the cosmopolitan so often take on
the character of domination and the vernacular, that of inevitability.”94
Pollock can guide rhetoricians towards a reemphasis of vernacular rhetoric as
vernacular action as opposed to the rhetoric of a vernacular people. This allows us to
return to Charland’s initial recognition of the rhetorical power of the discursive
background.
Hauser, Ono, and Sloop, recognized that a vernacular communities carry local
knowledge, modes of argument, and logics, imbued with a particular local rhetorical
salience. This vernacular discourse extends beyond the oral to the community’s cultural
practices, such as music, food, religion, art, and architecture. Those who have acquired
the local rhetorical salience apply a particular local judgment within these
vernacular practices—a dynamic judgment that evolves with the community. Drawing
from folklorists and other social theorists allows vernacular rhetoric to emphasize the
informal nature of these local practices, both in the acquisition and application. This
informality directly leads to the fluidity and evolution of the local practices. More so,
this informality allows for an internal diversity within each vernacular practice, and
provides the potential for seeing how rhetorical agents are able to exercise agency within
any particular practice. The ultimate focus of my project is to hone in on what an aural
rhetoric might look like, thus, the everyday vernacular practices that concern me are a
locality’s everyday musical practices, and the rhetorical salience and judgment
developed within such musical practices. In drawing from these various sources to flesh
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out what a vernacular rhetoric, and ultimately a particular type of aural rhetoric, might
look like, I have suggested how vernacular are everyday practices, but have ignored
defining what I mean by everyday practices—I turn there now.
3.2. Everyday Practices
Studying everyday life can be difficult to grapple with, partly because everyday
life seems obvious; this obviousness hides everyday practices in plain sight. Some events
that are the most commonly shared, such as birth and death, exist within both our
everyday yet are also experienced as the most special of occasions. Would the practices
that form around these moments that are simultaneously epoch and mundane be seen as
everyday, or special? To simplify the complexities that this concept carries, everyday life
should be seen as nothing more than an interpretive lens for social practices. An
everyday mundaneness of background practices would sit on one end of a spectrum that
seats foregrounded special events on the other. A researcher might classify an event or a
practice within this spectrum depending on its context, the agents involved, and the
interpretive purpose itself.95 Giovanna Del Negro and Harris Berger explain:
“... everyday life is an interpretive framework, and the reading of any social
practice as everyday or special depends on a complex interplay of factors and the
interpreter’s own meaning-making process. The significance of this analysis, we
believe, is that it clears away the fog that surrounds the notion of everyday life
and can help to focus research on concrete human practices and reveal the
differing ways in which everydayness is constructed.”96
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While classifying everydayness might seem arbitrary, Del Negro and Berger show how
the classifying a practice as everyday conceptually allows an interpreter to gain a greater
insight about that particular social practice by offering a perspective. Viewing a social
practice as if it was a part of the everyday might reveal a deeper understanding of how
the social practice fits within the community than if the practice were viewed as a
special event, and vice versa.
When referring to concrete human practices situated within the everyday, Del
Negro and Berger remind us that we are discussing human action. This might seem
apparent, but conceiving of practice as action—and therefore everyday practice as
action—indicates a relationship between rhetoric and everyday practices, both terms
that describe a distinct form of human activity. We must draw out precisely what type of
human action everyday practices refers to in order to understand where and how the
two intersect as vernacular rhetoric. Michel de Certeau helps here as his own work on
everyday life draws heavily from theories of rhetoric: “Everyday practices depend on a
vast ensemble which is difficult to delimit but which we may provisionally designate as
an ensemble of procedures. The latter are schemas of operations and of technical
manipulations.”97 He also provides a more direct comparison between rhetoric and
everyday practices: “Both rhetoric and everyday practices can be defined as internal
manipulations of a system—that of language or that of an established order.”98 De
Certeau offers everyday practices as a repertoire of operations and technical
manipulations occurring within an established system.

Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley:
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Seen through De Certeau’s eyes, a community operates as a routinized
mechanism of social actions undertaken within a network of social relations. We engage
with the community when we engage in these routines, situated as an expected set of
actions. Oft-cited in de Certeau’s work is his example of walking within a city, and the
social expectations of such a routine practice.99 Those who walk within the city enact a
practice that relates to the structure of the space in which they reside. The act of walking
can be seen as an everyday practice for those who reside within the city, but might just
as well be situated as a special event for the suburbanite who only occasionally travels to
the city. The community who resides within the city, and experiences it as part of
everyday life, carries a set of social expectations for engaging with the surrounding
space and those within it. The city’s physical structure can reveal the city planners’
official set of expectations, as seen in the sidewalk, the traffic light, the walk signals, the
street, etc. These expectations and regulations are not met with rigid adherence though,
as those who engage in this everyday practice understand how and when to manipulate
the established order, such as by jaywalking. Those who do not engage with this practice
within the everyday might not understand the social implications of slowly walking
down a busy city street during rush hour.100 They might not even recognize that they are
interfering with a social practice at all. The routine nature of this social practice hides it
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Not to gripe, but as a longtime resident of Boston’s Fenway neighborhood, I am
routinely confronted with suburbanites and tourists who feel inclined to make a baseball
pilgrimage to my area. Residents of the neighborhood must constantly grapple with
“outsiders” who walk slowly or block the sidewalk while either posing for pictures or
staring at maps, oblivious to our attempts to navigate home from the store laden down
with groceries. For us, walking this space is part of our everyday, and we carry certain
expectations of behavior—expectations unrecognized by those simply traveling through
who do not experience this space as part of an everyday practice.
100

50

in the background. More so, while participation in the action is routine, it is not precisely
repeated. The routine of walking to the grocery store confronts an individual with
infinite variables, each calling for the individual to make judgments as to how to
manipulate the established order, with each judgment making that particular adventure
both unique and routine.
Recognizing the importance of context plays out within vernacular communities
situated around musical routines. During the summer in Cape Breton, you can’t trip
without stumbling into some sort of live musical performance. During six nights of the
week, there are regular square dances held at various parish halls and community
centers. Other non-dance performances are scattered on a regular schedule throughout
the week, and nearly every weekend at least one town holds a town festival which
features non-stop entertainment. On the day that I write this, a summer Saturday, there
are exactly fifty live performances being held on the Island.101 These performances are
part of the everyday routines of this community.102 Contrast this with a generic
Midwestern suburb of Cleveland, which may have a few bars that feature cover bands
on the weekends. Here, musical performance is present, but pushed towards a special
event. Even the music being performed in these two instances reveal a contrast. While
the Cape Breton musician is performing the music of Cape Breton, in the Cleveland
suburb, the music might be the same cover songs performed at a thousand other
American bars on the same night. Rarely is the music performed in these bars born of

I reference the website Music Cape Breton, which is the local’s choice for identifying
events on the island. “Daily Digest”, Music Cape Breton, last visited August 23, 2014,
www.musiccapebreton.com.
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the same community. Both examples are musical performances, but for Cape Breton,
these performances are routines embedded into the community’s everyday—if they
disappeared, the community would operate differently, while if the occasional
performances of cover bands disappeared, suburban social expectations might continue
unscathed.
Categorizing a practice as everyday implicates how the activity is experienced.
When an activity is experienced as part of one’s everyday, it contributes to one’s story,
filling the gaps exist between the experience of special, marked events. “Both the flow of
activity and distinctive, marked-out acts and events go under the name of experience.
Moreover, the very flow of the everyday assures the continuity between routine
activities and extraordinary ones.”103 The special event and the everyday practice are
linked, in that each shapes meaning of the other. Everyday practices create a backdrop
of routines that might give meaning to special events, and the marked nature of special
events can contextualize the routine of the everyday. It also helps to situate our own
place within the story of our community.104 While the special marked events might be
experienced as intimate and personal, even when amongst others, the routinized
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De Certeau finds stories to be a vehicle that describe everyday practices, alluding to a
more direct relationship between narrativity and everyday practices: “... stories provide
the decorative container of a narrativity for everyday practices. To be sure, they describe
only fragments of these practices. They are no more than its metaphors. But, in spite of
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operating in the form of tales. This series includes therefore the contemporary novel as
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everyday experience can reveal how our actions situate us as individuals within a
broader community:
“On the one hand, we have a sense of disjuncture between the flow of everyday
experience; an experience; a typical experience that is reportable about ourselves
as a means of playing out our having entered, individually, into life’s recurrent
problem situations; and a large-scale Experience in which we recognize that the
progress and pattern of our activities are part of a much larger story that began
long before we were born and will continue after our death.”105
Abrahams notes here that by participating in a community’s everyday practices, one
steps into a series of routines that took shape before one’s own contribution to the
practice. This allows us to recognize that as we exert our own individuality into a
practice, that practice already bears the scars of countless individuals who have
proceeded us.
One can take the idea that when we participate in a community’s everyday
practice we enter into an already existing routinized activity, and conclude that
everyday activities are static—such a conclusion would be a mistake. When we
manipulate the system of an everyday practice we also exercise agency and creativity.
Manipulating this system is not to subvert the community, but on the contrary, is to
directly participate with the community. The cumulative effects of exerting agency can
subtly change the community’s practice over time, all the while masking those very
changes.
“Everyday life, when it changes, evolves according to a rhythm that does not
coincide with the time of accumulation and in a space that cannot be identified
with that of cumulative processes. Thus an illusion is created of the unbroken
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continuity of houses, buildings, and cities from the oriental town of proto-history
to the present day....”106
This recognition by Lefebvre is key, and goes hand in hand with de Certeau’s
description of everyday practices as the internal manipulation of a system—a
description that bears upon an individual’s ability to exert agency. Accounts of everyday
practices, vernacular rhetoric, and aural rhetoric, must account for the routine and
system of a community on the one hand, but also the exercise of individual agency on
the other. Any account of such a system that does not allow for an individual to exercise
agency within such a system would be hindered when accounting for change. The
problem is that—as Lefebvre indicates—everyday practices evolve at such a subtle pace
that it might be easy to ignore change as it occurs.
The subtlety of change in the everyday can mask agency because this subtlety
also can easily cast those who engage with a community’s practices into anonymity.
From the outside looking in, when a community’s practices evolve, it is easier to
conceive of that evolution guided by an invisible hand than to think that Larry from next
door might have placed his own mark upon the change. This potential anonymity is a
root cause for any romanticism that can occur when discussing traditional social

Henri Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, trans. Sacha Rabinovitch (London:
Continuum, 2002), 61. Lefebvre devotes his research to a critique of modernity seen in
the loss of everyday practice in his native France. My previous example comparing how
the loss of an everyday routine of music in Cape Breton would also result in a loss of
community identity while the loss of cover bands in the Midwest would carry no
corresponding identity loss illustrates Lefebvre’s work. But where the focus of my work
is on a community that maintains everyday practice, Lefebvre focuses on the loss of
practice, and subsequent loss of identity. See also, Henri Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday
Life: Volume I, Introduction, trans. John Moore (London: Verso Publications, 1991); and
Henri Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life: Volume II, Foundations for a Sociology of the
Everyday, trans. John Moore (London: Verso Publications, 2002).
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practices. For example, when describing the vernacular rhetoric of a Greek political
parade, Hauser describes the expressions of public sentiment exhibited by “honking
horns,” and “street corner debates”107 as if these practices were enacted by a faceless
mob. But those within the community who experienced it as an everyday could have
recognized the identity of those participating. Clifford Geertz offers that, even though
communities identify as collective groups, recognizing identity and agency exhibited in
community practices is important when interpreting the everyday:
“The everyday world in which the members of any community move, their
taken-for-granted field of social action, is populated not by anybodies, faceless
men without qualities, but by somebodies, concrete classes of determinate
persons positively characterized and appropriately labeled. And the symbol
systems which define these classes are not given in the nature of things—they are
historically constructed, socially maintained, and individually applied.”108
Geertz and de Certeau show the need to consider a balance between the individual and
the group when looking at everyday practices. Too much emphasis on the group can
lead to romanticism while too much emphasis on the individual ignores agents are
situated in systems that preceded that agent’s involvement.
Despite the illusion that change does not occur while we experience it, a
backwards glance can reveal not only the changes that occur to everyday practices, it can
also reveal agents’ role in these changes. Looking at the aural rhetoric of Cape Breton,
the music performed today bears a marked difference between the music performed a
century ago. This does not mean that the practices are new ones, but rather that the
social expectations within these practices have evolved during that time. There are a
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number of reasons for this evolution, but the agency of many individuals plays a role,
and Cape Breton offers the possibility to save these agents’ effects from obscurity. For
example, Winston Fitzgerald, a virtuosic fiddler, introduced a clean style of fiddling into
the Cape Breton music that contrasted with the “dirty” Mabou Coal Mines style more
prevalent at the time.109 His performances were rhetorically influential, and young
fiddlers who grew up listening to Fitzgerald emulated his smooth style which now
partly defines the community’s style. The introduction of this style into the community
can be attributed to Fitzgerald, yet, this change did not necessarily mark a break in the
practice. Fitzgerald entered into this community practice that existed before him, and
manipulated the system that he found there. The practice itself changed because of
Fitzgerald’s agency, as it does because of the agency of countless other individuals.
Accounting for the everyday practices within this system requires the balance of
recognizing the agency of individuals such as Fitzgerald, but also the practice as a
system that preceded these agents’ own involvement.
This leaves a number of considerations when interpreting everyday practices,
and conceiving of them as vernacular rhetoric. Background practices are routines within
a community that also carry social implications—however hidden. Constant
engagement in this routine is not a constant repetition of the same exact acts. An
individual enacts routine within the community understanding the possibilities to

Designating these playing styles as 'clean' and 'dirty' is an adjective used often by
Cape Bretoners. There are certain embellishments a fiddler can employ that are more
characteristic of the 'dirty' style and those that are more characteristic of the 'clean' style.
The same distinction extends to tune selection. The distinction can be heard when
comparing the more 'clean' style of fiddler Buddy MacMaster with the 'dirtier' style of
fiddler Donald Angus Beaton.
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maneuver within the community’s expectations. As individuals push upon these
expectations, the collective exercise of individual agency within the community shifts
the community’s expectations, and gradually changes the nature of the routine. Berger
and Del Negro propose a threefold focus to encompass the needed considerations: “...
practice encompasses three elements: social context, which both constrains and enables
the practice; social consequences, which can be intended or unintended; and the practice
itself, which is influenced by context and oriented toward consequences, but itself
depends at least partially on agency, a person’s active involvement in the world.”110
Each of these three focal points—social context, social consequences, and the practice
itself—bear upon the others and help the interpreter to balance the relationship between
the agent, the act, and the system. An agent’s acts create social consequences which
themselves affect the social context, and cyclically, that social context can then inform
the agent’s acts.
Berger and Del Negro are not alone in identifying context as essential to
understanding an everyday practice. De Certeau breaks down what should be
considered when taking context into account by looking at how language itself exists as
an everyday practice of enunciation:
“By situating the act in relation to its circumstances, ‘contexts of use’ draw
attention to the traits that specify the act of speaking (or practice of language)
and are its effects. Enunciation furnishes a model of these characteristics, but
they can be din the relation that other practices (walking, residing, etc.) entertain
with non-linguistic systems. Enunciation presupposes: (1) a realization of the
linguistic system through a speech act that actualizes some of its potential
(language is real only in the act of speaking); (2) an appropriation of language by
the speaker who uses it; (3) the postulation of an interlocutor (real or fictive) and
thus the constitution of a relational contract or allocution (one speaks to
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someone); (4) the establishment of a present through the act of the “I” who
speaks, and conjointly, since “the present is properly the source of time,” the
organization of a temporality (the present creates a before and an after) and the
existence of a “now” which is the presence to the world.”111
Here the speaker performs an act within a preexisting system, and when acting,
manipulates the system for the speaker’s own purposes. Enacting the practice situates
the agent not only within a system, but relationally towards others; in this act, the agent
asserts their own identity at that moment. De Certeau goes on to clarify that in enacting
the practice of language, “the speech act is at the same time a use of language and an
operation performed on it.”112 This reiterates a theme already discussed concerning
everyday practice: when an individual engages in a preexisting everyday practice, that
individual also rhetorically impacts the very nature of the everyday practice.
A further difficulty in discussing everyday practice stems from the relationship
between practice and judgment. I have already discussed De Certeau’s description of
everyday practices as the internal manipulation of a system. To manipulate the system,
an individual needs to make decisions of how to act. For a researcher to describe how
these judgments work requires the researcher to understand the system as a whole, and
then how the practice corresponds to the system. Understanding the complexities of any
given practice within a community is no small feat, in part because each practice
operates under its own system of rules, and no system is alike. “Practice has a logic
which is not that of logic, and thus to apply practical logic to logical logic is to run the
risk of destroying the logic one wants to describe with the instrument used to describe
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it.”113 Pierre Bourdieu suggests here that even attempting to describe the rules of any
practice is a Sisyphean task. He elaborates elsewhere:
“The language of rules and models, which seems tolerable when applied to
‘alien’ practices, ceases to convince as soon as one considers the practical mastery
of the symbolism of social interaction—tact, dexterity, or savoir-faire—
presupposed by the most everyday games of sociability and accompanied by the
application of a spontaneous semiology, i.e. a mass of precepts, formulae, and
codified cues. This practical knowledge, based on the continuous decoding of the
perceived—but not consciously noticed—indices of the welcome given to actions
already accomplished, continuously carries out the checks and corrections
intended to ensure the adjustment of practices and expressions to the reactions
and expectations of the other agents.”114
Bourdieu cautions against attempts to model how judgment works within practice.
While researchers might assign such models when interpreting the practices of others,
the same researchers would recognize the problems in assigning these models to their
own social practices. The practical judgment enacted within a practice, thus described, is
informed by a myriad of input; the very existence of any given input as an input may
just as likely be hidden from the very actor whose judgment is informed by the input.
In attempting to establish a theory of aural rhetoric, I have pointed out the
importance of linking aural rhetorics to community. This has led me into rhetorical
theories of constitutive rhetoric, and specifically the constitutive rhetoric of
vernacular discourse. As music is capable of existing as a background everyday practice
in certain communities, I have attempted to supplement a discussion of
vernacular rhetoric by expanding into theories of everyday practice. A common thread
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throughout each of these discussions is the notion of judgment. An individual engaged
in an everyday practice acts makes decisions informed by community expectations, but
the individual’s own acts also help to shape community expectations. Central to this
dynamic process is the role of judgment, for both the individual whose judgment is
informed by the community, and the community judgment being molded by the
individual’s act. Bourdieu offers a warning against any attempt to model practical
judgment, but that does not mean that general principals cannot be gleaned. The
folklorists, rhetoricians, and other social theorists who provided insight within this
section have discussed the centrality of judgment to these concepts. But in order to
understand the principals of how judgment works in the everyday practices of a
vernacular community, and specifically how aural rhetoric can exist as such a
vernacular, I must discuss judgment in its own right.
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CHAPTER 4
HERMENEUTICS AND THE EVERYDAY
Developing a theory of aural rhetoric depends on developing a theory of
vernacular rhetoric. Aural rhetoric is contingent upon the community wherein the
musical practice is performed. In many communities, music largely sits in the
background of the everyday, so the music’s rhetoric does not readily align with formal
rhetoric. Vernacular rhetoric attempts to account for the rhetorical properties that might
not only exist in oral communication, but also in other everyday practices such as food,
music, and sport. Because theories of vernacular rhetoric are limited, to understand the
vernacular and the everyday requires borrowing from folklorists and other social
theorists who traditionally devote more attention to the everyday. These theorists
consistently remarked on a relationship between everyday practices, and a particular
kind of practical judgment. But this discussion of judgment is itself incomplete, and can
be supplemented by yet another turn—this time towards the work of hermeneutic
theorists who devote considerable attention to the study of judgment. Such a shift is not
without precedent; folklorist Jay Mechling has called for folklore studies to better
incorporate the work of hermeneutic scholars and political scholars due to a shared
concern for an understanding of the everyday, and to acknowledge the relationship
between folklore and the political:
“We folklorists have a great deal to learn from the scholarship linking twentieth
century philosophy with twentieth century “interpretive” theory and practice in
the humanities and social sciences. Philosophers Richard J. Bernstein and
Richard Rorty clarify how intertwined is the thought of Peirce, James, Dewey,
Mead, Bergson, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Husserl, Wittgenstein, Gadamer,

61

Ricoeur and others in the emergence of an interpretive or hermeneutical
approach to human cultures.”115
While folklorists and other social theorists acknowledged that both practical judgment
and community evolution occur and are essential to the everyday, incorporating
hermeneutists allow for an understanding of how practical judgment works and how
community evolution occurs. In incorporating hermeneutic theory, I turn specifically to
the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Hannah Arendt. Gadamer’s work elaborates the
intimate relationship between judgment and hermeneutics, and Arendt’s work—
woefully ignored116—helps to explain the politics embedded in the everyday. In relying
on these two theorists, I also draw from hermeneutic theorists such as Richard Bernstein
and Ronald Beiner who expand upon Gadamer and Arendt’s work, as well as a
necessary brief turn to Martin Heidegger, whose work strongly influenced both Arendt
and Gadamer. I begin with a discussion of practical judgment, including how it is
informed by community, concerns deliberation and action, and is incorporated within
hermeneutic theory. Finally, I discuss how practical judgment is tied to the politics of the
everyday.
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4.1. Practical Judgment
I have already alluded to the distinction between technical judgment and
practical judgment. As I am drawing from the body of work related to Arendt,
Gadamer, and Heidegger, I must begin with Aristotle, for no better reason than the
foundation of these theorists’ work itself rests upon Aristotle. Aristotle describes the
distinction between technical and practical judgment within book VI of Nicomachean
Ethics.117 To grossly simplify, technical judgment—sometimes referred to as technē —
describes the knowledge of a skill, or technique...the technical ‘know-how’ of
performing an action.118 Whereas practical judgment, or phronesis, guides the knowledge
of when to perform this know-how within concrete situations, and corresponding to an
ethical know how, technē represents a technical know-how. This form of knowledge
guides action when we recognize that a given situation presents competing claims
making the best course of action uncertain..
Gadamer contrasts technē from phronesis in three ways. First, techniques can be
forgotten, “... we can ‘lose’ a skill. But ethical ‘reason’ can neither be learned nor
forgotten... man always finds himself in an ‘acting situation’ and he is always obliged to
use ethical knowledge and apply it according to the exigencies of his concrete

Aristotle provides a useful starting point, but is not infallible in his critique of
judgment. Nor does his philosophy necessarily ring true today. Aristotle’s notion of
judgment has been picked up by Heidegger, his students, Gadamer and Arendt, and
theorists responding to these works. While this work rests upon Aristotle, it expands
and evolves Aristotle’s work to reflect on a modern state of affairs. Each of the theorists
that expand upon Aristotle’s understanding of judgment also offer critique of his work.
See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press,
1996); Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1998); Gadamer, Truth and Method; Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism:
Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).
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situation.”119 Second, phronesis and technē, conceive of means and ends in different ways.
With technē the means used will always be the same, and the, while for phronesis, each
instance of practical judgment requires reassessing the proper means to be used. Technē
is always guided by a particular ends result, that will result in a particular “thing” or
product, while phronesis guides the actor to deliberate over means with an
understanding that the ends “are not perfectly fixed beforehand.”120 Finally, while
phronesis requires the actor to understand social relations and other individuals, technē
requires no acknowledgement of others. “The question here, then, is not of a general
kind of knowledge, but of its specification at a particular moment. This knowledge also
is not in any sense technical knowledge... The person with [phronesis] does not know and
judge as one who stands apart and unaffected, but rather, as one united by a specific
bond with the other, he thinks with the other and undergoes the situation with
him.”121,122
Recognizing that the ethical know-how of phronesis requires a social awareness of
others, as well as deliberation over the means of particular action, to act with practical

Hans Georg Gadamer, “The Problem of Historical Consciousness” in Interpretive
Social Science: A Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow & William M Sullivan (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1979), 140.
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The similarity in thought between Gadamer and Arendt becomes apparent with
Gadamer’s elaboration of the distinctions between technē and phronesis. Gadamer
explains technē much as Arendt describes her conception of ‘work’ as part of the Vita
Activa within The Human Condition which I will further elaborate later. While Gadamer’s
requirement that phronesis must occur in recognition of others corresponds to Arendt’s
account of ‘action’ as activity corresponding to “...the human condition of plurality, to
the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.” Arendt, The Human
Condition, 7.
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judgment requires the actor to have “insight into rhetoric.”123 Rhetoricians continue to
develop the relationship between rhetoric and practical judgment—a relationship
recognized since the origins of rhetorical thought.124 Aristotle understood that rhetoric
does not necessarily seek to persuade, but to affect judgment. His definition of rhetoric
as “the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion”125
presents a double-sided relationship between rhetoric and judgment. The one side
existing when the rhetoric judges the means of persuasion within a given situation, and
the other side in the judgment that the rhetor seeks from the audience.126
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Ronald Beiner, Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 83.

Due to the relationship between rhetoric and judgment lying at the heart of rhetorical
studies, providing a complete list of rhetorical scholarship focusing specifically on
judgment would itself be impractical. For a representative sample of scholars focusing
on the relationship of rhetoric and practical judgment through the lens of Aristotle,
Heidegger, Gadamer and Arendt, see: Arash Abizadeh “Passions of the Wise:
Phronesis, Rhetoric and Aristotle’s Passionate Practical Deliberation,” The Review of
Metaphysics 56 (2002), 267-296; John Arthos, “Gadamer’s Rhetorical Imaginary,” Rhetoric
Society Quarterly 38 (2008), 171-197; Jeffery L. Bineham, “Displacing Descartes:
Philosophical Hermeneutics and Rhetorical Studies,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 27 (1994),
300-312; Daniel Gross & Ansgar Kemmann, Heidegger and Rhetoric (Albany: SUNY Press,
2006); Robert Hariman, Prudence: Classical Virtue, Postmodern Practice (Penn State
University Press, 2004); Robert Hariman, “Prudence/Performance,” Rhetoric Society
Quarterly 21 (1991), 26-35; Michael J. Hyde & Craig R. Smith, “Hermeneutics and
Rhetoric: A Seen but Unobserved Relationship,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 65 (1979),
347-363; Walter Jost & Michael Hyde, Rhetoric and Hermeneutics in Our Time: A Reader
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); Allen Scult, “Aristotle’s Rhetoric as Ontology:
A Heideggerian Reading,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 32 (1999), 146-159; Louis S. Self,
“Rhetoric and Phronesis: The Aristotelian Ideal,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 12, no. 2 (1979),
130-145; Thomas Farrell, Norms of Rhetorical Culture (Yale University Press, 1993); Nola
Heidlebaugh, Judgment, Rhetoric, and the problem of Incommensurability: Recalling Practical
Wisdom (University of South Carolina Press, 2001); and Leslie Paul Thielle, The Heart of
Judgment: Practical Wisdom, Neuroscience and Narrative (Cambridge University Press,
2006).
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“Knowing that ‘the intellect alone moves nothing,’ that emotions can ‘warp’
judgment, and that the relationship of speaker and audience is crucial, Aristotle
developed a rhetoric which, when most artfully practiced, balances these modes of
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Such an understanding of practical judgment corresponds with De Certeau’s
discussion of how everyday practices work discussed in the previous section. De
Certeau sees practices as the internal manipulation within an established order. The
established order corresponds to social expectations within a given community. The
actor within a practice acts in a way to manipulate the established order. This
manipulation is only possible because of the actor’s ethical know-how. The actor has a
social awareness of the community within which they act. The actor must understand
not just social expectations in general, but the social expectations in that concrete and
contingent situation. Incorporating Gadamer alongside De Certeau allows us to see how
De Certeau’s manipulation of a system corresponds to a focus on means over ends.
While the actor might act with a goal in mind, the actor understands that the
possibilities correspond to the constraints in how the system itself works—the means of
the system.
4.2. Appropriateness
The relationship between rhetoric and judgment recognized by Aristotle makes
Aristotle’s Rhetoric a study of political judgment—itself a mode of phronesis. 127 Beiner
draws from both Hannah Arendt’s work on judgment128 and Gadamer’s understanding

proof. The Rhetor when functioning ideally as an artist facilitates good judgment in
hearers who are treated with certain respect.” Self, “Rhetoric and Phronesis: The
Aristotelian Ideal,” 142.
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Beiner, Political Judgment, 85.

The majority of Arendt’s work concerns articulating a theory of judgment. While her
seminal work of The Human Condition presents her most recognized understanding of
judgment, lesser cited works present a more thorough focus on judgment, including
Between Past and Future, Responsibility and Judgment, and The Promise of Politics. Hannah
Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin Classics, 2006); Hannah Arendt,
128

66

of rhetoric and hermeneutics to develop a theory of political judgment.129 In this
contemporary political judgment, appropriateness becomes the cardinal virtue of
judgment in rhetoric.130 When rules cannot guide the best action, the actor’s practical
judgment must lead:
“Judgment allows us to comport ourselves to the work without dependence
upon rules and methods, and allows us to defeat subjectivity by asserting claims
that seek general assent. In this way political reason is liberated, and the common
citizen can once again reappropriate the right of political responsibility and
decision-making that had been monopolized by experts.”131
This presents a way of thinking of action as guided not by dogma, but by a range of
possible appropriate actions from which a rhetor might select. The rhetor would select
what they see as the best action with the understanding that they must ultimately appeal
to the community. In this judgment the actor recognizes they do not exist in isolation,
but are accountable to others. Political judgment occurs when individuals make
decisions using practical judgment while understanding themselves as citizens—

Responsibility and Judgment (Berlin: Schocken, 2005); Hannah Arendt, The Promise of
Politics (Berlin: Schocken, 2007).
Beiner’s political judgment is form of practical judgment that acknowledges the
aesthetic, the hermeneutic, and the moral in informing a judgment that focuses on
questions of the collective. “[F]or political judgment entails an implied responsibility for
the assumption of what may be termed a shared way of life. All political judgments
are—implicitly at least—judgments about the form of collective life that it is desirable
for us to pursue within a given context of possibilities.” Beiner, Political Judgment, 138.
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“Phronesis is not one virtue among others, but is the master virtue that encompasses
and orders the various individual virtues. Virtue is the exercise of ethical knowledge as
elicited by particular situations of action, and to act on the basis of this knowledge as a
matter of course is to possess phronesis. Without phronesis one cannot properly be said to
possess any of the virtues, and to possess phronesis is, conversely, to possess all the
virtues, for phronesis is knowledge of which virtue is appropriate in particular
circumstances, and the ability to act on that knowledge.” Beiner, Political Judgment, 72.
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individuals who make judgments within a community concerning the very nature of the
community.
Appropriateness as conceived of by Beiner explains how accountability can
inform the traditional musician’s performance, especially when we acknowledge the
traditional musician’s role in shaping the aesthetic sensibilities of the community.
Traditional musicians draw from what is aesthetically appropriate for their community,
but musicians also help to make this collective appropriateness evolve. Beiner draws
from Arendt and Gadamer in noting the importance of the aesthetic in collective
identity.
“It is not at all coincidental that both Gadamer and Arendt concern themselves
with judgment, with taste, and with ‘common sense’. Both thinkers derive their
essential inspiration from Heidegger. One of Heidegger’s major
accomplishments is his de-subjectivization of aesthetics. Both Arendt and
Gadamer share this impulse, and Gadamer, especially, bases his hermeneutics on
Heidegger’s re-establishment of the foundation of aesthetics upon a new basis,
namely his idea of the ‘truth’ of art developed in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’.
It therefore becomes necessary to deny the ‘autonomy’ of art (what Gadamer
labels ‘aesthetic differentiation’, the ‘abstraction’ of aesthetic consciousness), so
that beauty is asserted to be a matter, not of private satisfaction, but of public
quality. Art and beauty, rather than being aesthetically divorced from truth, from
reality, from the world, assume responsibility towards the public realm, and
issue in the public meaning of a culture.”132,133
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The understanding of aesthetics as presented by the theoretical lineage tracing from
Heidegger through Gadamer, Arendt, Beiner, and others, explains why in this project I
approach explaining a musical community, not primarily through the work of folklorists
or ethnomusicologists, but through the work of political and hermeneutic theorists.
While I might share the same subject as ethnomusicologists or folklorists, my interest in
that subject is not the same. This is a project about the role of judgment in the rhetorical
practices of a community. It just so happens that the community I focus on is also a
traditional music community.
133
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This recognition also ties to previously discussed concepts of everyday practices and
vernacular rhetoric by recognizing the public qualities of everyday practices of
aesthetics. While I discussed the evolution of a community when drawing from theories
of vernacular and the everyday, by incorporating discussion of beauty and satisfaction,
hermeneutics offers a mechanism for how this community evolution occurs. Simply put,
some aesthetic practices are judged by community members as better than others.
These better performances are better in part because of the decisions made by the
performer. When the community recognizes these more aesthetically pleasing choices,
the choices filter back into the community’s understanding of how to judge the practice
itself. Thus, the decisions made by the traditional musician within a performance both
draw from and contribute to the public meaning of that traditional community. The
musicians base their decisions on their understanding of the audience’s aesthetic values.
When the musician makes a choice informed by an understanding of her own
community membership, it reflects an acknowledgment that the musician holds herself
accountable to her community. But those decisions also in turn affect the community’s
understanding of appropriateness.
Beiner is not alone in recognizing the relationship between appropriateness and
rhetoric. Walter Jost and Michael Hyde see this relationship as the key to the ethical
nature of rhetoric.
“Rhetoric offers itself as a response to the contingent demands of a situation; it
functions with an eye and ear attuned to the needs of others in the midst of
disputational contests it provides an opportunity for collaborative choice; its
ultimate aim is not merely manipulation and persuasion but the enactment of
deliberation and judgment and the cultivation of practical wisdom and kairotic
appropriateness. Rhetoric in other words, helps promote civic engagement and
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civic virtue; it thus lends itself to the task of enriching the moral character of a
people’s communal existence.”134
Appropriate rhetoric first requires the rhetor to possess empathy to understand the
audience—itself implicating hermeneutics—but also the practical judgment to not only
understand the other, but also to use that understanding to guide rhetorical decisions. A
community of rhetors seeking not necessarily to persuade, but to deliberate and affect
judgment, has the effect of cultivating the community itself. Rhetoric contains the ability
to enrich a community’s moral character by encouraging individuals to make rhetorical
judgments that acknowledge others, and in the exercise of that judgment, to facilitate the
judgment of others. The empathy needed to participate in this rhetorical community
attunes the rhetor to a more cultivated notion of appropriateness and judgment.
4.3. Deliberation and Action
Phronesis’ focus on particular situations limits any universal description its
mechanisms. This illusiveness gave birth to a debate between Hans-Georg Gadamer and
Jürgen Habermas concerning the nature of hermeneutics.135 Their debate traces to their

Walter Jost and Michael J. Hyde, “Rhetoric and Hermeneutics: Places Along the
Way,” in eds. Walter Jost & Michael J. Hyde, Rhetoric and Hermeneutics in Our Time: A
Reader (Yale University Press, 1997), 28-29.
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The Gadamer-Habermas debate began with Habermas’ review of Gadamer’s Truth
and Method. While Truth and Method was first published in German in 1960, it was
unavailable in English until 1975. Habermas’ review of Gadamer’s work, while released
in German in 1966, appeared in English in 1970, prior to the English availability of Truth
and Method. Gadamer responded to Habermas with “Reply to My Critics.” Habermas
replies with “The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality” which is followed by Gadamer’s
“The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem.” While other works by both theorists
might have indirectly targeted one another, these works represent the core of the
Gadamer-Habermas debate. Gadamer, Truth and Method (2004); Jurgen Habermas, “A
Review of Gadamer’s Truth and Method”, in eds. Gayle Ormiston & Alan Schrift, The
Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricouer (SUNY Press, 1989); Hans-Georg Gadamer,
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interpretations of Aristotle’s model of phronesis emphasizing the phronimos’136
deliberation of the good decision.137 Like Arendt and Gadamer, Habermas seeks to
protect the practical from the technical, not only in overtly political decisions, but in
everyday practices.138 Habermas borrows Gadamer’s version of phronesis to be used as a
tool for communication. But by locating phronesis as a tool, Habermas differs sharply
from Gadamer, who embodies phronesis in the deliberation of the actor situated in a
historical moment and context—itself a hermeneutic situation.139 As a tool for coming to
understanding through communication, Habermas sees the potential of phronesis
applied as a method through the use of rules.140 This idea of a rules driven phronesis

Universality”, in eds. Gayle Ormiston & Alan Schrift, The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast
to Ricouer (SUNY Press, 1989); Hans Georg Gadamer, “The Universality of the
Hermeneutic Problem” in eds. Gayle Ormiston & Alan Schrift, The Hermeneutic Tradition:
From Ast to Ricouer (SUNY Press, 1989).
Aristotle did not conceive of phronesis as something easily exercised but as a mode of
judgment available only to the phronimos, or ‘moral expert’. This causes some to dismiss
Aristotle’s understanding of phronesis in reaction to its taint of elitism. While it would be
wrong to throw Aristotle’s phronesis out with its tainted bathwater, it would be equally
wrong to not confront Aristotle’s elitist ways.
136

Aristotle addresses this in Book VI of his Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle, Nicomachean
Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross (Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books, 1999).
137

“But at a time when the threat of total annihilation no longer seems to be an abstract
possibility but the most imminent and real potentiality, it becomes all the more
imperative to try again to foster and nurture those forms of communal life in which
dialogue, conversation, phronesis, practical discourse, and judgment are concretely
embodied in our everyday practices. This is the telos that is common to the visions of
Gadamer, Habermas, Rorty, and Arendt.” Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism,
229.
138

“Understanding is to be thought of less as a subjective act than as a participating in an
event of tradition, a process of transmission in which past and present are constantly
mediated. This is what must be validated by hermeneutic theory, which is far too
dominated by the idea of a procedure, a method.” Gadamer, Truth and Method, 291.
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“Practical knowledge orients by way of rules of interaction. These transmitted rules
are acquired by training; but the historically changing conditions of their use call for an
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counters the very point of Gadamer’s development of the practical—that in particular
situations rules cannot govern us, and we must instead deliberate over the means of
action by relating the particular to the universal.141 In relying on rules to guide phronesis,
Habermas eliminates deliberation from the actor, focusing only on action. Rather than
weighing the situation’s possibilities and deliberating over the proper means, a
Habermasian phronesis instead requires applying a given pre-determined method.
Gadamer borrows from Aristotle in hinging phronesis on deliberation over future
action.142 This deliberation concerns not only the best means, but requires the agent to
act upon that decision. Knowledge of what justifies an action as ‘proper’ requires an

application that, for its part, further develops the rules through interpretation.”
Habermas, A Review of Gadamer’s Truth and Method, 232.
These points of contention do not encompass the entire debate between Habermas
and Gadamer, only the portion relevant to my project. Much of the debate concerns how
Gadamer’s understanding of hermeneutics contrasts with Habermas’s notion of the
ideal speech situation and prejudice. Gadamer sees prejudice as the fore-structure that
guides our understanding, and that prejudice itself is not negative. One goal of
hermeneutics is to reveal to ourselves our own prejudices so that we might assess which
prejudices are legitimate and which are illegitimate. Habermas disagrees, seeing
prejudice itself as a distortion to realizing an ideal communication. The two also
disagree about the status of positivism in the social sciences—a friction that stems from
their disagreement about the role of method in interpretive understanding, with
Gadamer seeing method as an interference with the contingency of the interpretive
situation, instead advocating for the researcher to employ practical judgment, and
Habermas attempting to anchor interpretation within a structure of rules.
141

Much attention has been given to this debate. Michael McGee covers it nicely in his
essay, “Phronesis in the Habermas vs. Gadamer Debate.” Much of McGee’s discussion
elaborates the various characteristics of both Gadamer and Habermas’s phronesis that I
already discuss here. Michael McGee, “Phronesis in the Habermas vs. Gadamer Debate,”
in Rhetoric in Postmodern America: Conversations with Michael Calvin McGee, Carol Corbin,
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Between Heidegger and Habermas (New York: Roman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000).
“This leads us to the fundamental Aristotelian concept of deliberation, for if political
judgment is defined in terms of the future; this at the same time defines deliberation:
what is deliberated is a course of action to be undertaken.” Beiner, Political Judgment, 90.
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understanding of the community where this action occurs. But phronesis requires more
than just understanding the community. It also concerns the actor’s attitude
approaching the action, as well as the way that act is ultimately performed. And since
phronesis always concerns action, it is always embodied. Action cannot be seen separate
from the judgment.143 Because these decisions concerning action are always contingent
on the particular, the exercise of phronesis cannot be taught. There is a clarification to be
made here. While phronesis cannot be taught it can be learned, or perhaps it is better to
say that it can be developed, and environments that cultivate the learning of phronesis
can be arranged. To say that a subject can be taught presupposes that there are rules,
methods, or information that a teacher can impart upon a student. Rules, though, are not
a component of phronesis. Instead, phronesis concerns agent centered judgment embodied
in action where the actor deliberates over contingent situations. An actor can learn
phronesis over time through exercising judgment, and developing an understanding of
what constitutes good action within a community. So in the case of a Cape Breton
musician, a teacher cannot provide a student with a set of rules of how to perform that
will apply to every audience and every performance. But the student could participate
within sessions, ceilidhs, and other interactions within the community, and in these
situations learn to practice enacting judgment. Treating these situations as dialogues, the
student could gain a greater understanding of the proper actions within each setting,
developing their ability to exercise phronesis.

“Phronesis is the union of good judgment and the action which is the fitting
embodiment of that judgment.” Ibid., 75.
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Stating that phronesis concerns good, or proper, action begs question, “what is
good?” Gadamer proposes that a communal good emerges when a community engages
in dialogue as sensus communis, or a common faculty of taste.144 This community
acquired sense of the good contributes to an individual’s prejudices which in turn
shapes an individual’s understanding—prejudices here not carrying the negative
connotations typically associated with the term.
Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they inevitably
distort the truth. In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in
the literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole
ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are
simply conditions whereby we experience something—whereby what we
encounter says something to us. This formulation certainly does not mean that
we are enclosed within a wall of prejudices and only let through the narrow
portals those things that can produce a pass saying, “Nothing new will be said
here.” Instead we welcome just that guess who promises something new to our
curiosity.145
This helps to show the relationship between hermeneutics and phronesis. Hermeneutics
concerns understanding, whether it be understanding a text, a person, a situation, or a
tradition. Understanding itself is only possible because of our collective prejudices that
shape our identity. Phronesis is a form of judgment that puts the particular in relation to
the universal, 146 as such, phronesis is a form of understanding where the ‘thing’
confronted is related to the actor’s prejudice.

“[T]he sensus communis [...] is a sense that is acquired through living in the
community and is determined by its structures and aims.” Gadamer, Truth and Method,
20.
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“The interpreter dealing with a traditional text seeks to apply it to himself. But this
does not mean that the text is given for him as something universal, that he understands
it as such and only afterwards uses it for particular applications. Rather, the interpreter
seeks no more than to understand this universal thing, the text, i.e., to understand what
this piece of tradition says, what constitutes the meaning and importance of the text. In
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It might seem like I am confusing two concepts, since hermeneutics is usually
acknowledged as the study of understanding and interpretation, and phronesis is a
particular form of judgment embodied in action. But in addition to understanding and
interpretation, hermeneutics encompasses application. In seeing these three elements as
essentially intertwined, Gadamer links phronesis and hermeneutics. “They are internally
related; every act of understanding involves interpretation, and all interpretation
involves application. It is Aristotle’s analysis of phronesis that, according to Gadamer,
enables us to understand the distinctive way in which application is an essential
moment of the hermeneutical experience.”147 A picture showing hermeneutics itself as a
form of judgment encompassing deliberation, understanding, and application as action
emerges.
Understanding is shaped by an individual’s prejudices, and these prejudices in
turn are in part shaped by an individual’s dialogue with their communities. Gadamer’s
develops hermeneutics with the goal of protecting practical judgment from a
domination of technical judgment. Key to understanding the distinction between the
practical and the technical, is that, while the two are opposed in operation, they are not
locked in conflict. Phronesis and technē need each other to coexist: “...we can even appeal
to the Greeks in order to point out that both for them and for us technē without phronesis
is blind, while phronesis without technē is empty.”148 Actions usually involve both technē
and phronesis. Technē, representing the knowledge of a skill while phronesis as judgment

order to understand that, he must not seek to disregard himself and his particular
hermeneutical situation. He must relate the text to this situation, if he wants to
understand at all.” Gadamer, Truth and Method, 289.
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guides the technē.149 While both Gadamer and Arendt caution against the modern
reliance of technē, technē itself is not their concern— their concern is domination by
technē.
“That is the point of philosophical hermeneutic. It corrects the peculiar falsehood
of modern consciousness: the idolatry of scientific method and of the anonymous
authority of the sciences and it vindicates against the noblest task of the citizen—
decision making according to one’s own responsibility—instead of conceding
that task to the expert. In this respect, hermeneutic philosophy is the heir of the
older tradition of practical philosophy.”150
This presents a very different trajectory of phronesis than that of Aristotle, because no
longer is it a form of reasoning restricted to an elite class of phronimos.
Instead, phronesis represents a form of understanding that everyone is capable of.
Arendt not only ties judgment to public relationships, she finds it to be an essential
faculty for the participating in the public. “Judging is one, if not the most, important
activity in which this sharing-the-world-with-others comes to pass.”151 Phronesis
becomes tied to one’s communal relationships. It demands an attunement towards these
relationships and requires a space for an individual to practice this judgment amongst
others within the community. The fear that technē would dominate phronesis stems from
these requirements. If individuals do not have a space to exercise phronesis within
everyday practices, they will lack the ability when they need it most. In ceding public

Here the violinist’s knowledge of the instrument is itself technē. They have to
understand how to elicit certain sounds from their instrument, requiring a technical
knowledge of the instrument as a tool. Phronesis could guide the violinist’s judgments of
when and how to use that technical knowledge within a performance.
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judgment to experts guided by technē, phronesis would disappear.152 Instead everyday
practices that require or promote the exercise of phronesis would allow individuals to
develop a faculty of public judgment. “If all human beings share a faculty of judgment
that is sufficient for forming reasoned opinions about the political world, the monopoly
of the expert and technocrat no longer possesses legitimacy. Political reason, from being
a technical science, is restored to a practical science.”153
The distinction between classical orchestral musicians and Cape Breton
musicians becomes somewhat clearer. It is not that orchestral musicians are not capable
of phronesis. On the contrary, in their community, these musicians make practical
decisions within their own everyday practices. Their prejudices informing these
practical judgments are shaped in part by their own dialogue with the classical music
community. In the practice of orchestral musical performance, the possibility for
enacting practical judgment is limited by the notes on the page and the director’s
instructions, but this does not mean that the musician does not exercise phronesis in other
practices, or even in other ways within this practice. The classical musician just happens
to enact practical judgment through different practices. The everyday practices of the
classical musician are different than the everyday practices of the traditional musician,
so what counts as a good practical decision for the classical musician differs than what
counts as a good practical decision for the traditional musician. It is their engagement

Again, this is not to disparage technē as a mode of thought. Gadamer and Arendt are
not cautioning against a scenario where we use expert knowledge to inform our own
phronetic decisions. Such a scenario would acknowledge a needed balance between
technē and phronesis. Rather, they caution against the domination of phronesis by technē—
a scenario where we would blindly cede our judgment to the expert.
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with their community that form part of the classical musicians’ prejudice, and thus
shapes their understanding of musical performance.
Informed by their own community, orchestral musicians understand certain
elements of performance as guided by their own everyday practices within their
community—and some of these practices, such as which notes to play, are not guided by
practical judgment. When these same musicians enter the Cape Breton music
community, they enter a community with quite different everyday practices. When the
classical musician exercises judgment within the Cape Breton musical community, their
judgment is not informed by the prejudices or norms of the Cape Breton community, but
by the norms of their own classical music community. This ignores the Cape Breton
tradition. “Every work of art, not only literature, must be understood like any other text
that requires understanding, and this kind of understanding has to be acquired.”154 This
classical musician first entering the Cape Breton community cannot demonstrate
phronesis in this new encounter, because their prejudices can hide the very notion that
they are engaging within a community practice with very different values than their
own. Even if the orchestral musician recognizes that this new community carries a
different set of values, these newly encountered norms do not automatically reveal
themselves to the musician. These norms would make themselves known slowly, and
only if the orchestral musician engages in an open dialogue with the Cape Breton
community.
The reason that the norms of Cape Breton’s musical practices could only reveal
themselves to an orchestral musician over time lies within the concept of prejudice itself.
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The classical musician’s prejudices can never be dissolved or bracketed through the
force of sheer will, or self-reflection, because prejudice is involved in all understanding.
“This recognition that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice gives the
hermeneutical problem its real thrust.”155 So for the orchestral musician to gain an
understanding of the norms of the Cape Breton musical community, it is not enough to
say that the musician needs to ‘lose” their prejudices, because one cannot lose prejudice.
Instead the prejudices of the orchestral musician would need to incorporate the
prejudices of the Cape Breton community. Returning briefly to discussion of vernacular
rhetoric, the rhetorical salience of the Cape Breton community would have to carry
similar salience with the orchestral musician. For this to happen, the orchestral musician
would need to approach encountering the Cape Breton musical community with an
openness where they might test their prejudices. This process of testing is where, for
Gadamer, our own prejudices are revealed to us as either blinding or enabling.156
To understand this testing, it is important to see the testing process in relation to
Gadamer’s dialogue. The orchestral musician would need to encounter traditional
practices of the Cape Breton community in such a way where the musician is open to
testing their own preconceptions of how the Cape Breton practices work—all while open
to changing some beliefs while solidifying others. In such a way, the musician’s
understanding of the community’s norms can somewhat align with the native Cape
Breton musician.
“[I]t is in and through the encounter with works of art, texts, and more generally
what is handed down to us through tradition that we discover which of our
prejudices are blind and which are enabling... [O]nly through the dialogical
155Ibid.,
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encounter with what is at once alien to us, makes a claim upon us, and has an
affinity with what we are that we can open ourselves to risking and testing our
prejudices.”157
This is a task that can never be completed. To assume that a perfect alignment of
understanding could be achieved would be to reify communal norms—an assumption
ignoring the process whereby a community’s norms constantly evolve. “A living
tradition not only informs and shapes what we are but is always in the process of
reconstitution. When tradition is no longer open in this manner, we can think of it as
“dead,” or as no longer a tradition.”158 But to say that the task of testing one’s own
prejudices in an effort to understand communal norms can never be completed is not to
say that an outsider cannot learn to enact phronesis within the community. Not all
classical musicians entering the Cape Breton musical community do so with an openness
where they test their own biases, and this speaks more to the hidden nature of prejudice
than any stubbornness on the part of the classical musician. An outsider’s ability to learn
community norms in order to enact phronesis within that community is a hermeneutic
process.
While this might begin to explain communal understanding, I still have yet to
address what the ‘good’ is, other than recognizing it is developed within the
community. As I have presented it, understanding what is good within a community
could border upon moral relativism. But hermeneutics offers a notion of good for
phronesis that sits between relativism and the universal. Gadamer’s development of the
dialogue defends against relativism. Bernstein elaborates:
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“I have argued Gadamer is really committed to a communicative understanding
of truth, believing that ‘claims to truth’ always implicitly demand argumentation
to warrant them, but he has failed to make this view fully explicit....For although
all claims to truth are fallible and open to criticism, they still require validation—
validation that can be realized only through offering the best reasons and
arguments that can be given in support of them—reasons and arguments that are
themselves embedded in the practices that have been developed in the course of
history. We never escape from the obligation of seeking to validate claims to
truth through argumentation and opening ourselves to the criticism of others.”159
Clearly not all communal norms would qualify as “the good” that anchors this
understanding of phronesis. To acknowledge so would be to potentially recognize a
tradition’s racist norm of hatred towards a particular minority to count as “the good”.
Bernstein and Gadamer assert that a tradition operating with such solitary and closed
thought would be incapable of phronesis in the first place. A living tradition as Gadamer
defines it is not homogenous in thought but essentially open.160 If it were not open and
uncertain, then tradition would be no different than a blueprint that guides technical
judgment.
Understanding ‘good’ as a communal norm requires recognizing where
arguments exist within the tradition, and also what wins these arguments. The openness
of tradition also recognizes that what might win an argument today might lose
tomorrow. Such a view of the good combats relativism by recognizing that
understanding informed by a living tradition is both limited and open. This is an
understanding of the ‘good’ that exists not as a binary, but on a spectrum. It
acknowledges that there are better arguments and worse arguments, not simply right
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arguments and wrong arguments. It is this spectrum of good that can be most easily
seen within musical performances.
“Of course, a Beethoven sonata consists of the notes written down by Beethoven,
but the sonata is also the realization of the written score. We not only recognize
that different musicians will perform a work differently but even that on each
occasion the performance of a given artist will itself be different. But in this
instance, acknowledging the variety of different interpretations does not invite
us to speak of relativism or to think that all performances are of equal merit. And
we certainly judge better and worse performances, making judgments that are
not to be assimilated to the expression of private likings (even though we do
acknowledge that there can be conflicting judgments.)”161
A Cape Breton musician’s rhetorical performances are judged within the Cape Breton
community. Each performance features a musician’s claim to communal values. As the
community judges some performances as “better” or “worse,” the limitations of how the
community judges aural rhetorical arguments are shaped. But because each
performance will bring something new, these limitations of communal value judgments
are always morphing. The limits of what counts as ‘good’ are never solidified. This
etherealness of what counts as good, does not push the values of the Cape Breton
community into relativism, because, while uncertain, these values are anchored to the
judgments already made—just in a way that allows for constant reevaluating what
counts as a good performance.
Hermeneutic theory’s ability to acknowledge that some performances of
everyday routines are better or worse than others is an important characteristic that

Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 125. I want to reinforce that it has never
been my assertion that Classical musicians are incapable of phronesis. In fact classical
solo virtuoso musicians embody the ideals of phronesis, and Classical music conductors
regularly exercise phronesis. But not all classical musicians are given the opportunity to
enact judgment. When playing in an orchestral setting, judgment is ceded to the
conductor. Some classical musicians operate solely within this role, without the
opportunity to develop their own faculty of judgment during communal performances.
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vernacular rhetoric and aural rhetoric should account for. It helps to guard against
romanticizing that all performers of given community are equally skilled. The
romanticism begins through ignoring the agency of individual members, instead
viewing the practice as if it were performed by a faceless population. But members
within a community internally recognize that certain performers of a given practice lack
ability—a deficiency that can be partially attributed to a lack of good judgment—and
that other members excel in ability, helping in part to shape the community’s norm.
4.4. Politics of the Everyday
Gadamer and Arendt’s concerns for ordinary practices have been neglected and
deserve attention, and it is precisely through the window of judgment that this neglect
can be seen. They can expand upon theories of vernacular and everyday practices that
recognize the importance of judgment but neglect to explain how practical judgment is
exercised. Arendt is generally recognized as tied to politics through her work on
judgment, revolution, and totalitarianism, and Gadamer is recognized for his work on
philosophical hermeneutics. Both recognize the political nature of judgment that occurs
within ordinary communal practices, and both are concerned for the relationship
between practical and technical judgment within communities.162 Their politics of the
everyday easily aligns with fleshing out an elusive vernacular rhetoric.

Bernstein’s quote from note 138 is apt again here to help begin unpacking why
Arendt and Gadamer are concerned with judgments made everyday, “But at a time
when the threat of total annihilation no longer seems to be an abstract possibility but the
most imminent and real potentiality, it becomes all the more imperative to try again to
foster and nurture those forms of communal life in which dialogue, conversation,
phronesis, practical discourse, and judgment are concretely embodied in our everyday
practices. This is the telos that is common to the visions of Gadamer, Habermas, Rorty,
and Arendt.” Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 229.
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It is understandable why both Arendt and Gadamer’s concern for judgment in
ordinary practices is overlooked. Neither explicitly discuss everydayness as such. And
while Gadamer discusses ‘community’ and ‘tradition’, Arendt rarely does. One could
attribute Arendt’s exclusion from the work of folklorists and other theorists concerned
with the ‘everyday’ to Arendt’s use of terms more readily seen used by political
theorists. But digging into what these overtly political terms mean for Arendt reveals
that Arendt’s concern for judgment and the political exists precisely within the ordinary.
One must begin with Arendt’s focus on the polis, a term that immediately might invoke
the legacy of a classical Greek understanding of the term. But Arendt’s polis is much
more than a place for land-owning Athenian citizens to debate:
The polis properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the
organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its
true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where
they happen to be.163
There is a very particular kind of activity that occurs within the polis for Arendt, namely
what she defines as ‘action’—the activity that goes on “... between men...” and
corresponds “... to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.”164
Action represents the condition of all political life, and this activity that recognizes others
is the root of Arendt’s contribution to a theory of ‘community’.
Arendt does not explicitly invoke the everyday or the ordinary, but she presents
a picture of a community founded on action. A community exists when people appear
together to act and speak. Action and speech here corresponding to the activity that
acknowledges others. And this form of action occurring in the presence of others and in
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acknowledgement of others is what Arendt conceives of as the political. Key to Arendt’s
view about this particular kind of activity, action, is that, while action is performed in
recognition of others, it is simultaneously performed to reveal oneself:
In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique
personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world, while
their physical identities appear without any activity of their own in the unique
shape of the body and sound of the voice. This disclosure of “who” in
contradistinction to “what” somebody is—his qualities, gifts, talents, and
shortcomings, which he may display or hide—is implicit in everything
somebody says and does.165
This quality of action might give pause to any notions of Arendt’s ‘action’ contributing
to a theory of ‘ordinary’, as it seems to represent a complete shift from the mundane
towards the marked. The polis becomes any place where individuals appear in the
presence of others, and act in recognition of others—these acts have the twofold
characteristic of recognizing others while disclosing oneself. Appearing in the presence
of others and acting in recognition of others is part of some communities’ everyday
practices.
Arendt’s recognition that the actor within the polis sought immortality
emphasizes the polis as a space for performance.166 But the twist in Arendt’s theory of
action, and more precisely of the immortality sought through action, is that this constant
quest to perform extraordinary acts in the polis is also the realm of the ordinary.
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Arendt makes an important distinction between immortality and eternity worth
clarifying. Eternity is concerned with a theological or philosophical eternal which,
whether it be concerned with the divine or the contemplative, exists outside of the world
of others. A concern for immortality, though, is a concern precisely for the world of
others. An actor concerned with immortality acts in a way hoping that the acts are great
enough to endure in time through the memory of others. See Ibid., 17.
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“The polis was supposed to multiply the occasions to win “immortal fame”, that
is, to multiple the chances for everybody to distinguish himself, to show in deed
and word who he was in his unique distinctness. One, if not the chief, reason for
the incredible development of gift and genius in Athens, as well as for the hardly
less surprising decline of the city-state, was precisely that from beginning to end
its foremost aim was to make the extraordinary an ordinary occurrence of
everyday life."167
This is a key insight into Arendt’s polis; as the realm of speech and action, the polis is a
place where the extraordinary is an ordinary occurrence. Special events are not
necessarily cleaved from the everyday, but in communities that allow for a space of
appearances where individuals act amongst one another, the extraordinary can be part
of the ordinary. This corresponds with theorists of the everyday who note the context in
defining whether a particular experience is part of the everyday or part of special events,
and how categorizing a performance should sit on a spectrum between the two. Recall
my discussion of fifty musical performances occurring on Cape Breton on one particular
summer evening, but remember that this number represents a routine for the Island.
Each of these performances offer the possibility for action, and offer the potential for a
given musician to achieve such a great performance that they win fame within the
community.168
Arendt’s possible contribution to a theory of ordinary community comes to light
with her development of action and the polis. Her vision acknowledges the political
within an everyday community, seeing the community as a place where individuals
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Mention to Cape Bretoners the names Winston, Buddy, Natalie, Ashley, Dan Hughie,
Dan R., John Morris, Howie, Jerry, Kinnon, Donald Angus, and so on, and they will
immediately recognize that musician’s role in shaping the Cape Breton music
community. Even though some of these musicians are long since deceased, their
performances are still remembered and talked about.
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come together in a space of appearance and disclose their identity through speech and
action. But my project focuses on a particular kind of community, and a particular kind
of action, namely a musical community and musical action—an aural rhetoric. While
Arendt has not developed a theory of music and community, she has acknowledged the
role of performing arts as action:
“The performing arts... have indeed a strong affinity with politics. Performing
artists—dancers, play-actors, musicians, and the like—need an audience to show
their virtuosity, just as acting men need the presence of others before whom they
can appear; both need a publicly organized space for their “work,” and both
depend upon others for the performance itself. Such a space of appearances is
not to be taken for granted wherever men live together in a community.”169
This is not the only opening Arendt gives indicating the potential of music as action.
Again, Arendt’s action corresponds to activity that acknowledges that “men, not Man
live on the Earth and inhabit the world.”170 While not every instance of musical
performance might acknowledge the other, it can hardly be refuted that some music is
performed in acknowledgment of others. More so, through the musical performance
itself a musician can express thoughts and values, and thus disclose identity. Rather
than arguing that all music equates to Arendt’s concept of action, I am pointing out that
Arendt’s conception of action might allow for a greater insight into music, and more
specifically ordinary musical communities, and that Arendt’s potential contributions
here have been overlooked.
The Cape Breton music community might be seen to have traditional venues
used regularly: the various square dance halls throughout the island; the Red Shoe
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Pub,171 with its regular performances both planned and spontaneous; and the regular
concert halls throughout the island. But rather than focus on the form of these venues, it
is better to see this musical community itself as Arendt’s polis. Whenever they come
together in a space of appearances, there is the potential for action. The spontaneous
sessions and dances that occur at the Red Shoe Pub illustrate this well.172 The Red Shoe
Pub represents a regular space of appearances for the people within the Cape Breton
musical community. Here individuals from the community come together to socialize
with another, and musical performances are scheduled. Despite this planned schedule, it
is also frequent for musicians to sit down with one another during unscheduled times,
simply to perform with one another in front of the crowd.173 The polis is not limited to
such a regular space though. Individuals routinely throw house parties that, for all
intensive purposes, are open to the entire music community, and where musicians
perform for all hours. Arendt’s polis allows seeing this community as existing not in any
one such place, but in any space where the people of the Cape Breton music community
come together for the purpose of performing and speaking together.

While the Cape Breton musical community spans the entire island of Cape Breton and
extends onto Antigonish on the mainland of Nova Scotia, the area between Judique,
Cape Breton, and Cheticamp, Cape Breton is probably the most active concentration of
this musical community. The Red Shoe Pub in Mabou sits near the center of this span
and is a popular space for individuals within this community to gather.
171

I will later expand on my methodology and experience with this community on a
whole, but to clarify, I lived across the street from the Red Shoe Pub, in Mabou, Cape
Breton, during the first two summers it was open. I was in the Pub nearly everyday
during these summers, and lived with the Pub’s staff.
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perform at noon with the music continuing nonstop well past closing time at midnight.
At least twenty musicians performed during this session.
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Arendt’s insights into the polis and more specifically action also expand on how
to perceive the music of Cape Breton’s musical community, and allows this music to be
seen as political. These musicians perform in a space of appearances that the polis
provides in recognition of others within the community. But while performing in
recognition of others within their audience, these musicians also perform to distinguish
themselves. As I will detail later, Cape Breton fiddlers usually perform solo and are
generally accompanied by a piano player. Cape Breton music allows for the musicians to
apply their own style and nuance to each performance. Community members are
familiar with each musician’s style, and judge them accordingly. Some musicians might
consistently pack a dance hall beyond its capacity, while other musicians draw the bare
minimum.174 This community allows these musicians to distinguish themselves with
each performance, so that, not only are they recognizing the community, they are
revealing themselves with each performance. Each performance has the potential to rise
to a level of greatness, and be judged as such. Some fiddlers develop cults of personality,
whose performances have arguably achieved immortality to this community, while
other musicians are just as soon forgotten.175 But the very nature of this community

Cape Breton Fiddler Howie MacDonald, in addition to being a fiddler, also regularly
produces and acts in an oft-quoted live sketch comedy show that satirizes the Cape
Breton community. In one infamous sketch, two older gentlemen, representative of the
music community’s seniors, debate the virtues of two fiddlers. As with most satire, this
scene contains a kernel of truth, as I have witnessed many such debates between
community members. One man says to the other, “I agree with you but you’re wrong... I
wouldn’t walk across the street to hear him play.” The kernel of truth here lies in the
level of criticism that these musicians subject themselves to, and the constant debate
within the community concerning musicians’ styles and abilities.
174

For example, the performances of fiddler Winston Fitzgerald who passed away in
1987, are still regularly discussed by the Cape Breton community. Other musicians are
likewise revered.
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allows for such extraordinary performances to be an ordinary occurrence. This warrants
how notions of the good, and likewise, Arendt’s concept of immortality, can be
incorporated into discussions of vernacular rhetoric.
Understanding that the political exists for Arendt as activity acknowledging
others sets the stage for Arendt’s concern for judgment, and specifically for concern that
technical judgment could dominate practical judgment. Because Arendt saw the political
as capable of being part of the ordinary, Arendt’s concern for practical judgment being
dominated by technical judgment also extended to ordinary practices. Arendt alludes to
such domination of practical judgment by technical judgment throughout Eichmann in
Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil.176 The work focuses on the trial of Adolf
Eichmann, architect of the Nazi’s ‘Final Solution.’ Her criticism of Eichmann’s brutality
stemmed not from a monstrous evil, but from Eichmann’s incapability of thought and
practical judgment. This incapability stemmed from Eichmann’s ability to think being
subsumed by bureaucratic procedure and the thoughtless repetition of clichés.
Arendt saw this lack of thought and practical judgment as the result of
bureaucracy’s ability to replace individual judgment with technical procedure within the
ordinary. Simply put, ordinary bureaucracy has the potential to destroy one’s ability to
think for oneself, and while this thoughtlessness originates in the bureaucratic
environment, it transfers to other areas of life. Arendt focuses on Eichmann’s use of
technocratic speak, quoting his admission that, “Officialese is my only language.”177
With this admission, Eichmann recognizes an inability to communicate outside of the
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use of bureaucratic clichés. These clichés show a domination of the practical by the
technical. “All these clichés have in common that they make judgment superfluous and
that to utter them is devoid of all risk.”178 It is not bureaucracy itself that Arendt targets,
nor technical judgment. Rather, it is domination of practical judgment by technical
judgment. The officialese of Eichmann’s speech has only become Eichmann’s only
language because the technical everyday bureaucracy he worked within destroyed the
possibility of practical judgment and thought. Instead, bureaucracy mandates the
following of rules, itself demanding technical judgment.179
To protect a domination of practical judgment by technical judgment, Arendt
calls for a space of appearances where judgment can be exercised. This space was the
virtue of Arendt’s conception of a polis as an everyday community. The polis of the
everyday is a space to publicly exercise judgment about concerns that acknowledge
others. Arendt distinguishes between this ideal polis wherein individuals appear before
each other to exercise judgment and engage in action, and the social or society, a space
that was “neither private nor public”.180 The social is a place where we appear before
others, but we do not engage in activity that acknowledges others, and we lose the
ability to distinguish ourselves before others:
“It is decisive that society, on all its levels, excludes the possibility of action,
which formerly was excluded from the household. Instead, society expects from
each of its members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and
178

Ibid., 297.
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the “officialese.” This bolsters David Kennedy’s argument that the vernacular of experts
needs to be the subject of critical study that I discuss in footnote 90. Arendt’s concern for
dominance of the practical by the technical offers a telos for such a critical project. See
Kennedy, “The Mystery of Global Governance.”
179

180

Arendt, The Human Condition, 28.
91

various rules, all of which tend to "normalize" its members, to make them
behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement... with the
emergence of mass society, the realm of the social has finally, after several
centuries of development, reached the point where it embraces and controls all
members of a given community equally and with equal strength. But society
equalizes under all circumstances, and the victory of equality in the modern
world is only the political and legal recognition of the fact that society has
conquered the public realm, and that distinction and difference have become
private matters of the individual."181
Without the public activities of action and the exercise of judgment, the social exists as a
place where technical judgment dominates practical judgment. Arendt saw the social as
a pseudo-public place that could devour the political. Foreshadowing her later
commentary on Eichmann, Arendt labeled this domination as its own form of evil: “As
we know from the most social form of government, that is, from bureaucracy, the rule
by nobody is not necessarily no-rule; it may indeed, under certain circumstances, even
turn out to be one of its crudest and most tyrannical versions.”182
As much as Arendt’s conception of the polis can contribute to theories of the
ordinary and community, so too can Arendt’s development of the social. Both require a
focus on questioning how judgment is exercised within public appearances. While the
polis recognizes a space for a plurality of individual agents, and their subsequent
exercise of judgment, the social presents the alternative. In the social, action is replaced
by behavior, and practical judgment is replaced by rule-following. It is not itself
practical to assume that any community can entirely fit Arendt’s ideal polis, or even her
society devoid of judgment. It is more realistic to say that communities exist on a
spectrum, where certain ordinary community practices allow for the exercise of
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judgment while others call for the application of rules. But these distinctions offer
insight into identifying where the political exists within everyday communities and
where technical judgment has the potential to encroach upon practical judgment.
To reiterate once again, I do not wish to present the Cape Breton community as a
phronetic utopia, nor am I equating classical musicians with technocratic automatons. But
I am saying that the practices in the Cape Breton music community that draw upon
practical judgment does not correspond to the same activity within the classical music
community. As such when Classical musicians enter into traditional music communities,
they do not necessarily recognize the place of practical judgment. This is not to suggest
that traditional music communities are in eminent danger of collapse due to an
impending domination by the likes of classical music infiltrators. Simply that these
musicians are distinguished by modes of judgment, and that as more classical musicians
seek to perform traditional music, there should be a recognition of this practical
judgment. One might respond, “So what, Greg? We are only talking about music. Not
the eminent collapse of civilization.” But Arendt shows us that the ordinary practices
where practical judgment is enacted in the everyday are important. These practices help
develop a faculty of judgment that can extend elsewhere. The practical judgment
enacted in Cape Breton music is important precisely because it is mundane and occurs
everyday.
Gadamer is more likely to be cited within studies of the everyday than Arendt
because of his contributions to hermeneutics. While his work on both tradition and
conversations have been explored at length, underdeveloped has been how Gadamer
saw an individual’s relationship with tradition itself as a conversation. When seen as a
conversation, this relationship between the individual and the individual’s tradition
93

reveals Gadamer’s concern for the domination of practical judgment by technical
judgment within one’s everyday community. Gadamer sees tradition as a relationship
between individuals—a set of relationships that shapes an individual’s prejudices.183
These relationships that make up tradition are where the distinction between practical
and technical come into play for Gadamer: tradition shapes an individual’s
understanding, but this itself does not close off the possibility of other understandings.
When an individual sees a tradition as a set of rules guiding behavior, that individual’s
understanding has been closed. Seeing tradition as a set of rules is, for Gadamer, a result
of technical judgment dominating practical judgment.
Conversation sits at the fore of Gadamer’s development of understanding.
Individuals come to an understanding through conversation, which itself both
presupposes a common language and creates a common language.184 To conduct a
conversation is not more than in the act of talking with another person, because talking
with another person can easily become the mutual “talking at” other people. A
conversation requires a particular orientation towards the other:
“To conduct a conversation means to allow oneself to be conducted by the
subject matter to which the partners in the dialogue are oriented. It requires that
one does not try to argue the other person down but that one really considers the
weight of the other’s opinions. Hence it is an art of testing. But the art of testing
is the art of questioning. As against the fixity of opinions, questioning makes the
object and all its possibilities fluid. A person skilled in the “art” of questioning is

See my above discussion on Gadamer’s use of prejudice, beginning with the quote
associated with footnote 145.
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“Conversation is a process of coming to an understanding. Thus it belongs to every
true conversation that each person opens himself to the other, truly accepts his point of
view as valid and transposes himself into the other to such an extant that he
understands not the particular individual but what he says.” Gadamer, Truth and
Method, 387.
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a person who can prevent questions from being suppressed by the dominant
opinion.”185
There is an openness on the part of a conversation’s participants. But each participant
also begins from a particular perspective. So while each is open to testing the position of
the other, they can only test each other’s position with the perspectives available from
their own starting position. In other words, while conducting a conversation allows the
testing of the other’s position, there is no guarantee that the other’s position is
completely understood. But in questioning and testing the other’s point of view, an
individual’s own perspectives can themselves change as the individual reevaluates their
own position. It is this reevaluation of one’s position that is central to Gadamer’s
understanding of tradition.
Understanding a relationship with tradition can be a participation in a
conversation rather than the following of rules provides insight into how tradition
relates to the exercise of practical judgment. When Cape Breton musicians perform, they
draw from a repertoire of tunes that might have been played hundreds of times by most
of the musicians to have participated within the tradition. Take the fiddle tune King
George IV for example.186 This is a strathspey187 that is part of nearly every Cape Breton
musician’s repertoire, and rarely does a dance go by without the tune being heard. This
history sets a heavy precedent for expectations of how the tune is to sound and forms a
prejudice for the members of the Cape Breton community. But this history does not form
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Here performed as the first tune in a set by Buddy MacMaster and his niece, Natalie
MacMaster. “Natalie MacMaster - King George Medley” YouTube, last visited May 24,
2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jbY-LpV3K-k.
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a set of rules. While this tune is performed thousands of times a year, each performance
is different.188 Yes, there is a similarity between each performance—a set of parameters
that guide the musician. But even with the parameters of prejudice, the musicians
approach each performance with an openness to precisely how these parameters sit.
Audience members who are part of the tradition also approach each performance with
an openness that tests their prejudices. Listening to the general style of Cape Breton
music over the past fifty years shows an undoubted shift in prejudices, even amongst
musicians active during that entire span.189 Seen from Gadamer’s perspective, this shift
comes about through the openness in testing and questioning prejudices.190 This offers a
mechanism for how practices and communities evolve. I am not suggesting that all
traditions and every participation with a community is capable of openness and testing.
Rather, that it is a characteristic possible within communities. And when present, this
openness is one characteristic that facilitates the evolution of tradition.
To be clear, Gadamer is not arguing for tossing tradition aside as if it were a
burden. Simply that an ideal relationship with tradition exists as a conversation, “For
tradition is a genuine partner in dialogue, and we belong to it, as does the I with a

Even the above example of Natalie MacMaster and Buddy MacMaster performing
King George IV illustrates this, when in the B-part of the tune, an attuned ear will note
that Natalie uses a scale with an F sharp while Buddy uses a note between an F natural
and an F sharp. I’ll discuss the significance of this more in later sections.
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Cape Breton music has evolved since the first fiddlers stepped onto the island, not
just the past fifty years.
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Don’t jump quickly against this by saying, “Clearly not everyone participating in the
tradition is open. What about the crotchety old man ambivalent to any change?” Be
careful that you are not confusing ‘openness’ with ‘picky.’ Openness towards new
possibilities does not mean that the listener will accept all interpretations. Further, be
careful that you do not confuse everyone as ‘participating’ in the tradition.
190

96

Thou.”191 And like a conversation with an individual allows for the testing of one’s own
beliefs, so to does the dialogue with tradition. What Gadamer sees as a practical
relationship with tradition requires first, admission that the prejudices of tradition
influence us—that we understand from a certain perspective, and that sometimes the
biases within that standpoint are hidden to us. And it is through a conversation with
tradition, that the individual can evaluate the value of the prejudice. Gadamer’s
relationship with tradition is one where the individual constantly tests the perspectives
of one’s own tradition:
“a person who does not admit that he is dominated by prejudices will fail to see
what manifests itself by their light. It is like the relation between I and Thou. A
person who reflects himself out of the mutuality of such a relation changes this
relationship and destroys its moral bond. A person who reflects himself out of a
living relationship to tradition destroys the true meaning of this tradition in exactly the
same way.... to be situated within a tradition does not limit the freedom of
knowledge, but makes it possible.”192
The domination of technical judgment sits on both ends of one’s relationship with
tradition. If one were to accept every tenant of tradition as if it were fiat, then they
would be dominated by technical judgment. But so too would the individual who, upon
coming to understand the prejudice of tradition’s sway over themselves, disavow such a
prejudice simply for the sake that it is prejudice. Gadamer sees tradition as sitting in
between these two poles, and it is through the conversation that one evaluates the
strength of the beliefs that originate via tradition.
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Given Martin Heidegger’s influence upon both Gadamer and Arendt, it is
important to briefly discuss Heidegger’s own notion of everydayness.193 Heidegger
introduces the term Dasein to refer to human existence—the very Being of human—and
his analysis of Dasein begins with its everydayness.194 Central to Heidegger’s Dasein is
understanding itself. “Understanding of being is itself a determination of being of Da-sein.”195
But the understanding of being that belongs to Dasein necessarily implies an
understanding of more than just one’s own being. To understand being requires the
understanding of a world that being exists within: “Thus the understanding of being
that belongs to Da-sein just as originally implies the understanding of something like
“world” and the understanding of the being of beings accessible within the world.”196
The everydayness of an individual creates the lens that allows the individual to

Heidegger undertakes the project of developing Dasein within Being and Time. To
avoid the distraction that a full discussion of Heidegger and Heidegger’s work would
carry, I will focus here only on his work that impacts everydayness, and not being in
general, as well as restricting this discussion to everydayness as developed within Being
and Time. Heidegger’s Being and Time was published in 1927 and represents his early,
Aristotelian influenced thought. His work would evolve towards a more Platoniccentered thought.
193

I restrict myself to the early thought represented by Being and Time because it was
during this period that both Gadamer and Arendt attended Heidegger’s seminars at the
University of Marburg. Daniel Gross and Ansgar Kemmann’s Heidegger and Rhetoric
cover this earlier work by Heidegger where they discuss the chronology of Heidegger’s
thought. Included within this work is an interview with Gadamer concerning this early
relationship. Daniel M. Gross & Ansgar Kemmann, eds., Heidegger and Rhetoric (SUNY
Press: New York, 2006).
“By looking at the fundamental constitution of the everydayness of Da-sein we shall
bring out in a preparatory way the being of this being.” Martin Heidegger, Being and
Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh, (SUNY Press: New York, 1996) 15.
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Ibid., 10 (Emphasis in original).
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understand. We only understand things in relation to what we already understand.197
This everyday process of understanding that allows us to interpret something as
something is conceived of by Heidegger as a fore-structure of understanding, which
includes fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception.198
It is through this fore-structure that anything with meaning for an individual
gained meaning for that individual. In the fore-having, I have an understanding of
possibilities of meaning. These possibilities are limited by the language I use within my
everyday. The fore-having does not refer to an interpretative moment, but a cache of
possible understandings that I have. But these possibilities are largely determined by the
language used within my community, hearkening to a notion of understanding and
likewise a notion of being that necessitates the influence of others. My fore-sight works
from my fore-having, but includes the interpretations I already have, such as my
preferences or my points-of-view, or likewise, my understanding of the points-of-view
of others. I can only have preferences or points of view for things that I have already
understood. So while my fore-having shaped the various possibilities for how I am
capable of understanding, my fore-sight shapes how previous understandings and
interpretations contribute to how I understand present and future experiences. Foreconception builds upon fore-having and fore-sight. So while fore-having is the totality of
possibilities that I understand as figured by my language, and fore-sight is a point of

“As the appropriation of understanding in being that understands, the interpretation
operates in being toward a totality of relevance which has already been understood.”
Ibid., 140.
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“The interpretation of something as something is essentially grounded in fore-having,
fore-sight, and fore-conception.” Ibid., 141.
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view, my fore-conception is the application of that point of view towards the particular
moment and experience at hand.199
I can illustrate how this fore-structure works by breaking down the statement,
“The hammer is too heavy” used often by Heidegger throughout Being and Time.200
Within this statement, the possibility of heaviness as a quality represents my forehaving; the point of view that something, anything, could be too heavy represents my
fore-sight, and the application of that fore-sight of something as too heavy, applied to
this particular hammer, seeing this hammer as a thing that is too heavy represents the
fore-conception. While the hammer represents a mundane application of the forestructure of understanding, applying the fore-structure elsewhere might provide insight
into how our culture affects understanding. Take the statement: “The music is too fast.”
This illustrates a fore-having of the concept fast as well as the concept of music. The
point of view that music could be too fast, and the point of view that organized noise
exists as music represent a fore-sight. Finally the application of these points of view to
the situation at hand—that this noise is music, and furthermore that this music is too
fast—represents a fore-conception.201
While Dasein understands new experiences based on this fore-structure, these
experiences also influence this fore-structure, in a hermeneutic circle.202 New experiences

There are some similarities here between Heidegger’s fore-structure and De Certeau’s
notion of ‘enunciation’ that I reference on page 61. Both demonstrate an intersubjective
mode of understanding that presupposes a linguistic system.
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Ibid., 144-150. Heidegger also discusses the hammer to refer to the handiness of things.
Ibid. 64-67.
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What one community perceives as music could easily be interpreted by another
community as ‘noise’ devoid of the aesthetic and organizational properties of music.
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Stambaugh translates Heidegger as using the term “circle of understanding.” Here
Heidegger states that “this circle of understanding is not a circle in which any random
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change our concepts for what is possible, altering our fore-having, for our potential
points of view, altering our fore-sight, and for our applied conceptions, altering our
fore-conception. In doing so, new experiences alter the way in which we understand
itself, and can alter our understanding of past-experiences. So that while we might
experience a similar situation again, we might understand it very differently. Given this,
the fore-structure of understanding is not static, but fluid and always changing.
Heidegger’s ontological project can be seen at the root of both Gadamer and
Arendt’s normative projects. The fore-structure of understanding offers nothing overtly
political, but Gadamer and Arendt, in basing their politics on the need to guard against
the domination of practical judgment by technical judgment, rely on a Heideggerian
understanding of how judgment works. Gadamer’s development of ‘prejudice’, for
example, can be seen within Heidegger’s fore-structure.203 Gadamer prescribes guarding
against a domination from technical judgment by constantly seeking out one’s own
prejudices that guide one’s judgment, and evaluating whether these prejudices were
valid. Gadamer’s notion of prejudice can be seen within each component of Heidegger’s
fore-structure, as they can limit the possibilities of fore-sight, and shape the points of
view that guide fore-having and fore-conception. Likewise Arendt’s concern for
argument and reliance upon uncertainty lies within the fluidity of a hermeneutic circle.
The lack of argument and the rigidity of given norms that would come from a technical

kind of knowledge operates, but it is rather the expression of the existential forestructure of Dasein itself.” Heidegger, Being and Time, 143.
This link is recognized by many. See, Dmitri N. Shalin, “Hermeneutics and Prejudice:
Heidegger and Gadamer in Their Historical Setting,” Russian Journal of Communication 3
(2010): 7-24; and, Jeff Mitscherling, “Philosophical Hermeneutics and ‘the tradition,’”
Man and World 22 (1989): 247-250.
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domination of practical thought, would work against a hermeneutic circle that seeks to
reassess pre-conceptions. Arendt’s work embraces the communicative possibilities that
Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle can open.204
In discussing ‘the ordinary’, both Arendt and Gadamer discuss an aspect of the
ordinary that deserves its own attention: common sense.205 Common sense is a type of
reasoning formed through the individual’s relationship with their community, existing
somewhere between the poles of universal reason and individual reason. Because

It is difficult to find scholarship that explores a theoretical link between Heidegger
and Arendt that doesn’t also become overly distracted by their romantic relationship.
Yet, the link between Heidegger’s hermeneutics and Arendt’s concern for argument is
explored by a few authors. See, Dana Villa, “Arendt, Heidegger, and the Tradition”,
Social Research 74 (2007), 983-1002; see also the chapter in Seyla Benhabib’s The Reluctant
Modernism of Hannah Arendt entitled “The Dialogue With Martin Heidegger: Arendt’s
Ontology of The Human Condition”. Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah
Arendt, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003).
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There are again many paths that could be taken to talk about common sense. I could
focus on the theorists who discuss sensus communis, as articulated by Giambattista Vico,
but while notable in its own right, this would be a digression from my project. Gadamer
himself draws from Vico in articulating his own notions of common sense, as does
fellow Heideggerian student Ernesto Grassi. Given Grassi’s own propensity for
rhetorical theory, it might seem natural that I would explore his work here, but I chose
to stay away from Grassi for a very simply reason. Grassi differs from Gadamer and
Arendt drastically in where they place sensus communis, and this difference does not
correspond with the purposes of my project. Gadamer and Arendt place this common
sense within the community and the relationships and communication occurring within
the community. But Grassi places sensus communis within the work—not the community.
For Grassi, it is in “the ‘ingenious’ structure of work, and not within the sphere of
rational thought, that common sense originally functions.” This places Grassi counter to
Arendt and Gadamer for the purposes of my project. Grassi sees work as the thing from
which common sense springs forth, where I focus on the action within the community as
the place where common sense is developed. Ernesto Grassi, “The Priority of Common
Sense and Imagination: Vico’s Philosophical Relevance Roday,” in Vico and Contemporary
Thought, eds. G. Tagliacozzo, M. Mooney, and D. P. Verene (Atlantic Highlands:
Humanities Press, 1979), 175. See also John D. Schaeffer’s discussion of the distinctions
between Gadamer and Grassi in their interpretations of Vico. John D. Schaeffer, “Vico’s
Rhetorical Model of the Mind: Sensus Communis in the De Nostri temporis studiorum
ratione”, Philosophy and Rhetoric 14 (1981): 152-167.
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individuals live with one another day-to-day, they develop an understanding of the
common practices, opinions, and arguments that exist within their community, and
these practices, opinions, and arguments contribute to the individual’s own
understanding of a subject. Even if the individual might disagree with a communal
norm, that individual is still aware and influenced by the common sense of their
community.206 The community, through it’s daily interaction, develops a shared taste,
and this very consensus helps to identify itself as a community.
[...] the unity of an ideal of taste that distinguishes a society and bonds its
members together differs from that which constitutes the figures of aesthetic
culture. Taste still obeys a criterion of content. What is considered valid in a
society, its ruling taste, receives its stamp from the commonalities of social life.
Such a society chooses and knows what belongs to it and what does not. Even its
artistic interests are not arbitrary or in principle universal, but what artists create
and what the society values belong together in the unity of a style of life and an
ideal of taste.”207
Here Gadamer discusses common sense relating directly to how a community values its
artwork. This makes sense as artists of a community who create or perform for that
community attempt appeal to the community’s aesthetic sensibilities.208 For this reason,
Arendt places taste and common sense at the center of the public sphere. “Taste, insofar
as it, like any other judgment, appeals to the common sense, is the very opposite of

Looking at Heidegger’s fore-structure of understanding, this common sense impacts
an individual’s fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception, as it shapes an individual’s
various points of view, as well as develops an individual’s understanding of
possibilities.
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Even artists who attempt to disrupt the aesthetic sensibilities of a community do so
with an understanding of those sensibilities. The act of breaking or challenging a
community’s taste is a de facto acknowledgment of that taste.
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‘private feelings.’”209 This relationship between art and taste reinforces the political
capacity of artists within a community: artists act publicly to appeal to communal
judgment.
When the artist acts to appeal to the public, that artist is attempting to say “value
this.” If the performance is accepted by the community, it contributes to the
community’s common sense of taste. But it is not only the artist who gains validity in
having a performance accepted by the community. The community members who judge
in agreement also gain validity in belonging to the community by sharing this judgment.
“wherever people judge the things of the world that are common to them, there
is more implied in their judgments than these things. By his manner of judging,
the person discloses to an extent also himself, what kind of person he is, and this
disclosure, which is involuntary, gains in validity to the degree that it has
liberated itself from merely individual idiosyncrasies. Now, it is precisely the
realm of acting and speaking, that is, the political domain in terms of activities, in
which this personal quality comes to the fore in public, in which the "who one is"
becomes manifest rather than the qualities and individual talents he may
possess.”210
Arendt makes a critical link between action and judgment here. Rather than seeing
judgment and action as distinct activities, Arendt sees judgment as a form of action
capable of disclosing identity—specifically those judgments regarding “the things of the
world that are common”. This paints the picture of a community sense formed through
the disclosure of the judgments in response to acts, and recognizes the disclosure of
judgment to be action unto itself. The disclosure of these judgments share the identity of
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the individual, but taken collectively, these disclosures begin to form the identity of the
community.211
The effects of this disclosure of judgment obscures boundaries between the
artistic and the political. Here it is important not to linger on the relationship between
art and the disclosure of truth.212 To help embrace this shift, it might be better to drop
the clichéd ‘work’ from a ‘work of art’, and instead approach performance art as an ‘act
of art.’ Seen as an act, Arendt offers a view where art’s importance stems from its role as
action within the public sphere—action that itself prompts debate and dialogue. Rather
than being distracted by art’s potential to unconceal truth, Arendt places the onus on
art’s ability to generate opinion. By both acting as medium of debate and an act debated
about, art is part of the political.
“Culture and politics, then, belong together because it is not knowledge or truth
which is at stake, but rather judgment and decision, the judicious exchange of
opinion about the sphere of public life and the common world, and the decision

Bernstein elaborates: “...taste is a kind of sensus communis: it is a “community sense,”
the sense that fits us into human community. What Arendt is struggling to discriminate
and isolate for us is a mode of thinking that is neither to be identified with the
expression of private feelings nor to be confused with the type of universality
characteristic of "cognitive reason." It is a mode of thinking that is capable of dealing
with the particular in its particularity but which nevertheless makes the claim to
communal validity. When one judges, one judges as a member of a human community.”
Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 217.
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For an example focusing on the truth quality of art, see Heidegger’s later essay
discussing Van Gough’s painting of a peasant’s shoes, The Origin of the Work of Art which
centers on the ability of a work of art to unconceal the truth about being in general.
Truth, here for Heidegger, “does not mean that something present is correctly
portrayed; it means, rather, that in the manifestation of the equipmental being of the
shoe-equipment, that whish is as a whole—world and earth in their counterplay—
achieves unconcealment.” Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Off the
Beaten Track, eds. Julian Young & Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002), 32.
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what manner of action is to be taken in it, as well as how it is to look henceforth,
what kind of things are to appear in it.”213
This is not to deny the undoubted relationship between art and truth, but to
acknowledge that art is much more than a work that reveals truth. Art is also a medium
of communication, and this communicative quality allows art to create a community
through collective judgment. And by collective judgment I do not mean that you and I
might come together to vote upon how we judge an act of art, but that you and I each
judge an act of art independently. When you and I and others disclose a similar
judgment of an artwork, we share a common sense of taste that begins to form an
identity. Living within a shared place where we disclose these judgments, we develop a
sense for what judgments are accepted within this community, and that, in some ways,
shapes how we make future judgments.
The political capacity of an aesthetic performance underscores the artist’s own
ability to exhibit agency in shaping communities. While artists can be constrained by
appealing to a common taste, at the same time they have a role in forming this taste. This
agency helps to explain how artists evolve the aesthetic standards of community
through innovation. Nineteenth century violinist Niccolò Paganini illustrates this.
Paganini transformed Romantic Europe’s understanding of human ability through his
music’s virtuosity, thereby changing the community’s ideals for human action.214 He
performed with skills that people did not realize physically possible on the violin.215 His
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See David Palmer, “Virtuosity as Rhetoric: Agency and Transformation in Paganini’s
Mastery of the Violin,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 84 (1998), 341-357.
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Paganini’s 24th Caprice demonstrates the exceptional level of skill required to play his
compositions which feature a combination of both complex bow-work and position
work. Paganini composed variations to his own compositions as well as the
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new and advanced violin techniques changed the public’s idea of musical possibility.
Arendt, who saw artistic performance as action, saw that artists could disclose their
identity to the community through performance. This disclosure of identity highlighted
the political role that artists as agents capable of action held for Arendt.
Individuals within the Cape Breton music community live with one another and
share everyday practices. This is not simply a location where individuals share only the
practices involving their music, but they also dine together, drink together, shop
together, and attend church together. In these associations, these community members
disclose their judgments to one another, both verbal and aural. They likewise develop an
understanding of the opinions of others within their community. These collective
disclosures help shape the community’s identity, as well as shape the notion of what is
acceptable for musician’s of the community. Seeing these disclosures as part of a
dialogue between individuals and their communities shows how practices are
maintained yet evolve. Drawing from Arendt and Gadamer helps me to focus on how
the collective judgments exercised within the Cape Breton music community contribute
to developing a common sense within the community. In this, they add to contributions
from theorists of the vernacular and of the everyday. Arendt and Gadamer also allow
me to focus on the performative nature of this art, seeing musical performance as
‘action’ rather than work. Their theories of understanding, communication, and

compositions of others, complicating the original pieces in order to demonstrate his
talent. As a showman, Paganini would also ensure his violin’s strings were weakened,
ensuring they would break during performance. Upon breaking, Paganini would hardly
miss a beat, compensating the loss of a string though using another string in a higher
position. Jascha Heifetz’s notable performance of Paganini’s 24th Caprice shows the
complexity of Paganini’s variations. “Jascha Heifetz plays Paganini Caprice No. 24”,
YouTube, last visited June 6, 2015, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vPcnGrie__M.
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judgment within the everyday help to demonstrate how individual musicians are able to
maintain a unique identity and exercise agency, even while operating within the
parameters of a community sense. Further, Gadamer and Arendt allow me to explain
how traditions evolve through the contributions of each new individual who performs
within the community, as well as through the constant judgments that take place within
the community—judgments of both the audience and the performer. In this, they do not
detract from theories of vernacular and the everyday that an aural rhetoric could be built
upon, but instead help to flesh these theories out. This leaves me with a framework built
upon theories of vernacular rhetoric and the everyday that are informed by rhetoricians,
folklorists, and other social theorists such as Bourdieu and De Certeau. I supplement
notions of community built by these theorists with theories of judgment and action as
conceived of by hermeneutists such as Gadamer and Arendt. These theories of judgment
help supply the mechanisms by which the everyday operates. With this framework, I
intend to develop a picture of what Cape Breton’s aural rhetoric looks like. While I have
already woven discussion of Cape Breton throughout this review of literature, I turn
now to a review of scholarship devoted specifically to Cape Breton culture and music,
before fully outlining my methodology.
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CHAPTER 5
THE STATE OF CAPE BRETON MUSIC STUDIES
Cape Breton music traces its roots to Highland Scots who settled the island in the
late 1700s and early 1800s. The music these Scots brought with them evolved in its own
trajectory to become a distinct musical style.216 Through the end of the nineteenth and
into the twentieth centuries, Cape Breton’s economic focus on steel production and coal
mining attracted a diverse array of immigrants. As a result, Acadian, New England,
Micmac, and Irish musical traditions all influenced the Cape Breton music community.
Even though the Island drew many immigrants, it remained both physically and
culturally isolated from mainland Nova Scotia until the mid-twentieth century.217 As the
transportation became easier, many Cape Bretoners moved to Boston, Toronto and
Detroit in search of work.218 These expats returned to Cape Breton during the summer
months, bringing mainstream American and Canadian popular culture with them. This
influx of cultural and demographic changes occurred in a relatively short period of time,
and drastically affected the Island’s traditional communities.
A division exists within Cape Breton studies between those attempting to locate
a cultural authenticity within musical performance219—often an authenticity based on the

Elizabeth Doherty discusses the evolution from Scottish music to Cape Breton music
at length. See, Elizabeth Doherty, Paradox on the Periphery, (Ph.D. Dissertation, University
of Limerick, 1996), 50-62.
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Burt Feintuch, "The Conditions for Cape Breton Fiddle Music: The Social and
Economic Setting of a Regional Soundscape," Ethnomusicology 48 (2004), 74.
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Regina Bendix shows how authenticity has long been a focus within folklore studies,
both from an attempt to justify ‘the authentic’ and from an attempt to critique the
concept of authenticity. Regina Bendix, In Search of Authenticity (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1997). Vincent Cheng posits how the cultural concern for authenticity
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Gaelic language perpetuated by Gaelic revivalists—and those who provide a more
complete ethnographic explanation. John Shaw’s work focusing on Cape Breton
authenticity can border on romanticism. Shaw’s work reduces all authentic Cape Breton
to derive from the Gaelic language.220 Shaw makes a musical distinction between
fiddlers who speak Gaelic and those who lack the language, holding only the Gaelic
speakers as the correct interpreters of the Cape Breton musical style—a claim he justifies

stems from a growing loss of identity, and the need to feel a sense of belonging—a point
relevant to my discussion about the desire of those outside of a community to learn the
cultural practices of the community. See, Vincent Cheng, Inauthentic: The Anxiety Over
Culture and Identity (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2004).
See John Shaw, “Language, Music and Local Aesthetics: Views from Gaeldom and
Beyond,” Scottish Language 11 (1992); John Shaw, “Observations on the Cape Breton
Gàidhealtachd and its Relevance to Present-Day Celtic Studies.” In Proceedings of the First
North American Congress of Celtic Studies, University of Ottawa (Ottawa: University of
Ottawa Press, 1988) 75-87. Shaw’s assertion that Cape Breton culture is only based on
Gaelic language is not alone within the academic discipline of Scottish Studies. Some in
Scottish Studies romanticize the Highland Gael and think of Cape Breton as the model
for a pure Gaelic world that contrasts to the impure contemporary Scotland. Michael
Newton who studies Scottish settlements within Cape Breton asserts that Scotland
should embrace Gaelic as a language because, “it could renew the vigour of Scottish
culture from within and reinforce the sense of place and identity which has only recently
been disrupted from its ancient roots. It could change Scotland from being a mediocre
periphery of the Anglo-American world to being at the centre of a Gaelic/Scottish
world. All of this together could help give Scotland the self-confidence necessary to seize
control of its own future and reclaim its status as a proud European nation among
peers.” Michael Newton, A Handbook of the Scottish Gaelic World (Dublin, Ireland: Four
Courts Press, 2000), 290. Shaw, Newton, and others like Marcus Tanner, paint the
picture of an ideal Scottish, Gaelic, or Celtic culture, and harken to Cape Breton as the
embodiment of this ideality. See Marcus Tanner, The Last of the Celts (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2004).
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by citing older Cape Breton Gaelic speakers.221 In doing so, Shaw romanticizes the
fiddlers of the past as pure representations of Cape Breton musicians.222
Glenn Graham223 responds to Shaw’s anecdote of older Cape Bretoners lament
for the hegemony of non-Gaelophiles by noting that despite any claim that young
fiddlers all sound alike, locals actively engaged with the community can easily identify
performers solely based on listening to their music. Shaw’s claims for Cape Breton
musical purity rests on the premise that a correct tribal practice (speaking Gaelic) gives
foundation to a correct musical style.224 While it is valid to link the development of a

Shaw, “Language, Music, and Local Aesthetics,” 41-43. Shaw does not recognize that
the Gaelic speakers he relies upon don’t actually interact with the Cape Breton’s musical
community in its current form. He uses older Gaelic speakers’ reflections that ‘things
have changed for the worse’ as justification that the music is either dying, or becoming
an “invented tradition.” But Shaw has ignored interrogating how the current
community thrives despite Gaelic playing a lessor role. It seems that Shaw would rather
the music die than for Gaelic to play no role—or rather, if Gaelic played no role within
the music, Shaw would use that as proof that the music was already dead. Contrast
Shaw’s view of tradition with that of Gadamer’s view discussed in the previous section.
Gadamer sees tradition as a dialogue that individuals constantly participate within.
Shaw describes tradition as if it is a static application of certain rules, without the
possibility to change. Hence, individuals who haven’t participated in the tradition for
decades are a reliable source for Shaw of what is wrong with the tradition today.
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Shaw asserts that the music of Cape Breton sounds the same as music in Gaelic
Scotland would have sounded in the eighteenth century. See Shaw, “Observations on
the Cape Breton Gàidhealtachd and its Relevance to Present-Day Celtic Studies.” But the
Cape Breton fiddle style, despite Cape Breton’s isolation, has evolved stylistically
through every musical generation over at least the past hundred years, and logically this
evolution extends to the arrival of Cape Breton’s first Scottish settlers. Glenn Graham,
Cape Breton Fiddle Music: The Making and Maintenance of a Tradition (Masters Thesis, St.
Mary’s University, 2004); Doherty, Paradox on the Periphery.
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Within “Language, Music, and Local Aesthetics,” Shaw frequently refers to a
“correct” style, form, or music. The article itself can be seen as a rhetorical attempt to
normalize the Cape Breton fiddling style more common fifty years ago by drawing from
an extremely small sample of former community members. Some of the patterns that
Shaw cites as occurring over the last two decades include “increased tempo (often
remarked upon by older Gaels); less bow used per note; a tendency to hold the bow with
a thumb and index finger only instead of the thumb and two-finger grip of the older
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musical style and the language of its origins225 it is reductionist to suggest that this link
is the only contribution to a communal aesthetic. Moreover Shaw’s understanding of
how a fiddle works is tenuous at best, as evidenced by the questionable claim that the
practice of some modern fiddlers to hold the bow with only an index finger and thumb
stems from the lack of a Gaelic language.
While Shaw is not alone in his desire to root Scottish authenticity in Cape Breton
culture,226 a second strand of scholarship dismisses the idea of an authentic Gaelic-ness.
Ian McKay challenges any concept of establishing an authentic folk as reliant on
unchanging criteria.227 McKay looks at the logical inconsistencies of the tartanism
movement of the 1930s that romanticized an authentic Highland Gael in Nova Scotia—a

players; a smoother (or less varied) tone, and the introduction of musical ornaments
which recall Irish music. Over time, these leave the listener with a clear impression of a
drift toward the style of English-language Irish fiddling popular with the media and at
folk-festivals.” Ibid., 43. While this impression of “Irishness” is hardly clear to someone
who actually listens to the music, Shaw demonstrates a lack of understanding in the
Cape Breton music community by ignoring such contributions of Winston Fitzgerald
and Buddy MacMaster—fiddlers who popularized a smooth tone in Cape Breton as
early as the 1940s.
As evidenced by the shared tunes of the fiddle and puirt-a’ beul, or “mouth music”
wherein singers would sing dance tunes using nonsense words. See, Heather Sparling,
Puirt-a’Beul: An Ethnographic Study of Mouth Music in Cape Breton, Nova Scotia (Masters
Thesis, York University, 2000).
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In a similar vein, some scholars have been promoting the idea of ‘pan-Celticism.’
They advocate for Gaelic speaking peoples to unite and develop solidarity due sharing a
special relationship. Peter Ellis, in Celtic Dawn: The Dream of Celtic Unity (Ceredigion,
Wales: Y Loifa Press, 2002) details the struggles of the ‘Celtic people’ and advocates for
the “freedom” of these nations. He traces the history of the notion of ‘pan-Celticism’ and
discusses, at length, the Celtic-League, a non-governmental organization dedicated to
gaining political freedom for Celtic countries. Ellis argues that Galicia, an area of Spain
with elements of Celtic culture, especially musical culture, is not fit for membership
within the Celtic League, because people in the region speak a “non-Celtic” language.
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myth that McKay shows as contrasting with the actual Scottish immigrant experience.
For example, Cape Bretoners never wore kilts prior to Nova Scotia’s government
promotion of the Highland tourism experience. Here, the Cape Breton Gaelic revival
movement rests its justification of revival on an authentic Gaelic Cape Breton
Highlander who never existed.
Other scholars have focused solely on Cape Breton’s musical community.
Elizabeth Doherty provides the most comprehensive critique of Cape Breton’s musical
development.228 Rather than concentrating on one musical element, such as the fiddle or
the Gaelic Language, Doherty creates a more ecological picture of Cape Breton music.
Herself a noted fiddler from Donegal, Ireland, Doherty immersed herself within the
Cape Breton music community not only as an observant scholar, but as a participating
musician. She traces how several generations of musicians have altered the musical
style, shifting it to a unique Cape Breton identity that differs from Scottish music. Her
analysis contrasts from the revival purists who look to Cape Breton music as the ideal
that Scots should replicate. Cape Breton fiddler Glenn Graham aligns with Doherty in
his Master’s thesis229 and subsequent book230 but focuses on the importance of family
connections in music transmission. Fiddlers born into families that participate in the
fiddle community understand music as part of the everyday. Graham pushes back
against the romantic idea that music passes from one generation to another “in the
blood.” His work indicates how family structure serves as an institution that shapes the
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conditions for a musical community. This musical community, for Graham, is one that
evolves with each generation and thrives in this change.
Burt Feintuch, like Doherty, observes a number of factors contributing to the
formation of Cape Breton’s musical community. 231 Apart from the music itself, Feintuch
has focused in on both economic and social influences. The Island’s high unemployment
rate, for example, has pushed many youths to leave in search of jobs. This consistent loss
of young community members has led to difficulties in the maintenance of the Island’s
musical tradition. Both Feintuch and Doherty acknowledge how specific individuals
have influenced Cape Breton’s musical style. Feintuch has looked at the more
contemporary contributions of the late composer Jerry Holland as well as the Beaton
family. Doherty has focused on the contributions of composer Dan R. MacDonald232
who, after World War I, brought tune books from Scotland to Cape Breton. Winston
Fitzgerald also contributed to Cape Breton’s musical community, not through
compositions, but through style—a role that I discuss elsewhere.233 Doherty234 has also
expanded on Fitzgerald’s centrality in setting the stage for the current sound of the
Island’s music.

See, Burt Feintuch, “Revivals on the Edge: Northumberland and Cape Breton—A
Keynote,” in 2006 Yearbook for Traditional Music, vol. 38, eds. Svanibor Pettan & Jonathan
P.J. Stock (UNESCO, 2006); Feintuch, “The Conditions for Cape Breton Fiddle Music:
The Social and Economic Setting of a Regional Soundscape” (2004).
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(University of South Carolina Press, 2015).
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Other studies have focused on how specific events have shaped Cape Breton’s
musical community. Marie Thompson235 examines the 1971 documentary The Vanishing
Cape Breton Fiddler. This documentary forced the Cape Breton community to address the
lack of youth within the traditional music scene. Thompson shows how the community
responded by actively integrating youth. Virginia Garrison’s work236 examines the
documentary’s effects from a different angle. With the community actively seeking out
youth by establishing formal music classes, young musicians no longer needed to live in
historically musical families in order to join the music community. This new source of
community, for Garrison, saved the music.

Marie Thompson, “The Myth of the Vanishing Cape Breton Fiddler: The Role of a
CBC Film in the Cape Breton Fiddle Revival,” Acadiensis XXXV, no. 2 (Spring, 2006), 526.
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CHAPTER 6
RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES
Because this work sits at the intersection of rhetorical studies, folklore studies,
ethnomusicology, and hermeneutics, you might expect a traditional ethnography. I am
respectful of ethnography; but this is not ethnography. While I will incorporate a
varying level of participant observation, it will not be used in the traditional sense that
one finds in folklore or ethnomusicology projects. Similarly I will not be using rhetorical
criticism, even in the sense of critical rhetoric. Nor am I philosopher per se. So what am I
doing? As my project sits at the intersection of various disciplines, so to will the
perspectives that I use draw from each of these methodological perspectives. The
folklorist, ethnomusicologist, rhetorician and philosopher might all identify with some
elements, while finding others foreign. But this will not be the case where I take the
hammer of a methodology and apply it to the nail of my project. The unique nature of
the project is one that demands an organic perspective to be applied—one that suits the
project naturally. As such I will devote some time to walk you down the path I’ve
travelled so that you might better orient around how this project’s perspectives are
informed, and so that those in one discipline might understand how I draw from other
disciplines. To assuage the fears up front that this dissertation is one without a home
anywhere, there is good justification for locating its home within the field of
communication. The theme that unites the methodologies I draw from in order to define
my perspective is ‘conversation.’ The idea of conversation is central to communication
and rhetorical theory, but also one familiar to music, where musicians participate in
musical conversations, to folklore, to where conversation drives the orality of folk
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practices, and to philosophy, where hermeneutics is predicated on the notion of
conversation. It is hermeneutics where I first turn.
Hermeneutics plays a large theoretical role in my project, but in the same light
that hermeneutics informs my project’s theoretical foundation, it would be hypocritical
if hermeneutics did not also inform my project’s research perspective. There is some
confusion over Gadamer’s opinion of social research, given that the corpus of his work is
largely critical of the methodology of human sciences.237 In the forward to the second
edition of Truth and Method Gadamer tries to clarify any confusion.
“I did not intend to produce a manual for guiding understanding in the manner
of the earlier hermeneutics. I did not wish to elaborate a system of rules to
describe, let alone direct, the methodical procedures of the human sciences. Nor
was it my aim to investigate the theoretical foundation of work in these fields in
order to put my findings to practical ends.”238
Gadamer’s remarks do not mean that his work is immaterial to my discussion of a
research perspective. While Truth and Method may not disavow methodology, and while
Gadamer may purport to offer no practical ends within it, Gadamer’s hermeneutics can
inform the conception of a research perspective.239

Gadamer is critical of method, but as in the case of Gadamer’s work, this criticism is
directed at those who place blind faith within the procedure of method. Gadamer’s
concern is aimed at the domination of practical judgment by technical judgment, and
blind faith in procedure represents just such a blindness. “When a naive faith in
scientific method denies the existence of effective history, there can be an actual
deformation of knowledge.” Gadamer, Truth and Method, 300. Gadamer’s is critical of the
human sciences only to the extent that researchers have not thought through the
philosophical implications of both their goals and their methods.
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When discussing my own project, I refer to the “method” I employ as a research
perspective. Here I draw from Michael McGee, who critiques the very notion that a
method can be anything more than a perspective on a problem, and can offer no claim of
certainty. And that the multiple competing, and contradictory methods tolerated within
the human sciences should be recognized as perspectives, because any claim otherwise
would distort the knowledge these “methods” purport to provide. McGee’s critique
239
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One target of Gadamer’s criticism of method within the human sciences is the
concern for repeatability. Making procedure repeatable is born from a desire for the
researcher to maintain objectivity. The prejudices of an objective researcher will not
interfere with results when the procedure is repeatable—one researcher can just as easily
be swapped out for another, because the onus of the results is on the procedure and not
the researcher.
“The aim of science is so to objectify experience that it no longer contains any
historical element. Scientific experiment does this by its methodological
procedure. The historico-critical method, moreover, does something similar in
the human sciences. Through the objectivity of their approach, both methods are
concerned to guarantee that these basic experiences can be repeated by
anyone.”240
Gadamer is not implying that repeatability is not a valid concern for some human
sciences. But not all human sciences carry the same objective, and his critique is offered
against human sciences that concern understanding. When research concerns
understanding, rather than attempting to eschew prejudices—which Gadamer shows is

aligns nicely with Gadamer’s commentary on methodology: “’Pluralism’ thus becomes
an intellectual version of liberalism; it might be defined as ‘pure tolerance of alternative
and mutually exclusive methods.’ To ‘have a distinct method’ at some level of
abstraction, is equivalent to ‘having a unique perspective on the problem.’ It must be so
in this mindset, for ‘method’ (have not we all been taught?) is the one and true path to
anything deserving the name ‘knowledge.’ And if we are to make claims to knowledge
based on multiple perspective-taking, we of course must be intending to offer an elegant
explanation of the curious plethora of contradictory methods which inhabit an
intellectual world unified (is it not so?) by a fantasy we don’t even believe—the
rhetorical vision of one, true method leading us to certainty.” Michael McGee, “Another
Philippic: Notes on the Ideological Turn in Criticism,” Central States Speech Journal 35
(1984), 47.
240
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itself an impossibility—the researcher should attempt to embrace and expose prejudices,
with the goal of clarifying how prejudice shapes understanding.241
As an alternative to a pre-conceived procedure, which shifts judgment away
from the researcher towards the procedure, Gadamer proposes returning judgment to
the researcher, and offers two related reasons for this. First, social research involves
placing the particular situation into relation to the research goal. Pre-conceived
procedures are not necessarily designed to respond to the contingencies that might
emerge, and situations occur where following the procedure might actually lead the
researcher away from the goal. Freeing the researcher to respond to such contingencies
requires allowing the researcher to make judgments while conducting research.242
Second, Gadamer contends that the researcher is not an objective instrument hovering
above the social setting being researched. Instead, the researcher is a participant
enmeshed within the situation, and as such, the decisions the researcher must make are
ethical. Because of this necessarily ethical dimension, Gadamer sees that social research

This does not mean that Gadamer conceives of understanding that borders on
relativism. Quite the contrary, as I have already shown in my review of hermeneutics,
Gadamer’s hermeneutics provides a space between objectivism and relativism. The goal
of embracing and exposing prejudices is an attempt to expose where this space exists.
Prejudices shape our understanding, and since the traditions we live within are a source
of our prejudices, prejudice itself is neither universal nor subjective, but part of our
participation with tradition. Gadamer shifts hermeneutics focus from one concerned by
procedure, to one concerned by attempting to find the source of understanding.
“Understanding is to be thought of less as a subjective act than as participating in an
event of tradition, a process of transmission in which past and present are constantly
mediated. This is what must be validated by hermeneutic theory, which is far too
dominated by the idea of a procedure, a method.” Gadamer, Truth and Method, 291.
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Particularly relevant here is discussion of Gadamer’s development of deliberation
and action in section 4.3.
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should be guided in part by an ethical judgment—for which he returns to a foundation
of Aristotle’s phronesis:243
“The alienation of the interpreter from the interpreted by the objectifying method
of modern science, characteristic of the hermeneutics and historiography of the
nineteenth century, appeared as the consequence of a false objectification. My
purpose in returning to the example of Aristotelian ethics is to help us realize
and avoid this. For moral knowledge, as Aristotle describes it, is clearly not
objective knowledge—i.e., the knower is not standing over against a situation
that he merely observes; he is directly confronted with what he sees. It is
something he has to do.”244
This begins to clarify how a researcher informed by hermeneutics might conduct
inquiry. This also begins to link how hermeneutics relates to critical studies, a link that I
will explore later.
It is not enough to say that hermeneutics allows a researcher to make their own
decisions and leave it at that. Such a claim would push hermeneutics in relativism—a
push Gadamer stoutly guards against. A research perspective informed by
hermeneutics relies upon the researcher’s judgment within contingent situations, this
judgment is guided by placing the contingent in relation to a goal—and while this goal
does not prescribe a set of rules, it provides a foundation to guide the researcher’s
judgment. Gadamer offers the goal of clarifying the conditions in which understanding
takes place.
“Given the intermediate position in which hermeneutics operates, it follows that
its work is not to develop a procedure of understanding, but to clarify the
conditions in which understanding takes place. But these conditions do not
amount to a “procedure” or method which the interpreter must of himself bring
As I discuss in detail within in section 4.1., Gadamer’s use of Aristotle is not one of
rote obedience, but one of modern rehabilitation. Rather than blindly following
Aristotle’s phronesis as Aristotle might have originally intended, Gadamer explains how
phronesis is something that everyone is capable of within everyday practices.
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to bear on the text; rather, they must be given. The prejudices and fore-meanings
that occupy the interpreter’s consciousness are not at his free disposal. He cannot
separate in advance the productive prejudices that enable understanding from
the prejudices that hinder it and lead to misunderstandings. Rather, this
separation must take place in the process of understanding itself, and hence
hermeneutics must ask how that happens.”245
The goal of clarifying the conditions in which understanding takes place guides the
researcher to attempt to expose prejudices, and allow these attempts to inform the
researcher’s judgment of how to act. Because the researcher cannot predict how
prejudices might affect understanding, or even which prejudices exist, the researcher
must make judgments in the course of the research process itself—all with the goal of
clarifying the process of understanding.
Researchers in the medical community have conducted inquiries informed by
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and these studies help model what a hermeneutic inquiry
informed by the goal of clarifying understanding might look like. Here I must clarify
that there is a distinction between hermeneutics and phenomenology, as many similar
studies offer methodology informed by Heidegger and Gadamer’s development of
phenomenology where discussion of hermeneutics is relevant only when it contributes
to interpreting phenomenology.246 Put simply, hermeneutics concerns the study of
understanding while phenomenology concerns the nature of experience. There is
sometimes a confusion between the two, especially given Heidegger’s Being and Time
was a hermeneutic phenomenology of Dasein’s historicity, and given how the
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researcher’s question of understanding is often the question of self-understanding.247 But
the aim of hermeneutic inquiry, in seeking to understand the conditions of
understanding, is fundamentally different than an inquiry seeking to understand
individual experience.248 A hermeneutic inquiry would ask the question “how is
understanding possible here” while a phenomenological inquiry would seek to expose
consciousness, treating consciousness as an object of study. Though separate
perspectives of analysis, some researchers combine them as a hermeneutic
phenomenology, with the combined goal of interpreting experience, but these
researchers tend to focus more on phenomenology than hermeneutics.249 For my
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This is a reason why, although valuable in its own right, Harris Berger’s Metal, Rock,
and Jazz: Perception and the Phenomenology of Musical Experience, does not contribute to my
own analysis. Berger’s phenomenology is informed by Edmund Husserl’s work, which
works from a theoretical foundation contrary to that established by Heidegger, and
focuses on the phenomenological experience of music, a goal markedly different than a
hermeneutic inquiry seeking to clarify understanding. Harris M. Berger, Metal, Rock, and
Jazz: Perception and the Phenomenology of Musical Experience (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan
University Press, 1999).
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Nursing Studies 44 (2007) 131-142.
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purposes it is important to tease out the distinction between a perspective concerned
with understanding from those concerning the nature of experience.
Tina Koch outlines that an inquiry informed by a Gadamerian hermeneutics
would be informed by Gadamer’s notions of the hermeneutic circle, dialogue, prejudice,
and how understanding is gained.250 Fleming, Gaidys, and Robb draw from these
themes identified by Koch and propose a Gadamerian hermeneutic inquiry that contains
five stages. First the researchers would define a research question “congruent with the
aims of interpretative hermeneutics [...] so that data obtained and conclusions reached
will be appropriate and useful.”251 The question itself will open of possibilities of
understanding, and likewise close others. Second, the researcher will attempt to identify
their prejudices concerning the topic. They offer conversation as a method to provoke
the possibility of where prejudice might exist.252 Engaging in this dialogue with the goal
of exposing prejudices helps the researcher to “enter the hermeneutic circle.”253 Third,

Tina Koch, “Implementation of a hermeneutic inquiry in nursing: philosophy, rigour,
and representation,” Journal of Advanced Nursing 24 (1996), 174-184.
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Here, it is important to remember Gadamer’s development of conversation that I
previously discussed: “Conversation is a process of coming to an understanding. Thus it
belongs to every true conversation that each person opens himself to the other, truly
accepts his point of view as valid and transposes himself into the other to such an extant
that he understands not the particular individual but what he says.” Gadamer, Truth and
Method, 387.
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Fleming, Gaidys, & Robb, “Hermeneutic Research in Nursing,” 117. The concept of
using the hermeneutic circle as a guiding light of a hermeneutic research method was
also proposed by Tina Koch and Ann Harrington. Koch and Harrington see focusing on
the hermeneutic circle allows the researcher to critically reflect on understanding
throughout the research project. This proposal was in response to attempts to graft a
concern for qualitative rigor onto methodology based on hermeneutic and philosophical
inquiry—attempts they saw as problematic due to the theoretical underpinnings of
hermeneutics conflicting with rigor’s positivist legacy. Tina Koch & Ann Harrington,
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the researcher should engage in dialogue with the focus on gaining understanding.254
Such a dialogue would not necessarily be with other individuals, but would also include
texts and traditions. This could occur alongside dialogues that expose prejudice. The
researcher would share the understanding of dialogue participants as the researcher’s
prejudices are exposed and within the conversation.255 Fourth, Fleming, Gaidys, & Robb
propose that the researcher revisit these conversations through both written transcripts
and taped recordings. After revisiting these transcripts, the researcher would
summarize, and again approach each dialogue partner and engage in yet another
dialogue, this time concerning the summary. The summaries would be based on themes
that the researcher pulls from each dialogue. Finally, the researcher would seek to
establish trustworthiness of both process and analysis. Such a trustworthiness would be
based on an auditability of the research process.256 Given that Gadamer stresses the
researcher should employ practical judgment during the research process, auditability
helps to ground this judgment by forcing the researcher to document and explain how
judgments were made during the research process.257 To gain trustworthiness the

“Reconceptualizing Rigour: The Case for Reflexivity,” Journal of Advanced Nursing 28
(1998) 882-890.
Fleming, Gaidys, & Robb suggest that a research employing a Gadamerian
hermeneutic would never conceive of “collecting data” since the goal of the
methodology would be to reveal spaces of understanding.
254

It should be noted that any sharing of understanding here would be temporal, as
understanding is itself temporal for both participants.
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Note the distinction here between auditability and repeatability. While Gadamer is
critical of method’s preoccupation within repeatability, an auditability would allow the
researcher to be held accountable simply through explaining and documenting
judgments made along the way.
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The concern for clarifying the grounds upon which research decisions were made was
the focus of Jonas Debesay, Dagfinn Nåden, & Åshild Slettebø in their development of a
Gadamerian hermeneutic as method for qualitative study. The researcher must act as a
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researcher would also confirm direct quotations and dialogue in an effort to establish
credibility.
This perspective proposed by Fleming, Gaidys, & Robb was used by Jane S.
Grassley and Tommie P. Nelms in an attempt to understand the confidence of mothers
when breastfeeding.258 Grassley and Nelms focused on using Fleming, Gaidys, & Robb’s
method to create a hermeneutic circle to constantly move “from the whole to the part
and back to the whole.”259 From engaging in dialogues, and reviewing them, three main
themes and fourteen subthemes emerged. Grassley and Nelms used stories from the
dialogue participants to help illustrate these emergent themes. Trustworthiness was
gained through re-engaging in dialogue with the original participants in order to verify
credibility.
Given that my project concerns developing an aural rhetoric, any perspective
that I offer would also have to incorporate concerns of rhetorical theory. I have already
shown that a perspective informed by hermeneutics would concern prejudice, the
hermeneutic circle, an openness of understanding, and dialogue. But these concerns
themselves do not automatically provide a readily made research question, especially
one that would explain how an aural rhetoric is evolves within a community. To do so, I

rhetor in justifying the decision process, as part of the process would be finding the
appropriate argument. Jonas Debesay, Dagfinn Nåden, & Åshild Slettebø, “How do we
close the hermeneutic circle? A Gadamerian approach to justification in interpretation in
qualitative studies,” Nursing Inquiry 15 (2008), 57-66.
Jane S. Grassley & Tommie P. Nelms, “Understanding Maternal Breastfeeding
Confidence: A Gadamerian Hermeneutic Analysis of Women’s Stories,” Health Care for
Women International 29 (2008), 841-862.
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must explore how perspectives of rhetorical theory can align with a methodology
informed by hermeneutics in order to ground my project.
6.1. Critical Rhetoric & Hermeneutics
I have already hinted at labeling a research inquiry as the application of
perspective and not as the application of a method that gains knowledge.260 While the
idea of approaching research from an anti-method is justified by the work of Gadamer
discussed above, rhetoricians have also embraced this concept, recognizing that critics
bring their own ideology to bear when ‘doing’ criticism.
“[I]f it is true that good criticism is the product of a critic’s personality, then any
idea of method will get in the way of determining what should count as
knowledge in the study of rhetorical criticism.”261
This quote from McGee hints of how Gadamer discusses prejudice. McGee shows that
the critic must embrace their own personality which itself informs a research
perspective, much as Gadamer offers that a researcher should embrace their prejudices
during inquiry, as prejudices shape the researcher’s understanding. McGee’s criticism of
method targets the notion that a procedure within social inquiry can lead to certainty or
truth,262 while Gadamer, also critical of conceiving method as a source of knowledge,
provides “understanding” as an alternate research goal.263
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“Of course most academics realize the frailty of what they take to be knowledge in a
given time and place; but they invest in the dream anyway, agreeing that it may be a
useful regulative ideal. The central image of this dream has been the concept ‘method,’
for it is possible to envision a unification and integration of knowledge springing from
universal acceptance of model rules for the right direction of the mind.” Ibid., 45.
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Other rhetoricians, such as Philip Wander, echo McGee’s critique that method could
promise certainty of knowledge. “One of the questions raised through an ideological
perspective concerns method—the assumption that “method” contains within it a sense
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The proposal that rhetoricians should approach criticism through embracing
their personality likewise meant that the critic could also bring their own ideology to
bear in criticism. Philip Wander saw this engagement with ideology as an answer to a
malaise that had existed in rhetorical criticism—one where critics simply applied
methods to texts, without actually contributing anything.
“[W]hat is now called ‘criticism’ is the result of an established order willing to
tolerate work which is morally, socially, and politically meaningless so long as it
reproduces forms associated with technical reason. It is the product of a system
which asks not why is this subject important, what does it add to human
knowledge, or what is its emancipatory potential, but committed to technocratic
solutions, what is the ‘text’ or object of research, what have other researchers said
about it, and above all, what method or methods are going to be employed.”264
Wander offered this critique in a special issue of the Central States Speech Journal devoted
to ideology. The issue was sparked by backlash265 from a previous article from Wander,
wherein he suggested that adherence to method in rhetorical criticism “prevented the
critic from estimating the truth of a speaker’s statement and the adequacy of the values
the speaker assumes or recommends.”266 Thus, when analyzing a 1969 speech by
Richard Nixon, the critic should not simply let the light of the speech shine forth and
speak for itself, but must responsibly also recognize that people died because of the
speech—the speech had consequences.

of purpose or the promise of understanding.” Philip Wander, “The Third Persona: An
Ideological Turn in Rhetorical Theory,” Central States Speech Journal 35 (1984), 204.
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Wander proposed an alternative to method—one where the critic is guided by
the purpose of attempting to reveal the extent to which rhetoric, whether it be in the
form of speech or academic theory, can negate audiences through a text.267 Operating
from a perspective, the critic would actively embrace their own ideology and attempt to
demonstrate the real-world consequences of rhetoric. It was in this vein that other
rhetoricians took up the call of embracing ideological perspective. Raymie McKerrow
entered this conversation by introducing the concept of “critical rhetoric” as an
alternative to rhetorical criticism.268
“As theory, a critical rhetoric examines the dimensions of domination and
freedom as these are exercised in a relativized world... In practice, a critical
rhetoric seeks to unmask or demystify the discourse of power.”269
McKerrow’s critical rhetoric offers guidance for what a rhetorical anti-method might
look like; one guided by a goal of demystifying domination, but also one acknowledging
the critic’s own agency in reaching such a goal. 270 Shifting from rhetorical criticism to

“But just as the discourse may be understood to affirm certain characteristics, it may
also be understood to imply other characteristics, roles, actions, or ways of seeing things
to be avoided. What is negated through the Second Persona forms the silhouette of a
Third Persona—the ‘it’ that is not present, that is objectified in a way that ‘you’ and ‘I’
are not. This being not present may, depending on how it is fashioned, become quite
alien, a being equated with disease, a ‘cancer’ called upon to disfigure an individual or a
group; or an animal subordinated through furtive glance or beady eye; or an organism,
as a people might be transformed, through a biological metaphor, into ‘parasites.’”
Wander, “The Third Persona,” 209.
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Raymie McKerrow, “Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis,” Communication
Monographs 56 (1989), 91-111.
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For more of the debate concerning critical rhetoric amongst authors not cited here, see
also, Kent Ono & John Sloop, “Commitment to Telos: A Sustained Critical Rhetoric,”
Communication Monographs 59 (1992), 48-60 ; Susan Owen & Peter Ehrenhaus,
“Animating a Critical Rhetoric: On the Feeding Habits of American Empire,” Western
Journal of Communication 57 (1993) 169-177; John Murphy, “Critical Rhetoric as Political
Discourse,” Argumentation and Advocacy 21 (1995), 1-15; Fernando Pedro Delgado
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critical rhetoric places the emphasis on the critical nature of the work, as well as on the
researcher’s role in producing rhetoric. “[W]e might have said ‘critical rhetoric’ instead
of ‘rhetorical criticism’ thus keeping it clear that criticism is a vehicle for doing rhetoric.
When we reduced rhetoric to its adjectival state, however, we accepted the literary habit
of taking the bite out of criticism by conceiving it as a kind of interpretation.”271
With critical rhetoric on the table for rhetoricians, the debate moved from
whether a researcher’s work should be informed by ideology to which ideology could
inform critical rhetoric. 272 The very notion that a critical rhetoric would demystify and
expose the domination of power, might in some situations lead to a response of “so
what?” The mere exposure of power relations does not necessarily guarantee that the
alternative to existing domination would lead to a better world. Maurice Charland,

“Chicano Movement Rhetoric: An Ideographic Interpretation,” Communication Quarterly
42 (1995), 446-455; Raka Shome (1996) “Postcolonial Interventions in the Rhetorical
Canon: An “Other” View,” Communication Theory 6 (1996), 40-59; and Marouf Hasian,
“Rhetorical Studies and the Future of Postcolonial Theories,” Rhetoric Review 20 (2001),
22-28. This is by no means a complete list, but offers a representative sample of the
discussion.
Michael McGee, “Text, Context, and the Fragmentation of Contemporary Culture,”
Western Journal of Speech Communication 54 (1990), 276.
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While there is much discussion over what critical rhetoric is, there is far from an
agreed upon ideology to guide it. Celeste Condit justifies this heterogeneity by pointing
out that critical work does not need to draw from an a priori ideology. Instead, criticism
shares the perspective of the researcher as advocate. See Celeste Condit, “Clouding the
Issues? The Ideal and the Material in Human Communication,” Critical Studies in Mass
Communication 14 (1997), 197-200. I present here some of the initial framers who bring
the argument to light calling for a conception of critical rhetoric, however I leave at the
wayside a large dialogue concerning the specifics of critical rhetoric. The argument is
taken up by the works of Robert Hariman, “Critical Rhetoric and Postmodern Theory,”
Quarterly Journal of Speech 77 (1991), 67-70; Dana Cloud “The Materiality of Discourse as
Oxymoron: A Challenge to Critical Rhetoric,” Western Journal of Communication 58 (1994)
141-163; Norman Clark, “The Critical Servant,: An Isocratean Contribution to Critical
Rhetoric” Quarterly Journal of Speech 82 (1996), 111-124; and Joseph Zompetti, “Towards a
Gramscian Critical Rhetoric,” Western Journal of Communication 61 (1997) 66-86. This is by
no means exhaustive an exhaustive list of an ongoing debate.
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while embracing critical rhetoric, offered this criticism, noting that critical rhetoric itself
was not complete.
“In its current form, Critical Rhetoric strengthens our powers of observation. It
directs us to look at the dynamic of social relations that are discursively
instantiated and at the agents, agencies, and objects constituted in rhetorics that
address publics. It assists us somewhat in diagnosis, but here its contribution is
limited because diagnosis occurs with respect to a conception of the healthy
organism. What would the healthy social body be?”273
It is from this criticism that Charland proposes critical rhetoric should incorporate
hermeneutics in order to grapple with the contingencies of community.
A critical rhetoric informed by hermeneutics could be guided by practical
judgment. Since critical rhetoric is, in part, a recognition that the critic is a producer of
rhetoric, then the critic is also commenting on action, as much as the critic is herself
acting. As I discussed in a previous section, practical judgment is folded into
hermeneutics; practical judgment involves deliberation over action, and the best
decision requires understanding the community that act takes place within.
“Phronesis is only mentioned briefly by Professor McKerrow, as he dismisses it as
a virtue tied to ‘an ideal life-style.’ Admittedly phronesis is in Aristotle a virtue
tied to an ideal conception of the good citizen and leader, but the Aristotelian
project entails more than the celebration of virtue. It also includes a seminal
enquiry into the character of doxastic knowledge and of judgment in the face of
contingency. For Aristotle, better and worse courses of action do exist even
though they cannot be determined through theoretical knowledge.274
While rhetoric does constitute community, a single rhetorical act does not exist in a
vacuum, and community is constituted by more than a single rhetorical act. By
advocating for adding a hermeneutic element to critical rhetoric, Charland recognizes

Maurice Charland, “Finding a Horizon and Telos: The Challenge to Critical Rhetoric,”
Quarterly Journal of Speech 77 (1991), 72.
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Ibid., 72.
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that the critic should investigate the contingency of good within a community, and
acknowledge that a community needs to be understood.275
It is worth noting that a relationship between critical rhetoric and phronesis was
also proposed by John Sloop and Kent Ono in their essay “Out-law Discourse: The
Critical Politics of Material Judgment.”276 Ono and Sloop offer a flawed understanding
of phronesis, though, making their contribution little help to my project. Here they are
interested in “judgments made through vernacular discourse in particular marginalized
communities with localized systems of judgment”, labeling such forms of discourse as
“out-law” due to their opposition to dominant discourses.277 As vernacular, Ono and
Sloop recognize these judgments are part of the everyday.
“Hence, it is toward an investigation of the occurrence of judgment on the level
of everyday life, and the political deployment of these judgments, to which we
direct our investigation of out-law judgment.”278
They briefly sketch that the phronesis of out-law discourse could be observed in the
speeches of Malcolm X, Monster Cody Scott’s Monster: Autobiography of an L.A. Gang
Member, and the judgments of “gangsta-rap.”
While a notable contribution, if for nothing more than recognizing that phronesis is a
worthwhile addition to critical rhetoric, Sloop and Ono’s proposal contains flaws worth
discussing. They draw attention to vernacular discourse of marginalized communities as

“The interpretive component of phronesis seeks to locate the contingent good for a
particular community at a particular time and place. Rhetoric and phronesis are
inherently tied to the local and this forms the basis for a crossing of postmodern and
hermeneutic trajectories.” Ibid., 73.
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if the judgments made within these communities are automatically phronesis because
they exist contrary to dominant forms of judgment. This wrongly contrasts phronesis
with the dominant, when phronesis should instead be seen as the counterpart to technical
judgment. Such a distinction is important, because by contrasting phronesis with the
dominant, Sloop and Ono ignore the possibility that marginalized vernacular
communities are also capable of exhibiting technical judgment within various cultural
practices.279 Likewise, dominant communities are capable of exhibiting phronesis despite
their dominant discourse. Further, phronesis necessarily concerns good decisions, with the
caveat that good is in large part weighed by the standards of the community that
measures these decisions. But Sloop and Ono provide no way to assess whether a
community actually judges any of the decisions they purport to exhibit phronesis to be
good decisions representative of the community. This omission is more glaring in that

Sloop and Ono miss that in contrasting phronesis to a dominant they might turn to De
Certeau’s distinction between tactics and strategies. Kendall Phillips notes this omission
in his criticism of their work—a criticism I will bring up more in a moment. See, Kendall
Phillips, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono,” Philosophy
and Rhetoric 32 (1999), 99-100.
279

Even if De Certeau’s contributions to judgment were highlighted, while he offers
‘tactics’ as a form of judgment that contrasts with the dominant discourse of ‘strategies,’
not all of De Certeau’s tactics are created equal. “Tactics are more and more frequently
going off their tracks. Cut loose from the traditional communities that circumscribed
their functioning, they have begun to wander everywhere in a space which is becoming
at once more homogeneous and more extensive.” De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday
Life, 40.
Sloop and Ono’s work misses this distinction by labeling all forms of judgment contrary
to dominant discourse as de facto phronesis. If I were to borrow De Certeau’s tactics as a
form of judgment, phronesis might be an example of a tactic, but not all tactics are
themselves phronesis. Phronesis refers to good judgment, and that assessment of good is
determined by the community wherein the act occurs. Sloop and Ono label a judgment
as phronesis by virtue of it being performed by a member of a marginalized community.
They need to take two more steps and question first, whether the community itself sees
the judgment as good, and second whether the judgment was practical or technical.
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Sloop and Ono are proposing that such out-law discourse represents the vernacular
everyday of a community, yet themselves ignore both the vernacular and the
community. They instead offer traditional forms of public address as examples of
vernacular discourse: speeches, a book, and commercial albums.280 To better discuss
how phronesis occurs within the vernacular requires placing judgments in relation to
how the community understands those judgments.281
The calls by Charland, and Sloop and Ono that critical rhetoric acknowledge the
contingent good exhibited by phronesis is not the only possible relationship between
hermeneutics and critical rhetoric. While Gadamer’s hermeneutics is generally
considered a diversion from theorists associated with critical theory,282 his development
of hermeneutics involves two critical goals: guarding against blind prejudices and
guarding against the domination of practical judgment by technical judgment. Earlier I
have discussed that Gadamer uses the term ‘prejudice’ as a neutral term, to refer to all

I have discussed above that there is a fine line between vernacular everyday practices
and special events. Some communities very well might foster special events in line with
traditional public address to be part of their vernacular everyday practices. Sloop and
Ono make no offer that this is so for the communities they discuss, and do not justify
how they decided that their proposed examples of phronesis are in fact vernacular
everyday practices.
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Kendall Phillips offers further criticism of Sloop and Ono’s discussion of out-law
judgments. “Hidden outlaw discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden...
Academic critical discourse is not transparent... [T]he effect of legitimizing out-law
discourse is unknown and potentially destructive... Criticism of resistance denies the
practical and theoretical importance of opportunity.” Phillips, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and
Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono,” 99-100.
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It is rare to see Gadamer’s name linked with theorists typically associated with critical
theory, such as Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkeimer, Walter Benjamin, or
Antonio Gramsci. Here Stephen Gencarella is an exception, offering a comparison
between Gramsci and Gadamer’s work within the case of developing critical folklore
studies. See, Stephen Olbrys Gencarella, “Gramsci, Good Sense, and Critical Folklore
Studies,” Journal of Folklore Research 47 (2010), 221-252.
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pre-understanding, and how our participation with tradition can shape our prejudices.
While Gadamer uses ‘prejudice’ as a neutral term, he draws a line between blind
prejudices that close off understanding, and illuminating prejudices that open
understanding. It is in drawing this line that a link between critical rhetoric and
hermeneutics could exist.
“Only by virtue of the phenomenon and clarified concept of “temporal distance”
can the specifically critical task of hermeneutics be resolved, i.e., of knowing how
to distinguish between blind prejudices and those which illuminate, between
false prejudices and true prejudices. We must raise to a conscious level the
prejudices which govern understanding and in this way realize the possibility
that “other aims” emerge in their own right from tradition—which is nothing
other than realizing the possibility that we can understand something in its
otherness.”283
A critical rhetoric that incorporates hermeneutics would be concerned with raising
prejudices to consciousness. The purpose of uncovering prejudices would not be to
dispel the prejudice, but to test whether that prejudice is blinding or illuminating.
Gadamer’s hermeneutics is also influenced by his concern over a domination of
technical judgment. As I have already explored, this concern is not to imply that
technical judgment is inferior to practical judgment—rather, the two should be seen as a
balance. With this balance in mind, Gadamer’s goal for hermeneutics is to protect
practical judgment against such domination.
“I think, then, that the chief task of philosophy is to justify this way of reason and
defend practical and political reason against the domination of technology based
on science. That is the point of philosophical hermeneutic. It corrects the peculiar
falsehood of modern consciousness: the idolatry of scientific method and of the
anonymous authority of the sciences and it vindicates again the noblest task of

Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The Problem of Historical Consciousness,” Graduate Faculty
Philosophy Journal 5 (1975), 48 (emphasis in the original).
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the citizen—decision making according to one’s own responsibility—instead of
conceding that task to the expert.”284
When McKerrow introduced the term ‘critical rhetoric’ he did so proposing the goal that
it demystify domination and power. A critical rhetoric informed by Gadamer’s
hermeneutics would begin with McKerrow’s goal of demystifying domination and focus
specifically on the balance between practical judgment and technical judgment.
I began this project with an anecdote concerning how classical musicians are
learning traditional music as if the music was performed through the application of
rules. This is not to make the claim that classical musicians embrace only technical
judgment, nor that their desire to perform traditional music is an existential threat to
traditional fiddlers. When an individual from one community attempts to engage in the
practices of another community, if the individual engages in this new practice using
mechanisms of judgment not usually used within that practice, friction can develop. But
the source of this friction is not necessarily apparent. My concern is that classical
orchestral musicians, who themselves exercise practical judgment within the practices of
their own community do not recognize that transitioning to traditional music requires
not simply a matter of learning new notes, but of learning a new form of judgment. Thus
ignored in this process is a concern for practical judgment at the expense of technical
judgment. I am not approaching this project with a critical perspective because I have
already concluded that classical musicians wield a technical judgment that represents a
danger to practical judgment. Nor am I saying that Cape Bretoners must beware the
eminent collapse of practical judgment wrought by an onslaught of technical judgment. I

Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Hermeneutics and Social Science,” Cultural Hermeneutics 2
(1975), 316.
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am simply recognizing that there can be a friction between technical judgment and
practical judgment and, informed by a critical perspective, I wish to gain a better
understanding of how practical judgment works within the everyday practice of music
within the Cape Breton community.
I approach this project with a critical perspective informed by hermeneutics in an
attempt to reveal the prejudices of individuals within the Cape Breton musical
tradition—specifically, the prejudices that inform the judgment Cape Breton musicians
use in their musical practices. It might seem like I just presented a second purpose for
my project, with the first being the developing a theory of aural rhetoric. But these are
not, in fact, two separate purposes. By beginning with a critical perspective informed by
hermeneutics, I seek to both expose prejudices and clarify the conditions in which
understanding takes place. I have already discussed that understanding itself is
intertwined with application and judgment; the three should not be seen separately.285 In
seeking to clarify the conditions in which understanding takes place, I therefore seek to
clarify the conditions in which application and judgment take place. This is what ties a
critical perspective informed by hermeneutics to the development of an aural rhetoric.
Clarifying the conditions in which application and judgment take place within the
musical practices of Cape Breton is also the task of clarifying the aural rhetoric of this
community.
6.2. How I Conduct My Inquiry
To gain understanding of the judgment of Cape Breton musicians, I engaged in
dialogue with Cape Breton musicians, attempting to clarify how they understood their
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See the discussion associated with footnote 147.
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own actions within their community and how they understood acts of others within
their community. It is important to note that I had spent a significant amount time as a
member of the Cape Breton musical community. I have lived in Cape Breton and with
Cape Breton musicians. I have been a regular at functions within this community that
relate to music, as well as functions that are non-musical in nature. I have spent time
traveling with musicians, and have a relationship with these musicians that transcends
both the music and my role as a researcher. Also, I play the fiddle and guitar and am
learning the piano, and have spent years publicly performing as a fiddler. While I do not
consider myself a Cape Breton fiddler, Cape Breton fiddling is the genre of music I am
most identified by and most identify with. My own background within this community
is important in hermeneutic research, since I approach my inquiry immersed in the Cape
Breton musical community.
Starting from a point already informed by my own participation, my initial goal
was not to become acquainted with the Cape Breton music community, or even
musicians themselves. While I began this project with a prejudice concerning the
material, this prejudice did not overlap with the prejudices of those musicians who I
engaged in dialogue with. Though I lived in Cape Breton and spent extensive time there,
I was not born and raised there. I did not step foot in Cape Breton until I was in my
twenties, and did not learn to perform my instrument there. The musicians I
interviewed did. Also, as previously explained, I have extensive relationships with
many musicians from Cape Breton. In addition, the musicians see me as a musician, not
just a researcher. This opened the possibilities of discussion for me that researchers seen
primarily as researchers might not have access to. Cape Breton musicians are quite
familiar with researchers. Due to its popularity within the Celtic music community,
137

every summer musicians will sit down to provide interviews or fill out questionnaires
for research conducted by these researchers. In this, though, researchers have been
indiscriminate as to which musicians interview and in some cases have taken the word
of these musicians as pure truth without critical reflection.286 In order to have an open
conversation, the researcher should be recognized by the community as a musician as
much as they are recognized as a researcher.287
I restricted my conversations to musicians who played accompaniment
instruments. This does not mean I excluded from my conversations those who played
melody instruments. A unique characteristic amongst Cape Breton musicians, is that
many of the musicians are proficient in both the piano—typically an accompaniment
instrument—and the fiddle—a melody instrument. As I will elaborate in a later section,
accompanying music is quite a different skill than performing a melody, and in order to
understand how to accompany, a musician must also have insight into how a melody is
performed. The accompanist reacts to the decisions of the melody musician, and, in
order to be good must be able to anticipate how the melody musician might perform. By
limiting my interviews to either accompanists, or melody musicians who also played
accompaniment, I attempted to address the need to understand both the judgment that
occurs within performing a melody and judgment that occurs in accompanying a
melody.
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There are a number of researchers who are acknowledged by Cape Breton musicians
as being friends and performers as much as researchers, such as Burt Feintuch, Elizabeth
Doherty, Mats Melin, Nic Gareiss, and Pat Ballantyne.
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I placed reputation as a chief attribute informing whom I should converse with.
The musicians I engaged are recognized by the Cape Breton community as being the
community’s tradition bearers—those seen as carrying the musical tradition as much as
they are seen as defining it. The Cape Breton community recognizes only a limited
number of musicians as the ideal accompanists within a performance. These musicians
are sought by other musicians to participate in recording projects and touring. The
number of Cape Breton accompanists possessing the skill set to inform my inquiry only
lies between fifteen and twenty. These are the musicians who record albums and sell out
concerts, both in Cape Breton and internationally. I felt it important to engage in
dialogue with these musicians because they play a role in shaping the community’s
music. In total I conducted long form conversations with seven individuals.
While most research in Cape Breton music concerns either historical or
ethnomusicological concerns, I entered into each conversation reinforcing how my
project is different than the typical research project conducted in Cape Breton. I wanted
to make the musicians realize that they did not need to feel the pressure to speak for
their entire community. Instead, I attempted to open up a space for conversation about
how they understood their own performance of music. The goal for each dialogue was
to attempt to “fall into” a conversation. I did not begin with specific pre-conceived
questions, but rather began with the topic of how the musician makes decisions during a
performance.
While I did not want to formulaically conduct interviews, within each
conversation, I attempted to steer the conversation towards musician decisions. I might
have mentioned a particular tune the musician might have chorded for, and then ask the
musician to explain the different ways they might perform it. Once the conversation was
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established as one focusing on musical decisions, the musician would tend to guide the
conversations themselves by introducing various topics of decision making, such as
chord selections, variations, and embellishments.288 Depending on the course of the
conversation, I might ask my partner to discuss how they perceive their role in the
performance. I might also ask them to compare and contrast their own performing styles
with other musicians. These approaches allowed the interviewees to discuss the
possibilities for action during performance, and would allow them to explain why they
might prefer one musical approach over another, as well as how they understand
various musical approaches. The conversation might then allow the musician to
introduce their own approach to music, broadening the context of the interview. These
situations opened discussion about the possibilities for action, as well as allowing the
musician to address how they might evaluate a decision.
I took two steps within this project to protect the anonymity of my conversation
partners. The first is that I never reveal the name of a source that I will quote. The Cape
Breton musical community is tightly knit. It is conceivable that musicians from this
community will read this dissertation, or that sections of this dissertation will filter back
to this community through other sources. With that in mind, and with the
understanding that this is a discussion of personal perceptions of communal identity, I
decided to hide the identities of all who spoke. The second step I took, was to assess the
context of any musician’s name who themselves might be referenced within the quoted
material. There are certain instances where I hide the names of individuals when I
determine that these musicians might be referred to in an embarrassing or negative
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light. Here I err on the side of caution. But in other instances I leave the names of
musicians’ referenced within the quotes. Musicians’ identities can be reflected within
their musical style. Some of these personal musical styles are influential and set the tone
for a communal sense of style. The names of these musicians considered standard
bearers are well known for this profile within the Cape Breton musical community, and
their names were preserved here in acknowledgment both of this existing public role,
and also in acknowledgment that what is said, is already understood without
controversy within the community and by the individual in question.
After I engaged in dialogue with these musicians, I transcribed our conversations
attempting to identify the prejudices of both myself and my conversation partner.289 To
do this, I summarized the topics of discussion, and then approached my conversational
partners again, this time looking to clarify my summaries. In writing and clarifying these
summaries, I attempted to raise hidden prejudices to the surface. Using both the
transcripts and the summaries, I then looked for themes and subthemes that related to
understanding, action, and judgment.290 By identifying themes and raising prejudices to
the surface, I attempted to clarify the conditions in which understanding, action, and
judgment take place for a Cape Breton musician. In clarifying these three elements, I
attempt to elaborate how aural rhetoric works in Cape Breton music. These clarifications

This was a similar tactic to that proposed by Fleming, Gaidys, and Robb as a way to
attempt to enter the hermeneutic circle. See my discussion of Fleming, Gaidys, and Robb
on page 138.
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Moving between the transcripts and themes, back to the transcripts, and to the
conversational partner again was similar to the process employed by Grassley and
Nelms, who attempted to engage in the hermeneutic circle by moving “from the whole
to the part and back to the whole.” Grassley & Nelms, “Understanding Maternal
Breastfeeding Confidence: A Gadamerian Hermeneutic Analysis of Women’s Stories,”
845. See my discussion of Grassley and Nelms on page 122.
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will also help to explain how practical judgment works within the Cape Breton musical
community. I do not limit myself to any sort of “data” gleaned in this process, however.
I recognize that I am approaching this process having gained my own perspective and
prejudices from my experiences within the Cape Breton musical community. I will also
draw from these experiences to show how my own prejudices have been formed within
this community.
In the remaining chapters, I will elaborate the themes and subthemes drawn
from my conversations. I will begin by developing the Cape Breton musical community,
and explain how the community as a whole contributes to musicians’ understanding,
action, and judgment. I will then devote a chapter to the individual. This provides a
perspective that helps to relate the individual to the community. The community expects
the musician to operate within a range of musical decisions when performing. Here I
will elaborate how the community’s expectations inform the musician’s decisions.
Through particularly good performances, the musician can alter the community’s
expectations. Framing the chapters in such a way allows me to move from the whole
(the Cape Breton community), to the part (the Cape Breton musician), and back to the
whole (how the Cape Breton musician impacts the community). I explore the aural
rhetoric of Cape Breton by showing how the Cape Breton community shapes
understanding and expectations in the musician, but also by showing how a musician is
capable of exerting agency and altering the Cape Breton community’s expectations. This
framework allows me to reveal communal prejudices and clarify the conditions where
understanding, action, and judgment take place through perspectives that acknowledge
both the individual and the community.
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I have touched upon a definition of community at various points. I hint at a
definition, but before I continue, I should provide a working definition of ‘community’
as I have used it, and from which I will shape it going forward. This working definition
draws from the previously cited authors, and focuses on communication, specifically
conversation, as the key to community. To summarize, a community is a conversation
with a common topic that is constantly tested and reformed as each individual engages
with it. As this topic of conversation flows, the topic can highlight similarities and hides
differences. The conversation carries an argument of norms that exist in the form of
values and practices. This conversation also carries mechanisms of judgment. But these
norms and mechanisms are capable of shifting and evolving as individuals make their
mark on the conversation. As individuals act within the community they both explicitly
and implicitly proclaim their version of community values. They make an argument.
The conversation of community can exist within any communicative practice
that carries and shares meaning amongst its participants. It could be pop culture, words,
church, sport, music, art, theatre, academia, etc. This conversation exists as much in the
background discourses as in the foreground. To participate in this conversation requires
understanding these rhetorical practices—mere identification with a community is not
enough. One must be able to understand and participate with this conversation. Taking
part in this conversation does not require consciousness of being within the community,
nor does it require consciousness of the norms and mechanisms of judgments that exist
within the community. In fact, these mechanisms and norms might be so close to the
individuals, that they are blind to the mechanisms and norms existence.
When an individual enters the conversation of community, they enter a
pre-existing conversation. This conversation bears the scars of countless previous
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participants. These individuals engage with the conversation of community and hold
themselves accountable to those others also participating in the conversation. But they
also make their own mark on the conversation, and have the potential to change the
community. It is important to understand that I model community as a balance of the
individual and the group. As individuals cumulatively exert agency, they can subtly
change the community’s practice over time, all the while hiding those changes.
To say that a particular norm shapes community identity is not to say that the
community necessarily has consensus on the norm. But the shared judgments within the
conversation have tipped so that enough of the community identifies with a particular
value. When individuals engage in the conversation of community, they do not do so
with the intent of replicating the community's norms for the norm's sake. They do so
understanding that in adopting or rejecting any particular norm, they act within a
network of relationships with other individuals also participating in that conversation.
Because community is a conversation, it is not necessarily defined by place.
Technological limitations one forced conversations to remain in particular locations,
making place synonymous with community. But this is no longer the case, and now
conversations between individuals can take place at long distances. Community exists
when people appear together to act and disclose their identity. These appearances can
transcend place. Just as equally, geographic locations can be devoid of conversations.
Likewise, a group of people interacting is not necessarily a community, just as two
people talking with each other are not necessarily engaged in a conversation. A people
might fall into and out of a community as its conversation falls into and out of being.
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CHAPTER 7
CAPE BRETON MUSIC’S EVERYDAY
To develop a Cape Breton aural rhetoric, I will first focus on the 'everyday' of the
Cape Breton traditional music community. While the goal is to flesh out an aural
rhetoric, which concerns the performance of music, the everydayness that influences the
background rhetoric is influenced by both musical and non-musical factors. When
labeling a practice as part of the background, or 'everyday', I recognize that any practice
can also be seen as a special event, and part of the foreground. The only distinction
between situating a practice either as part of the background or as part of the foreground
is the interpretive lens being used. Using the lens of the ‘everyday’ can reveal how
concrete practices of the Cape Breton musical community construct the community's
everydayness.291 While classifying any practice as ‘everyday’ is arbitrary, I make this
classification to situate the particular practice within the Cape Breton community’s
vernacular.292 The resulting product should provide a picture of the daily life of the Cape

See my discussion of Giovanna Del Negro and Harris Berger's development of the
interpretive lens of the everyday on page 47. See also, Berger and Del Negro, Identity and
Everyday Life:, 9-14.
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This project relies on the discussion of music itself. The difficulty of writing about
music is well documented. If you were to delve into projects within the discipline of
ethnomusicology, you would see examples of written music that explain musical
concepts to an audience focused primarily on musical specifics. I will not be using such
method here for a few reasons. I am not presuming that everyone who reads this project
will be able to read music. Some of the musicians who I discuss within this project
cannot read music. Instead, as this project unfolds, I will discuss the elements of music
that relate to the topic being discussed as it is discussed. Where appropriate, I will
provide sources of media that can help supplement this discussion aurally. I will not
write a "music" section that acts independently of other sections because it would detract
from an understanding of what each particular element means within the context of the
overall project. If I were to discuss harmony in the abstract, it might provide the reader
with a basic understanding of harmony that might last for five minutes. If I discuss
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Breton musical community. I will use snapshots of examples and thoughts from the
Cape Breton community as the vehicle to describe these vernacular practices.
The background practices of the Cape Breton community’s social life constitute
and re-constitute the community's identity. Individuals become part of this community
when they gain the capacity to understand and engage in these background practices.
By working in the background, these practices often lack explicit articulation. In Cape
Breton, there is music literally in the background, as it can be heard in local retail shops,
restaurants, and other public places. Ads and articles cover musical performances and
the musical community in the newspaper. The music is talked about at church, at the
grocery store, and at other everyday places. In engaging with anything on the Island, it
is impossible to avoid the background of the music. Communal expectations extend to
the everyday musical events. For the audience, there are times to clap and times not to
clap, there are times to hiss and hoot, and times to sit in silence. Even if someone was
simply sitting at a bar in conversation with live music in the background, background
practices occur all around that person. The more individuals engage with these
practices, the more possibility of acquiring the rhetorical salience of these practices.293
Individuals acquire this rhetorical salience in these everyday places where the
music is performed, which is also where this salience is developed. While I previously
listed acts of the audience, such as clapping and cheering, the audience also forms

harmony in the context of where harmony relates to a practice within the Cape Breton
community, the musical concept will not be seen independent from the community.
I am not suggesting that every person can simply become rhetorically proficient in the
nuances of a community’s musical rhetoric through sheer willpower, much like
individuals can’t acquire the talent of great public speaking through practice alone. At
some level talent is involved. But just because a person isn’t a great public speaker
doesn’t mean that they haven’t acquired the language to understand rhetorical acts.
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opinions. These opinions range from judging the quality of individual performances to
the quality of tunes. These opinions concern the propriety of musical nuances—such as
whether one particular tune should follow another particular tune, or how a musician
should or shouldn’t express a particular passage. Audiences explicitly share these
opinions with one another and with the musicians by bringing it up in conversation at
the venue, or later elsewhere. They also implicitly share these opinions immediately
through non-verbal reactions. A cycle forms here, because individuals acquire the
rhetorical salience of the community’s shared common judgments, but they also shape
and reshape these common judgments.
The Island’s infrastructure and geography contributes to the community’s
background. It takes a little over two hours to drive north from Port Hawkesbury to
Cheticamp. This stretch of road encompasses the majority of the music venues for the
Cape Breton music community. Villages such as Judique, Mabou, Inverness, Port Hood,
and Southwest Margaree are scattered along Route 19, which is one of the two
thoroughfares that cuts north through the Western half of the Island. Driving north, you
would encounter one of these villages every half hour or so. It might seem like these
distances are too far apart to offer a single community, yet driving long distances are
built into the community's everyday.294 There are only a few restaurants and there are
only a few grocery stores. So people drive. But because there are only a few restaurants,
grocery stores, hardware stores, mechanics, gas stations, and any other retail store that

When I lived in downtown Mabou, across from the Red Shoe Pub, I had to do my
laundry in Inverness, twenty minutes north. If I wanted to shop for groceries at a
supermarket larger than the local fresh-mart, I had to drive the forty minutes south to
Port Hawkesbury. These are normal daily commutes for the area.
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we use in our everyday life, the members of the Cape Breton music community
frequently encounter each other at these locations and outside of the music venues.
Anyone who attended Saint Mary's Catholic Church in Mabou encounters the musical
community as part of the community backdrop. At every mass I attended at this church,
I recognized the parishioners from the local music venues, and the priest was a
well-known fiddler.295
When I talk about the community of Cape Breton’s fiddle music, I’m largely
referring to Inverness County. This is not at the expense of the three other counties of
Nova Scotia, but if you look at the locations of the dances and ceilidhs, most regular
venues are located in Inverness County. There are exceptional fiddlers, piano players,
and dancers from the Sydney area and elsewhere,296 but when it comes to discussing the
community in general, the focus is on Inverness County. While Inverness County covers
an area of nearly 1,500 square miles, it has a population of only about 19,000.297 This
population has been decreasing since 1986.298 The area is known for its landscape, and is

At one mass that I attended, the priest had his forearm in a cast. He joked about
getting injured at the dance the night before. This was already common knowledge for
the parishioners, despite being only eight hours later.
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Winston Fitzgerald, for example, was from Victoria County, Brenda Stubbert is from
Cape Breton County as are the Barra MacNeils. Fiddlers active in the community, like
Troy MacGillivray and Stan Chapman, are from mainland Nova Scotia.
296

Statistics Canada, “Inverness County: 2006 Community Profile,” last modified May 1,
2015, http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/prof/92591/details/page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo1=CD&Code1=1215&Geo2=PR&Code2=12&Data=
Count&SearchText=inverness&SearchType=Begins&SearchPR=01&B1=All&Custom=.
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Ibid. See also, Statistics Canada, “Inverness County: 2001 Community Profile;”and,
Statistics Canada, “Inverness County: 1996 Community Profile,” available at:
http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/index-eng.cfm.
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frequently featured as a must see destination by National Geographic.299 As a result,
tourism is one of the area’s main industries.
The population decrease of Cape Breton is partially caused by the lack of
employment opportunities.300 Young people move to Halifax or to western Canada.
Some will permanently locate to these new locations, while some travel back to Cape
Breton for long durations, alternating their time spent between Cape Breton and away.
Moving away to find employment is not a recent phenomenon in Cape Breton. While
the current generation travels to Western Canada, the previous generations migrated to
Boston, Toronto, and Detroit. These locations still feature enclaves of the Cape Breton
community that are actively engaged with the Island’s community. It is not uncommon
to encounter young Bostonians in Cape Breton with family ties to the community, who
have been traveling back and forth all of their life.301 These Bostonians identify with the
Cape Breton community and share an intertwined social life.302 This aspect of the Cape
Breton everyday allows community to transcend place. Cape Breton families extend

See, National Geographic, Drives of a Lifetime: 500 of the World’s Most Spectacular Trips
(National Geographic Press, 2010). See also, The Canadian Press, “National Geographic
names Cape Breton a ‘must-see’ place,” Halifax Chronicle Herald, December 8, 2012,
http://thechronicleherald.ca/travel/229278-national-geographic-names-cape-breton-a‘must-see’-place.
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For a brief overview of Cape Breton’s current outmigration see, Nelson Ferguson,
“From Coal Pits to Tar Sands: Labour Migration Between an Atlantic Canadian Region
and the Athabasca Oil Sands,” Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society 17 & 18
(2011): 106-118.
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Boston has regular Cape Breton square dances at the Canadian American Club that
often feature musicians visiting from Cape Breton.
301

Some Bostonians move to Cape Breton in order to take an active life in the Cape
Breton music community, such as the late Jerry Holland and Doug Lamey. Holland was
considered one of Cape Breton’s most influential fiddlers, and it would be difficult to
find any Cape Breton event that did not feature a musician performing a tune that he
composed.
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great distances. These families stay in touch and will either form gatherings of Cape
Bretoners abroad, or travel back to Cape Breton often enough that they maintain contact
with the background conversations of the community. When Cape Breton musicians
play venues on the road, they are likely to be held accountable to audience members
who still participate in the Cape Breton music community in Cape Breton.303
Members of the Cape Breton musical community often share family relations.
Cape Breton fiddler Glenn Graham’s Master’s Thesis discusses the role of family
relations in the maintenance of the Cape Breton fiddle tradition.304 Romanticists idealize
the Cape Breton fiddler by claiming that Cape Breton music is passed on ‘in the blood’—
as if the ability to play the fiddle was transposed through DNA. While there is arguably
a genetic disposition to artistic ability, Graham points out how families maintain the
tradition simply through exposure. When a child grows up listening to nothing but live
fiddle music, they are more inclined to play the fiddle and participate in the community.
They don’t even have to take an active role and learn the fiddle or piano in order to have
grasped the basics of what it means to be part of the community.305 Family members
maintain their relations over long distances, staying current on the happenings back

Fiddler Natalie MacMaster, who will perform at larger venues in the United States
due to the large crowds that she draws, will sometimes poll for Cape Bretoners when at
New England concerts. This inevitably results in more than a few shouting out.
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I review Graham’s work in Chapter 5, at page 109. Graham, Cape Breton Fiddle Music:
The Making and Maintenance of a Tradition (2004).
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One Red Shoe Pub waitress told me that she has no problem enforcing discipline in
the pub if anyone gets rowdy. She would never think of calling the police. Rather, she
would call the mother of the offending party, knowing that the mother’s wrath strikes
more fear than the police ever could. This is a possibility because she knows the mother
of every one of the pub’s patrons.
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home, and constantly visiting. The tie of family contributes to a reason that the Cape
Breton musical community transcends place.
Many Cape Bretoners trace their heritage to Highland Scots who settled on the
Island in the late 1700s and thereafter. This Scottishness is an important part of the
community’s collective identity, and sets the stage for the routine of the everyday. When
I say that they 'trace their heritage' I don't mean that they simply know their family came
to Cape Breton from Scotland. Some musicians can trace the musical lineage of all the
musicians in their family born in Cape Breton since the 19th century.306 Some families
have maintained a relationship with cousins still living in Scotland. Other families are
only recently in their second or third generation of English speakers, with Scots Gaelic
actively spoken in the Island through the 1950s. The importance of the community’s
Scottish roots contributes heavily to the community’s background practices.
Though not everyone in the community is Scottish, precisely how the members
of the community identify with this Scottish-ness differs by generation. Many of the
older members of the community see themselves as part of Scottish culture, whereas the
younger generations see themselves as part of Cape Breton culture (recognizing the
Cape Breton culture’s Scottish roots).307 Some of the older Cape Bretoners, when meeting

The commonly used ‘starting point’ for Scottish tradition in Cape Breton, is 1773,
which is when the immigrant ship The Hector sailed from Scotland, and landed in Pictou,
Nova Scotia, bringing with it Scottish Highlanders cleared from their lands. See Michael
Boudreau, “A Rare and Unusual Treat of Historical Significance: The 1923 Hector
Celebration and the political economy of the past,” Journal of Canadian Studies 28 (1993):
28-48.
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Elizabeth Doherty traces this generational understanding of identifying as Scottish
versus identifying as Cape Breton in her dissertation. She charts how albums from
musicians over the past thirty or so years have transitioned from recognizing that they
play Scottish violin, to Scottish music of Cape Breton Island, to finally Cape Breton
music. See Doherty, Paradox on the Periphery (1996)
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me for the first time, ask an opening question along the lines of, "Do you play the good
Scottish music?" These community members see Scottishness as synonymous with Cape
Bretonness. When Cape Breton dancer Willie Fraser passed away at age 100, his obituary
read: "Fraser remembered as legend of Scottish culture in Cape Breton."308 The
distinction between the youth who identify as Cape Breton culture, and the older
generation who identifies with Scottish culture revealing a differing generational
understanding within this community. The youth recognize that the Cape Breton
identity began in Scotland, but see it as having evolved as Cape Bretoners make their
mark. The older generation recognizes that the Cape Bretoners have made an impact on
the music, but see that impact as a natural progression of the culture's Scottishness.309
Because of the tourism, Cape Bretoners frequently interact with non-locals in
their everyday. The younger people of Mabou who I associated with dubbed these
people PFAs, or ‘People From Away.’ Tourists would come to Cape Breton for many

Laura Jean Grant, “Fraser remembered as legend of Scottish culture in Cape Breton,”
Cape Breton Post, March 24, 2015, http://www.capebretonpost.com/News/Local/201503-24/article-4088370/Fraser-remembered-as-legend-of-Scottish-culture-in-CapeBreton/1.
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Some of the younger generation's musicians have spent time in Scotland associating
with Scotland's musicians. There was a period of time in the 1990s and early 2000s
where Cape Bretoners were brought back to Scotland, and the Scottish were told (by
Scottish romanticists) that the Cape Bretoners were the authentic representation of what
Scottish culture should be, since the culture was (according to them) preserved in Cape
Breton unchanged for nearly 200 years. The ridiculous assumptions of this argument
aside, many Scottish musicians were not happy to hear such a critique. One Cape Breton
fiddler who lived in Scotland for a time remarked on how she had to overcome the
stigma associated with those who said that Cape Breton was more Scottish than
Scotland. She, and many other younger musicians who travel to Scotland, recognize that
Scottish music evolved in a different way than Cape Breton music, and they recognize
the virtues of this separate evolution. But likewise, they don't consider themselves to be
'Scottish' musicians. Rather, they identify as being Cape Breton musicians who, though
they share a common past with Scotland, are their own distinct culture.
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different reasons. Some would come for the hiking on the Cabot Trail, others would
come for salmon fishing in the Margaree River, and still others would come specifically
for the music. Tourists would typically drive to Cape Breton from elsewhere in Canada,
as well as the Northeast of the United States. It is also common for ‘PFAs’ to purchase
summer homes in Cape Breton, since gorgeous property is relatively cheap. Interacting
with these PFAs is a major part of the Cape Breton music community, as they frequently
attend dances and concerts. Their interaction allows for insight into the community’s
social expectations in a sort of musical shibboleth, since it is common for the PFAs to
clash with communal expectations, and in so doing, set themselves apart from the
musical community.310
Being labeled as a PFA is neither a binary, nor is it permanent. Musicians from
other traditions, such as Irish musicians, are readily accepted into the Cape Breton
musical community, and mostly because they have a pre-disposition to understand the
norms of the Cape Breton musical community, and can fit in. Elizabeth Doherty, an Irish
musician from Donegal who wrote her Ph.D. on the Cape Breton musical community,
was one such musician, as was Irish flute player Nuala Kennedy. While they might not
have had a mastery of every step of the Cape Breton square dance, they began with an
understanding of traditional music and traditional music communities, having come
from a traditional music community themselves. Slightly different are PFAs who are not
musicians, but who perhaps purchase homes in Cape Breton, and begin attending the

These could be little things, like asking a musician what song he just played, when the
Cape Bretoners would refer to it as a tune, or like clapping in time to music, when the
Cape Bretoners would stomp their feet (frowning upon clapping, since clapping has a
tendency to distract).
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dances and concerts regularly. Through this exposure and interaction, they gradually
acquire an understanding of the music, and of the community’s norms. Members of the
community might begin recognizing the couple who is attending the dance, and who
has demonstrated competency in participating in the dance. This familiarity would place
them in a different accord than the PFAs whose faces are seen for only a week before
they leave the Island for good.
The spectrum shown by the PFAs illustrates how acquiring the vernacular
language of a community does not occur through will alone. Those who belonging to the
Cape Breton music community understand the community’s local rhetoric, and
participate in the local conversations. When I say ‘local’ conversations, I do not mean the
ability to talk about the weather while at the gas pump. I mean the ability to talk about
the newest fiddler to play at the West Mabou dance while at the gas pump. Those in the
community understand the common judgment of the community—not simply the
common judgment as if all Cape Breton community members agree that last night’s
dance was good—but the common judgment of agreeing that last night’s dance itself is a
topic relevant to the community. Community members understand the community’s
background practices, participate in the local conversations, and understand local
rhetoric.
7.1. Musical Practices of the Cape Breton Community
Members of the Cape Breton music community have a background
understanding of the music itself, the people who play the music, the people who listen
to the music, and the various locations where the music is routinely performed. These
members have a background understanding of the rhetorical musical action. The music
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is primarily dance music. As such, the two prominent rhetorical acts are musical
performance and dance performance. In discussing the background practices of the
musical performance, I will first provide a brief overview of the structure of the music,
before then discussing how these practices are acquired and transmitted. I will then
focus on the performance of dance. The goal here is to outline how these background
practices create the framework for the aural rhetoric of the Cape Breton musical
community.
7.1.1. The Structure of Music in Cape Breton
In explaining the structure of the Cape Breton music, I will explain some of the more
technical music elements, such as how the melody and the accompaniment works
musically. This will include a discussion of the various tune types heard in Cape Breton,
and how these tune types differ from one another. I will also explain the instruments
typically found in the Cape Breton music community, as well as how the musicians
approach each performance. Finally, I will discuss how musicians musically express
themselves through the use of embellishments and variations. In discussing these
musical elements in this section, while I am discussing the actions performed by the
musician, I am doing this from the standpoint of the community, and how communal
expectations relate to each of these musical elements. In a later section I will discuss the
musical from the perspective of the individual judgment of the musician.
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7.1.2. The Cape Breton Melody
The usual arrangement for any live Cape Breton venue features a single fiddler playing
melody accompanied by a single piano player. Variations of this basic model exist. The
most common variation would either involve replacing the piano with a guitar, or
would add a guitar as a third musician.311 It is also possible for a second fiddle to play
melody alongside the first fiddler. The addition of a snare drum has been growing more
common312 as has the addition of a bass player. While these ‘extra’ musicians, such as
the bass player and the drummer, are rare at live venues, they are more likely in the
recording studio, where they will record for an album.313 This typical arrangement of

This depends on the venue, at a dance, you’ll never see the piano replaced. At a
ceilidhs, this is more likely, and at a festival, or a venue that targets tourists, replacing
the piano with the guitar is much more likely.
311

Typically the drummer would only use brushes on the drum kit, as opposed to drum
sticks. This is because the drums’ purpose is to enhance the fiddle, and drum sticks
would draw attention away from the fiddle.
312

This is because there are so few musicians who play bass, drums, or even guitar, that
it is more difficult to secure these musicians for live events than it is to secure them for a
recording studio. When scheduling for a recording studio, musicians can schedule
around the bass player or drummers schedule.
313

This is also why only a few piano players are featured as accompanists on CDs. In
general, there are a few piano players, such as Tracy Dares, Mac Morin, Joel Chaisson,
Allan Dewar, and Troy MacGillivray, that fiddlers seek out for studio recordings. These
piano players are valued for bringing creative ideas into the studio. The studio differs
from live venues. Rather than having to be spontaneous in the performance, musicians
can work together to plan out arrangements. This is not to say that the musicians have
hyper-planned each detail of each performance. There is room for spontaneity, and the
energy that it brings. But the musicians can work together to talk through the
parameters for that spontaneity, and offer discussion over doing new things.
In the studio, this innovation largely occurs due to a combination of conversation, trial,
and error. The musicians will discuss what worked, what didn’t, and alter their
performance based on this conversation. The result will be because of a performance
that sits in between spontaneous and orchestrated, but the result will also contribute to
the musician’s repertoire of what is considered acceptable within the music, and is likely
to contribute to the community’s understanding of what is considered acceptable.
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musicians differs from most other forms of Celtic music.314 In Irish music, for example,
the default environment is the session. In a session, many musicians share melody and
many musicians share the accompaniment. While virtuoso performances will sometimes
feature a single melody musician, the Irish community on a whole is more structured
around the group performances.315 The Cape Breton performance rarely features groups
or sessions. Even at house parties comprised of a majority of musicians, these musicians
might play one or two sets in small groups, but will usually take turns at the melody,
one after another. The musicians at these parties are as content to listen to other melody
players taking turns, as they are to play themselves.
The fiddle is the primary melody instrument in Cape Breton music. To be clear,
in Cape Breton, the fiddle is a violin. It is the same exact instrument as a violin. It is not a
different instrument. The difference in names being used for the instrument is largely
one of context, with folk music often being described as being played by a fiddle, with
classical music being played by a violin.316 The instrument has four strings, commonly

In order to demonstrate the uniqueness of the everyday background of Cape Breton, I
will often contrast the Cape Breton music community with the Irish music community,
as this will show how even traditional musics, and more specifically Celtic musics are
distinct from one another. This will also help to show that aural rhetoric requires
understanding the background practices of the specific community.
314

For example, Seamus Connolly and Liz Carrol are Irish musicians known for their
solo music performances. But Irish music features 'super groups' that include the
Chieftains, Danu, Solas, Lunasa, and others. It is far more frequent for Irish music, even
at a high level, to feature groups. Musical groups exist in Cape Breton, but they are
relatively recent and have yet to become a norm. The Cape Breton band Beolach is one
such group, but most of the musicians in this group are also know n for their own solo
work.
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Interestingly enough, in previous generations of Cape Bretoners, it would be common
to hear the instrument be called a violin, and the style of music being played labeled as
music of the 'Scottish violin.' It’s also not unheard of for the cello to be referred to as a
fiddle. The American cellist Natalie Haas often plays with Scottish fiddler Alasdair
316
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tuned to the notes of E, A, D, and G, and is played by drawing a bow across the strings
with the musician's dominant hand to elicit sound.317 The musician uses their nondominant hand to press the strings on the fingerboard in order to change the notes.
The fiddle isn’t the only melody instrument in Cape Breton. While I will discuss
the piano and the guitar more when I discuss accompaniment, they are both likely to be
heard playing melody in addition to accompaniment. The bagpipes are also sometimes
heard playing melody in Cape Breton. There are two main styles of bagpipe music that
you would hear on Cape Breton. The first is the military style bagpiping, which is the
traditional picture that comes to mind when someone thinks of a bagpiper. This
bagpiper plays standing and somewhat formally reminiscent to the highland piping
heard in Scotland. But Cape Breton also features another, increasingly less common,
form of piping, in the traditional Gaelic bagpipes. The traditional Gaelic bagpipe style
features a bagpiper who sits and plays pipes alongside the accompanying piano much

Fraser and is part of a recent wave within traditional music of cellists playing fiddle
tunes on their cello, and sometimes referring to their cellos as fiddles.
I say 'primary hand' here because the musician should use their dominant hand for
the bow, and less dominant hand for on the fingerboard. Classical musicians tend to
eschew the notion that we have dominant hands and less dominant hands, and instead
require all violinists to bow with their right hand, and manipulate the fingerboard with
their left. Cape Breton features left-handed fiddle players, though, which often causes
confusion since these fiddlers will use the bow with their left hand. This will often draw
remarks from non-Cape Bretoners, such as, “don’t they realize the advantage they
would be at if they played the way everyone else does, because their left hand would be
able to move faster.” People who have made this statement, generally don’t realize the
logic that, if “the way everyone else does it” really did provide an advantage to
lefthanders, everyone else would likely be doing it the other way. But they also don’t
realize that the dominant hand uses the bow because the bowing arm requires far more
coordination than the fingerboard hand. Look at yourself. You likely use a keyboard in
front of your computer. You’re likely using your left hand when you type. And your
left-handed fingers are likely moving as fast as a fiddler typing fast. For a right handed
fiddler, the left hand is more or less stationary on the fiddle, with only the fingers
moving. The right arm needs to coordinate for every note, and requires far more skill.
317

158

like a fiddler would. While military pipers use a standardized regimented fingering, the
traditional Gaelic pipers typically did not. Gaelic bagpiping was an aural informally
learned skill. There are only a few pipers in the Cape Breton community, such as Kevin
Dugas, who can still play for dance.318 While more and more a rarity, the bagpipes as a
melody instrument are still part of the community identity.
7.1.3. The Cape Breton Accompaniment
The accompanist contextualizes the melody. The accompanist controls tempo
and can dictate the overall mood of a performance through chord choice. If the
accompanist did not maintain the tempo, both the fiddler and the audience would be
confused. If the accompanist played a chord that clashed with the melody, it would
make the entire performance seem amateurish, even if the fiddler performed
flawlessly.319 The accompanist’s chord choice can make a tune sound dark, pensive, or

See an example of Dugas playing, “Wednesday Nigh Ceilidh – Kevin Dugas and Matt
MacIsaac,” YouTube, last visited May 22, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a2X51S4cN1Q.
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For an analogy here, think about flavors. When lemon is combined with mint, the
lemon can compliment the mint. But when lemon is combined with coffee, the
combination can create an unpleasant experience.
319

But you might argue that you favor the flavor combination of lemon and coffee.
Apparently, this flavor combination is ‘a thing.’ That some people might enjoy this
flavor combination illustrates my overall point even more. This combination of flavors is
not absurd to some, much like how not every culture hears chord ‘clashes’ the same.
Hearing chords as clashing or not is a result of community expectations, in part built by
a community’s background practices. Those who come from a Western music
background tend to hear certain chords as dissonant or consonant, not because they
absolutely are. But because it fits with our understanding of how notes should
compliment each other. Non-Western music communities hold other opinions. Even
Western music communities from the past held different musical opinions. So too for
your favored lemon and coffee combination—whether or not the flavors compliment
each other depend on the expectations of the taster. See, Bruce R. Smith, “The Contest of
Apollo and Marsyas: Ideas About Music in the Middle Ages,” in By Things Seen:
159

bright. While I will discuss this more at length later, through chord choice, the
accompanist can build anticipation, and then create release. While the melody’s
structure limits what chords can be used at any given time, this limitation still offers
infinite room for creativity from the accompanist. While there might not be ‘right’
chords to be used at any given time, there are definitely ‘wrong’ chords—those that
would clash with the melody.
If the accompanist did play the wrong chord, depending on the makeup of the audience,
the fault of the music’s ‘failures’ might be misplaced. Understanding the
accompaniment’s role in contributing to the quality of performance can distinguish
audiences.
“Especially if you're playing for a foreign audience. If you're playing around here
than everyone knows the tunes, and they can pretty much tell a good fiddle
player. But if you're playing for an audience from away, if the accompaniment
sucks than they think the fiddler sucks.”320
As a mistake by the accompanist can cause the audience to judge the fiddler to be a poor
performer, so too can an exceptional accompanist cause an unfamiliar audience to
perceive a mediocre fiddler to be an exceptional fiddler. This is caused by how the
accompanist—not the fiddler—chooses to express the music.
“A lot of the times, that's where the variety comes in - and someone will say, oh
my god that's a great fiddle player. And they won't realize that it's really the
piano player. And they're saying, oh this time we'll do a relative minor, and this
time we'll do this, and it's unconscious. And that makes the variety of the music.
But it's really the piano player that makes the dynamic. You can have a great

Reference and Recognition in Medieval Thought, ed. David Jeffrey, Ottawa: University of
Ottawa Press (1979) 87-107.
320

Confidential Respondent, interview by Greg Dorchak, December. 2010.
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accompanist, and not a great fiddler, and people who wouldn't know any better
would think that fiddler is fantastic.”321
The way that the piano player controls the context will be discussed further in the next
chapter, but relevant here is that the Cape Breton community’s background
understanding of the musician’s roles allows community members to discern a
musician’s ability in ways that audience’s who lack that understanding cannot.
The accompanist accompanies the melody by using of chords. So while the melody
consists of notes played sequentially and these notes form the phrases of a tune, a chord
is formed of three or more notes played at the same time. The most common chord
structure has only three notes and is called a triad. When the accompanist adds a fourth
note to these triads, they changing the ‘quality’ of a chord.322 Accompanists accompany a
tune by playing chords along with the melody, in a sequence called a chord progression.
Because a chord progression is relative to the key it is performed in, rather than referring
to the specific notes of a chord, the musician will refer to the chord’s relative position in
the musical scale (written out as a roman numeral). For example, in the key of C major,
the C major chord is the first chord, and therefore the I. Likewise, in the key of G major,
the G major chord is the first chord, and also referred to as the I. The accompanist
generally uses the chords that correspond to the key of whichever tune the fiddler is
playing. So as not to bog down this discussion with musical theory, I will keep this
section brief, and focus on the communal expectations. But there will be points later will
I will have to elaborate on more specific elements of music theory as they relate to how
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For an example, see, “Understanding 7, 9, 11, and 13 chords,” YouTube, last visited
May 1, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7c6IsNbh5FI.
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accompanists make judgments in the chording of tunes based on community
expectations, and in so doing, creating rhetorical effects.
The main accompaniment instrument in Cape Breton is the piano. While there might be
some ceilidhs or other venues where a fiddler performs solely with a guitar, the majority
of accompaniment is done with a piano. There will never be a dance without the
piano.323 Piano as the main accompaniment instrument differs from other Celtic music
traditions, where the guitar is usually the main accompaniment instrument. The piano
brings unique properties that contribute to how the music as a whole is understood
within the community. The piano is a percussive instrument, which allows it to maintain
a solid beat necessary for dancing. The piano has 88 keys, meaning that the piano player
can play more than seven octaves worth of notes. The Cape Breton piano player
typically will use the left hand (deeper notes) to play the bass notes when accompanying
a tune, and the right hand will play the chords of a tune. This allows the piano player to
play both the bass notes and the chords. Conversely, the piano player will sometimes
use the right hand to mimic the melody along with the melody musician. The left hand
here would play either bass or chords.
The keyboard of the piano features the same pattern of keys for every octave. So when
the pianist learns the fingering for chords or a melody, this fingering is the same
regardless of the octave being played. This gives the musician the option of playing
multiple voicings of a single chord or tune anywhere on the piano once they learn it in

This is likely due to the acoustic properties of the piano versus the acoustic properties
of the guitar. The piano doesn't need to be microphoned for a dance, while a guitar
would have to be microphoned. The piano can resonate and fill the dance hall, as well as
maintain the percussion needed for the dancers to dance.
323
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one spot. Also, the keyboard lends itself to allowing the musician to break apart various
chords. When striking the keys for a chord, the piano player can divide the chord,
playing only two of the three notes, followed by the third a moment later, or vice versa.
When the musician breaks apart the notes of a chord, it is called ‘arpeggiating’. Pianist
could also play the three notes of a triad, and while this chord resonates, play a fourth
note, which would change the quality of the chord.
The guitar is the second most common accompaniment instrument in Cape Breton. It
differs from the piano structurally, which distinguishes how the instrument can
accompany when compared with the piano. So while the pianist can access more than
seven octaves of notes, the guitar player has little more than two octaves to work with.
While the piano player can use both the left hand and the right hand to play notes, the
guitar player has to finger the notes on the fingerboard with (for a right handed player)
their left hand, while they use their right hand to strum the strings. Also, because of the
keyboard being the same up and down the piano, when the piano player learns how to
perform something in one octave, or learns one chord, the piano player can transfer that
knowledge and utilize it up and down the keyboard. The guitarist's fingerboard does
not offer the same structural advantages. Whereas the piano player can transfer the
same shape324 up and down the keyboard, the guitar player has to learn an entirely new
shape when playing a different voicing of the chord. When a piano player wants to
change the voicing of a chord by adding a fourth note, they only have to lay down an
additional finger in order to make a new voicing. But the guitar player might have to
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learn an entirely new pattern to make a similar effect. The structural differences also
limit how the guitar can accompany. Because the piano allows for the piano player to
divide the work between the right hand and left hand, and further allows chords to be
divided rhythmically, the Cape Breton piano style has developed a syncopated rhythm.
But the guitar cannot mimic this rhythm. So functionally, the guitarists and piano
players differ in how they can approach accompanying.
Some Cape Breton Guitarists, like Dave MacIsaac, have crafted their accompaniment
style in order to compliment and work with the piano.325 But the major influence in
guitar players comes from other Celtic traditions, specifically of Irish influence. Guitar is
popular in Irish music. Irish guitar players like John Doyle are popular amongst Cape
Breton musicians.326 But the way that guitars accompany in Irish community differs a
great deal from how a guitar accompaniment style that would seek to compliment the

MacIsaac is referred to throughout this dissertation, and his history deserves a brief
mention. MacIsaac plays both the fiddle and the guitar. His guitar ability extends
beyond Cape Breton music. Early in his musical career, MacIsaac toured as a blues
guitarist, playing with such musicians as Jon Lee Hooker. Later, MacIsaac toured with
the Cape Breton musical acts such as the Rankin Family and Natalie MacMaster, that
were popular throughout Canada and the United States. MacIsaac is concerned by
musicians in Cape Breton to be an encyclopedia of tunes. Musicians routinely call him
and sing out an obscure melody so that MacIsaac can tell them the name of the tune. See
an example of MacIsaac playing with the late Jerry Holland in 1981, “Jerry Holland
Rehearsal with Dave MacIsaac,” YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwXoFqfJjN0.
325

Doyle currently plays with American Irish fiddler Liz Carroll who is also popular
amongst Cape Breton musicians, but for a long time played in the Irish traditional ‘super
group’ Solas. Doyle’s strumming accentuates the beat differently than a Cape Breton
piano player, creating a different rhythm all together. Doyle’s technique is so dominant
that it would distract and clash with any rhythm the piano player attempted. Compare
MacIsaac’s playing the from previous footnote with Doyle’s playing here, “Michael
McGoldrick John McCusker and John Doyle (sic),” YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzOKVeOgqp8.
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piano would work. As this Irish influence in Cape Breton guitar grows, and as the piano
accompaniment itself evolves, the two are diverging stylistically.
“I wasn't there, but I daresay that many years ago, the guitar player and piano
player would have played the same thing. It was very simplified, and you had
your two or three chords, and the guitar was doing the same thing. Today, the
guitar players are taking in all these Irish influences, and the piano is getting
stuff from all over the place, and they're getting together and wanting to show
off all those new things, and it does not work. Unless it's rehearsed.”327
The community does not reject these changes outright, and the guitar is gaining
popularity.
The guitar is not acceptable for accompanying a dance on its own, so as long as the
dance is the fore of Cape Breton music scene, the guitar will not be the main
accompaniment instrument in Cape Breton. The changing nature of Cape Breton
accompaniment causes controversy over how the guitar and piano can work together.
This argument centers on how the two instruments rhythmically approach the music.
“And it does not work, these new guitar rhythms. I call them new rhythms, like
the Irish thing is creeping up, and it does not work with the piano playing. These
new rhythms can't work with the strathspey, it's not dotted enough. They're
great at what they do. But they don’t have to play with the piano.”328
The focus here, is not on the problem with the guitar in general, but in how the guitar
and the piano work together. This piano player is fine with the Irish style influencing the
guitar, but finds that, this new influence does not work with the piano, nor does it work
with tune types such as the strathspey.329
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This piano player clarifies at other times, that he has no problems with the guitar in
general. This piano player values playing with Dave MacIsaac. But MacIsaac has a
329
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7.1.4. The Cape Breton Fiddle Tune
I have been referring at various times to specific ‘tune’ types without discussing
what a tune is. A ‘tune’ is how traditional musicians label the melodies they play. If
someone were to interact with the Cape Breton community and refer to these melodies
as songs, not tunes, it would indicate that person as an outsider who is unfamiliar with
the tradition. Tunes generally have a common structure, where twelve bars are played
and repeated (called the A section), and then twelve different bars are played and
repeated (called the B section). This whole process is then itself repeated, producing
AABBAABB, before the musician transitions into the next tune.330 These different
sections are themselves made up of phrases. I have heard one Cape Breton musician
describe these phrases as calls and answers. This general pattern stands true no matter
the tune type. Of which, in Cape Breton, the most common tune types are jigs, reels,
strathspeys, and marches, with the occasional air.
Jigs and reels are two different forms of traditional tunes. Reels have a 4/4 time
signature, while a jig has a 6/8 time signature. The first number tells you how many
beats are in each musical bar, and the second number tells you the note value of each
beat. So in the case of the reel (4/4) there are four beats in a measure, and the quarter
note gets one beat. In the case of the jig, there are 6 beats in a measure, and the eighth
note gets one beat. The major difference between the two, is that the jig is subdivided

unique approach to playing guitar. MacIsaac's goal is to compliment the piano with his
guitar, rather than seeing the guitar as the primary accompaniment.
Some tunes have C, D, and maybe even more sections, and some tunes are not
usually repeated. Although as a general rule, most tunes are repeated a single time. This
is a distinction from some Irish communities where a tune is often repeated three times,
and in New England contra dance communities, where a tune is repeated more times
than I can count.
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into groups of three. You can say "jig-it-tee, jig-it-tee" over and over to match the timing
of the jig. That's three syllables, repeated evenly over and over.331 While if you attempted
to repeat the same phrase to a reel, it would quickly feel off-beat and awkward. A reel
has a more consistent driving pulse that accentuates every fourth note.332 Jigs are often
played by themselves, although lately it has become more common for fiddlers to pair
jigs with reels or other tune types. Reels, when being played for a square set, will
generally be played by themselves, but otherwise will likely be preceded by strathspeys.
A strathspey is a tune type that, like the reel, is in 4/4 timing. However, where a reel is
played with a straight-ahead, consistently emphasized beat, the beat of a strathspey has
a varied emphasis—almost as if the beat had a hiccup.333 This hiccup itself is not
consistent like the offbeat in ska or reggae. The beat in a strathspey depends on the
specific tune being played. There are two general types of strathspey: the slow
strathspey and the fast strathspey. For step-dancing, the fiddler will start out with some
fast strathspeys, before transitioning into the reels. At a sit-down concert or a ceilidh, the
fiddler would probably start out a tune with an air or a march—both slower forms of
fiddle tunes also in 4/4—before transitioning to the fast strathspey and then the reel. It
is unlikely to hear the strathspey on its own without hearing the reel to follow.

See, for example, Cape Breton fiddler Jerry Holland playing a set of jigs, “Jerry
Holland – Jigs,” YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dbkBzalYt-0.
331

See, for example, Cape Breton fiddler Jerry Holland playing a set of reels, “Jerry
Holland Reels,” YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bTZSRDG3_sQ.
332

See Cape Breton fiddlers Buddy MacMaster and Natalie MacMaster playing a
common set of strathspeys and reels, “Natalie MacMaster – King George Medley,”
YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jbY-LpV3K-k.
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An air is also usually in 4/4 timing. This is the slowest tune type played in Cape
Breton. It is usually played to start a long set that will progress to strathspeys and reels,
or it will be played by itself. It has a more lyrical quality than most tunes, and you could
imagine it sung with words. It is unlikely to ever hear an air at a dance, although it is
common to hear them at concerts, as they generally create a more pensive atmosphere
for the audience. The fiddler will often use the air to create such an atmosphere to allow
for a more dramatic contrast when they transition to a strathspey.
Marches are typically in 4/4, but could also be written in 6/8. Whether it is
written in 4/4 or 6/8, the emphasis is placed on two beats in the measure (so the
emphasis would either be placed on the first or the third beats of either measure). The
march comes from the military tradition, and is often originally written for pipes.
Historically, they were literally used for the pipes to set the pace for an army to march
into battle. While faster than an air, they are slower than strathspeys and reels, so when
a fiddler strings together a longer set of tunes, the march will come before the strathspey
or reel. It is unlikely to hear a march played on its own without being followed by a
strathspey and reel.
The tunes played in the Cape Breton musical community have a variety of
origins. Many are composed by Cape Bretoners, and many regulars in the community,
whether they are musicians or not, have tunes named after them. Many of the tunes also
come from Scotland. It is also common to hear tunes from Irish, New England, and other
Canadian fiddle traditions. Fiddlers are always seeking out 'new' tunes to perform,
especially musicians who record and sell albums. Cape Breton musicians have been
recording albums since the mid-twentieth century, so all of the commonly played tunes
in the Cape Breton tradition have already been recorded. Various musicians have told
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me that they see no point in recording a tune that's already been recorded, unless you're
going to perform it drastically different than its previous record. Therefore musicians
seek out new tunes, or write new tunes. After popular fiddlers record new tunes or
tunes from other traditions and begin to play these new tunes live, these tunes will
generally gain a brief period of popularity. When I say 'new tunes', I'm not necessarily
saying that the tune itself is brand new, just that it's new to the Cape Breton vernacular.
One of the locations that fiddlers will find 'new' tunes, is in the tune collection books
written in the 18th and 19th centuries. These books each feature thousands of tunes,
many of which are not part of the Cape Breton vernacular. I have seen fiddlers spend
hours pouring through these books in search of a new tune.
This discussion of transitioning between tunes brings me to an important point
about how Cape Bretoners understand grouping tunes together. The way that Cape
Breton musicians (and Scottish musicians) group tunes together differs greatly from
how Irish musicians group tunes together. Irish session musicians will typically play the
same types of tunes in a set of tunes, whether it be reels or jigs. They will vary the key of
the tune that they play. So they might start out with a jig in the key of G major, and then
transition to a jig in the key of A minor, before ending in a jig in the key of D major. In
contrast, a Cape Breton musician will vary the structure of the tune type they play,
advancing from slower tunes into faster tunes.334 Using this structure to perform tunes is

See an example of Buddy MacMaster advancing from a commonly heard tune “Neil
Gow’s lament for the Death of his second wife,” into a set of Cape Breton strathspeys
and reels. The first tune was composed in the 18th century by Scottish composer Neil
Gow. Many of Gow’s tunes are part of the Cape Breton vernacular. “Buddy MacMaster
in Concert Cape Breton Fiddler Clip 2” YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ny2beJky_KM.
334
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engrained in the Cape Breton community’s background, to the point that it’s hidden
from their foreground recognition. One piano player who teaches outside the
community often points out he loses track of this:
“I think when you know something really well, that you take things for granted
when you're teaching. Because you just expect that everyone just understands
that. But I often get asked questions like: what comes first, a strathspey or a
march?”335
Musicians will sometimes deviate from this general structure, but the deviation is a
rarity. When musicians do deviate from the structure, they do so for the effect of
deviating from the norm, relying on the fact that the general structure of advancing from
march to strathspey to reel is itself part of the everyday, so that the deviation is
disruptive.
Musicians are expected to vary the tunes that they play so that they do not play
only the popular tunes. In Cape Breton, every year there seems to be a fad new tune that
no one can get enough of, and the following summer, the tune is burnt out. Play one of
these hits, and it’s fine, but play a second back-to-back and eyes roll. Musicians are also
expected to not repeat playing a tune during the night. Because it only takes about a
minute or so to play a single tune, when the fiddler plays for three hours for a typical
dance or ceilidh, it is more than possible that they play close to two hundred tunes. One
fiddler has estimated that, in order to play a dance, the fiddler should know at least a
thousand tunes, if not two thousand tunes. This is an enduring feat, not only for the
body to play for three hours straight, but also for the mind to recall so many tunes.
While it’s frowned upon for a fiddler to play a tune more than once in an evening, some
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have said that if they play two dances in a week, and repeat a tune on a Friday that they
might have played on Monday, some in the audience will give them grief.
While the musicians alter the type of tune they play within sets, they usually
maintain a consistent tonal center.336 The Cape Breton musician might start out with an
air in the key of G minor, before transitioning to a march in the key of G major, then into
a strathspey in the key of G major, then into a reel in G minor, and then a reel in G
major. Every tune played by the musician in this example was built on a tonal center of
G. Maintaining this tonal center is central to the Cape Breton vernacular, and is distinct
from other traditions. At one ceilidh, where I heard a well respected Irish musician play
a set of Irish reels that transitioned between keys with each new reel, I also overheard an
older Cape Bretoner in the audience comment about whether the fiddler knew enough
tunes in G or not337. There was a disconnect, in that the Cape Bretoner either didn't
understand that the Irish fiddler normally transitions keys, as is the Irish custom, or that
the person didn’t care. Likewise, an Irish music session might have a few sets where
they would transition between tune types, such as from jigs or hornpipes into reels. But
this as well is not a common practice, and will not happen in an extemporaneous Irish
session where the sets aren't worked out beforehand. These are both areas of the
everyday for members of the community, where the practice of how sets are
constructed, while not set and stone, carries with it notions of acceptability.

Here I say tonal center, referring to the various keys that relate to G, or A, or
whatever key it may be. But A major and A minor and A mixolydian (another key type)
share the same tonal center. But A major and B minor do not.
336

Younger fiddlers do generally play more keys within a set, but they do it for effect.
This is something that wasn't done fifty years ago.
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Note that this is a slight oversimplification that needs some expansion. Musicians
do transition between keys. But they won’t transition often. They might play seven tunes
in a row in the tonal center of G, before transitioning to a tune in the key of A to finish a
set. Finishing a set of tunes by transitioning to a tune in a ‘higher’ key is relatively
common, though not necessary. The is called ‘modulating’, and doing so can create a
sense of energy, because while the transition of tune is expected, the transition of key
isn’t. There is a sense of movement by shifting to a higher, some would say brighter,
key. Modulating a single time is common. Modulating twice in the same set is rare, and
if done outside of the right situation, could be frowned upon. The situations where I’ve
heard a musician modulate twice in the same set were where the fiddler was in the
midst of a long set of reels.338 But while the fiddler can modulate and change keys

I can think of one situation where, during a dance, a fiddler went from the key of A,
into a tune called “The Road to Errogie”, which is in the key of B, before transitioning
into a tune in the key of E. ‘The Road to Errogie’ was a showpiece in the key of B that
was the ‘it’ tune in Cape Breton around 2006. It was popular because playing a tune in
the key of B is difficult for fiddlers. The key of B requires four sharp notes, including A
sharp. The A sharp, while not difficult for the fiddler, is something that the musician is
not used to, since there are no tunes written with it (and in a tautology, there are no
tunes written with it because the fiddler isn’t used to it). In contrast, the bluegrass
tradition is full of tunes in the key of B. ‘The Road to Errogie’ also involves a shifting of
positions. This is another, somewhat difficult, skill. When the fiddler plays, their hand is
anchored to the end of the fingerboard. Because the hand never moves from here, the
fiddler gains muscle memory, based on their hand position, as to how to place a finger
so that a note is in tune. Knowing where to place the finger is relative to the position of
the hand, and because the position of the hand is determined by the fingerboard, there is
no discretion as to where that begins. But when a fiddler shifts into a higher position
(typically the third position, which is called the third position because the first finger on
the fingerboard is taking the place of where the third finger would normally be) they
have to move their entire hand up the fingerboard. The fiddler loses that anchor, and
has to learn where to place their hand in order to be in tune without the end of the
fingerboard to guide them. Because of this, it takes time for the fiddler to learn how to
play in this position in tune. There are not many Cape Breton fiddle tunes that require
shifting, and some fiddlers could go a lifetime being considered a reputable player
without ever playing a tune where they need to shift.
338
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sometimes, the acceptability of this practice is a relatively recent development, and it's
debatable that everyone in every generational cohort has accepted the practice. This new
trend shows that standards of acceptability that form the community's expectations can
be manipulated for effect. So the second shift to a new key creates effect by disrupting
the community's conventions and therefore creating a sense of surprise. But as
musicians begin to exploit this expectation more and more, shifting to a second key
could itself become a new norm.
7.1.5. Embellishments and expression in Cape Breton Fiddle Music
Not all notes are the same. The same tune played by two different musicians will
be different based on how the musician expresses notes, or how the musician makes
decisions about what to perform, or what chords to play. While the possibilities for
expression are shaped by the instrument, they are also shaped by communal
expectations. Even within this framework, individual decisions are made. While a Cape
Breton musician sounds different than an Irish musician playing the same tune, the
Cape Breton musician will also sound different from a different Cape Breton musician.
How musicians express themselves within these communal expectations is key to
understanding musical rhetoric.
If a Cape Bretoner plays the same tune as an Irish musician, the audience
members from their respective communities could easily identify that musician’s origin,
if not the musician themselves.339 The different musicians ‘embellish’ the music
differently. Embellishments are nuances in how one performs a note, similar to an accent

Some discerning blindfolded Cape Breton audience members would not only be able
to identify that the musician is from Cape Breton, they would also be able to identify the
specific musician.
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in speech. So while one community might speak slowly with a drawl while another
drops their ‘R’s, a community of musicians might slide into a note while another
community might drone a particular note. Irish musicians often embellish by sliding
into notes, while Cape Breton musicians approach notes more rigidly, with 'hammer
ons' or 'hammer offs.' In places where an Irish musician would 'roll' a note, the Cape
Breton musician would likely play a 'cut.' These embellishments are community patterns
of approaching each note.340
Embellishments can be planned, where a musician decides ahead of time that
they want to apply a certain embellishment to a particular section. But when not
planned, embellishments filter into how the musician naturally approaches the music.
“Even if it is a learned pattern, or something you've picked up along the way, you are
thinking about it, but you're not actually thinking about it. It's all on the fly.”341 One
Cape Breton piano player discusses how oftentimes his embellishments are influenced

I won’t go into detail here as to the precise technical descriptions of each of the
various unique Cape Breton embellishments as this could turn into a project all unto its
own. Each Cape Breton musician adopts the general stylistic embellishment in their own
unique way. The point I am trying to illustrate is that there is a general commonality
shared within the Cape Breton community that makes the music sound different from
other communities, even musicians from the respective different communities were to
perform the same tune. My point is not to describe the sound of these embellishments,
but to illustrate that judgment is the guiding force that distinguishes the musicians. If I
were to focus too long on the precise sound, it would detract from my argument.
Focusing on the precise sound would solidify a technique as essential to the ‘correct’
Cape Breton sound. I argue that, because individuals apply their understanding of
communal notions of acceptability, the community’s sound will eventually shift and
evolve. Other projects have done a better job than I ever could in describing the many
nuanced embellishment of various Cape Breton musicians, and have focused on how
these individuals have embellished the tunes differently. See, Kate Dunlay & David
Greenberg, The Dungreen collection: Traditional Celtic Violin Music of Cape Breton, (Toronto:
Dungreen Music, 1996).
340
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by how he might have heard a particular tune expressed by others. This influence is not
usually thought through: “Its probably something I subconsciously have heard this
method before… so I might have heard someone else heard a rip in a tune in that spot
before. It's very spontaneous.”342 While I cover the role of individuals in its own section,
acts of an individual can become part the community's collective background. This
musician picked up an embellishment through the constant listening to individuals in
the community.
The Cape Breton community does not approach embellishment with a single
mind. There is a stylistic spectrum of embellishments in the community, with what is
described as a 'dirty' sound on one side, and a ‘cleaner’ sound on the other. The ‘clean’
sound can be heard in musicians like Troy MacGillivray343 and Winston Fitzgerald,344
while the 'dirty' style can be heard in musicians like Donald Angus Beaton345 and Little
Mary MacDonald.346 With a clean style, the musician approaches playing notes crisp and
clear, while the 'dirty' style involves more droning. The dirty style has become less
popular after Winston Fitzgerald brought more attention to the cleaner style. Thus, the
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For an example of MacGillivray’s fiddling, see “Shetland Folk Festival: Troy
MacGillivray,” YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mYv5CGeQSLU.
343

For an example of Fitzgerald’s fiddling, see “Winston Scotty Fitzgerald – Mrs.
Douglas of Ednam,” YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_8msCjpVXhs.
344

For an example of Beaton’s fiddling, see “Donald Angus Beaton (Glendale 1970,
Strathspey and Reel)” YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2n2EBBZ6y4g&index=5&list=PL78H8gcbnsUJbM
nivit4yB_ImeEqGNIXw.
345

There are no videos or recordings of MacDonald, however Kate Dunlay and David
Greenberg devote much discussion to her personal style in Kate Dunlay & David
Greenberg, The Dungreen collection: Traditional Celtic Violin Music of Cape Breton, (1996).
346
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dirty style came to be revered by romanticists as associated with the past. These
romanticists often mistook the nuances of a ‘dirty’ style with general ‘scratchy’ fiddling.
“Their definition of dirt is just crappy playing. I think the real dirt is all the elements that
characterize the style, like all the neat bowing and finger embellishments that a lot of
these players are great at. But it wasn't necessarily scratchy.”347
While embellishments concern how each note is played, the Cape Breton
musician also takes liberties with what notes are played. Cape Breton musicians see the
tune as a skeleton that provides a structure, but allows for deviations at the appropriate
time and in the appropriate way. The view in how liberties can be taken varies both
generationally and ideologically. The older generation of Cape Breton musicians would
take pride in learning a tune ‘correctly’ or would place pressure on musicians to play a
tune ‘correctly’ as it was written. Yet despite this pressure for correctness, musicians
such as Winston Fitzgerald would change tunes as they saw fit, and these changes could
become standard.348 These musicians who do create variations that ‘stick’ within the
community make variations that they see as acceptable to the community’s expectations
and sensibilities—not just any variation will do. These variations could be entire bars of
music, or could be a note or two.
This notion of correctness in how a tune is played is another locus of
romanticism in the discourse about Cape Breton music. Because correctness is often
mentioned as important by Cape Breton musicians, especially by the older generation,
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Often the way that Fitzgerald would change a tune would become seen as the
‘correct’ way. Fitzgerald once changed a tune written by composer Dan R. MacDonald,
and Fitzgerald’s way of performing the tune was seen by most as the right way to play
the tune. MacDonald then wrote a new tune, which was actually the original tune.
348
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romanticists cite correctness as an absolute element of Cape Breton music—that the tune
must be played correctly as written. As much as ‘correctness’ is paid lip service,
functionally, the performance by musicians show that how strictly one aligns with the
written tune varies with each musician, and it is just as acceptable for a musician to vary
from the written score as it is for a musician to follow it rigidly.349 Not every variation
from a fiddler would be acceptable though.350 The musician would have to ‘tastefully’
vary based on the audience’s expectations. When a fiddler varies a tune, it is common
for them to play it as it was written the first time through, and subtly vary it the second
time through, or vice versa. While this is not always the case, it allows for an
ideologically mixed crowd to be pleased, as it demonstrates deference to the standard,
but also shows innovation. Likewise, the musician could play a few tunes as they were
written, and only apply variations to select tunes.

Some musicians have explained that decisions on how to vary, or whether to vary, in
a given tune is based on who is sitting in the audience. If they know that some people in
the audience are opposed to varying a tune, they will adjust as needed. It would not be
uncommon for the composer of a given tune to be in the audience, and the fiddler to
base how they perform a given tune on that composer’s presence.
349

When some musicians are introduced to the Cape Breton tradition, or other Celtic
traditions, and they hear that the music allows for variation, they sometimes take the
stance that, because variation is allowed, then any variation is allowed like in jazz. This
would be wrong, both about what kinds of variation are allowed, and about jazz. The
way that many people refer to jazz is not jazz. Jazz operates within its own community
frameworks just as much as traditional music and is not monolithic. Both have notions
of acceptability when it comes to improvisation and variation. Yes, in Jazz, musicians
who have challenged the status quo of established principles have had success, but that
does not mean that their success in challenging the status quo means anyone who
challenges the status quo will succeed. Far from it. Jazz musicians who have challenged
the status quo have themselves succeeded because of their understanding of how to
challenge the status quo, which itself has required a firm understanding of the
community’s notions of acceptability.
350
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In addition to variations in the melody, accompanists will vary the chords that
they use to accompany any given tune. Accompanying tunes offers much more
opportunity for variation than performing the melody, and some accompanists would
say that accompanying properly demands variation. Unlike the melody, which often has
an original ‘standard’ melody written in print, accompaniment does not have a standard
set of chords written for a given tune. Here, the notes of the melody determine the
‘correct’ chords for accompaniment. So if a melody had a string of notes that included D,
F sharp, and A, then the accompanist could possibly play the D chord (which includes
D, F sharp and A) the entire time. But depending on the melody, the accompanist could
start on the B minor chord (which contains D and F sharp) and then switch to a D major
or A major. Just as likely, the accompanist could play the chords one way the first time
through, and another way the second time through. A wrong chord would be a chord
that clashes with the note of the melody. But also, just because a chord ‘could’ work,
doesn’t mean it would. Accompanists operate within a framework of subtlety much like
the melody musicians. Lately, more advanced chords, such as 9th chords and sustained
chords have been used by accompanists. These chords can draw more attention to the
accompanist and away from the melody, in addition to other effects. It would be seen as
‘wrong’ for the musician to over-use these chords, and would contrast with the
community’s expectations. The chord choices made by the accompanist create the
background of expression for the entire performance—both melody and
accompaniment. When the note played by the fiddler is heard, it is heard in the context
of the chord from the accompaniment.
What the discussion of musical expression within the Cape Breton musical
community shows is that there is no ‘one’ way for musicians to play Cape Breton music
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and align with the expectations of the community. Each musician brings their own
ideas. While boundaries are drawn regarding the common judgment of musical
expectations, they are not drawn in stone and they allow for diversity. The fiddle styles
extend on a spectrum from clean to dirty, the fiddlers vary in how they take liberties
with the ‘correctness’ of tunes, and accompanists are confronted with the near limitless
choice of chords. This diversity allows for an infinite and changing set of possibilities for
musical rhetoric, but these possibilities are still bound by the expectations of the
community.351
Earlier, when discussing the difference between piano and guitar, I hinted that the
accompaniment is in a state of change. While guitar players generally adopt Irish and
other traditional music influences, the Piano players are also changing. In both cases, the
accompaniment is advancing beyond a simple three-chord style. Musicians are
understanding more music theory, and this understanding has expanded the possibility
of how they approach chording music. The basic structure for accompanying a tune in a
major key is to utilize the I, the IV, and the V chords. So in the case of a tune in C major,
the musician would use the C (which is the first chord) the F (the fourth chord in the
scale) and the G (the fifth chord in the scale. In the past, before the community adopted
more knowledge of music theory, it wouldn't have been uncommon for a musician to
use the C major chords to accompany A minor. A minor and C major share the same

It is important to not misinterpret infinity here. While infinity can extend to every
horizon allowing for every permutation, infinity can also exist within the bounds of an
integer. It is this latter type of infinity that I refer to. I am not saying that there is a
boundless notion of acceptability, but rather that, even when operating within the
community’s limits of possibilities, there are a seemingly infinite number of decisions
that could be made.
351
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notes, with the difference coming in the tonal center of the notes. A minor is the relative
minor of C major, and C major the relative major of A minor. Tunes in A minor will
revolve around the A minor chord and the G major chord (the I and the vii chords).
Playing these chords with these tunes today would be heard as clashing within the
community. In addition to the I, IV, and V chords of a tune, the accompanist now
understands the possibility of substitute chords, and that the second and the sixth
chords of each key, also minors, can be used when accompanying a tune. So in the case
of the C major tune, in addition to the C, F, and G, major chords, the accompanist will
also use the D minor, and the A minor chords.
These five chords present a basic understanding of music theory. Cape Breton piano
players are adopting a much more complex understanding of how to accompany tunes,
and are adopting chord understanding from jazz music and other musics. These
musicians are integrating 7th and 9th chords into their accompaniment style. These
musicians are also implementing more complex bass lines with their left hands. The
overall result of these additions to the piano style is a much richer allowance of
acceptable accompaniment than what was heard fifty years ago. Seen in hand with the
changes in the Cape Breton guitar accompaniment, the community can is in the midst of
a continuing evolution of accompaniment.
Community judgment can be seen in the Cape Breton community’s adoption of new
musical elements, such as the new accompaniment chords, or the cleaner style of fiddle
playing, or the variations in tunes. The audience might not realize that they’re making
judgments of innovation when they gravitate towards one musician or another. They
might just like the sound of a particular musician, without realizing that they like that
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musician because of particular variations, or chord choices. The Cape Breton audience
makes these common judgments through a variety of means, such as attending concerts,
buying albums, or inviting musicians to perform. They have deemed these musicians to
be appropriate representations of their community’s music. This switch could be
flipped, if the musician began performing too far outside of the community’s
expectations. But as the Cape Breton community chooses the musicians that it likes, it
also chooses the style and substance of that musician’s expressive choices. So by the
Cape Breton community continuing to attend concerts of Troy MacGillivray, and asking
him to teach workshops, and buy his albums, they are also acknowledging that Troy’s
chordal choices—though new to the community—are part of the Cape Breton
community. In this way, newness and an individual’s choices become part of the
community’s expectations.
When the community recognizes these more aesthetically pleasing choices, the choices
filter back into the community’s understanding of how to judge the practice itself. Thus,
the decisions made by the traditional musician within a performance both draw from
and contribute to the public meaning of that traditional community. The musicians base
their decisions on their understanding of the audience’s aesthetic values. When the
musician makes a choice informed by an understanding of her own community
membership, it reflects an acknowledgment that the musician holds herself accountable
to her community. But those decisions also in turn affect the community’s
understanding of appropriateness.
While the community’s understanding of appropriateness changes over time,
and is changed by the rhetoric of individual musicians, the speed at which it changes
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creates the illusion of unbroken continuity.352 The beliefs of Cape Breton romanticists
help to parse out the illusion of unbroken continuity a bit more. This illusion does not
suggest that the community is unchanging. Romanticists have complete faith that the
community is changing. This faith that the community is changing has romanticists up
in arms.353 The romanticists see the community’s history as unbroken, until today’s

See my discussion of Henri LeFebvre’s use of ‘unbroken continuity’ earlier on page
53.
352

A debate within the editorial section of Celtic Heritage magazine illustrates the extent
to which these romanticists are up in arms. This debate began with a submission by
American Seamus Taylor, where he stands up for his Gaelic culture, when he says “I
think it has become more important than ever in these days of Rock/New
Age/Jazz/Whatever-‘Celt’ to keep in mind that this is NOT a malleable ‘world music,’
but rather the tribal music of our ancestors, preserved and revered for many centuries
(especially in Nova Scotia and Cape Breton Island, until quote recently)… I am
extremely sorry that artists like Natalie McMaster (sic), the Rankins, and (lately) Mary
Jane Lamond, are attempting to ‘rock up’ their material. I likewise deplore what Ashley
McIsaac (sic), another young prodigy, has done to debase the native idiom. I understand
the lure of money and fame, and don’t begrudge them their success—they are extremely
talented youths. I wish they would realize that this music doesn’t NEED ‘improving.’ It
has stood for centuries on its own merit, preserved by our ancestors into the modern
age, and may go on (if we can keep the Gaelic culture that produced it alive) long past
the unlamented (by me, at least) demise of rock, jazz, and other pop idioms. What we
need is for someone of their stature to stand up for the true Gaelic music, language, and
culture, and stop pandering to the fickle-pop taste of the ‘great unwashed’ and loudly
declare; (sic) ‘THIS IS THE MUSIC AND LANGUAGE OF OUR PEOPLE, AND I WILL
NOT DEBASE IT, NOT FOR ALL YOUR GOLD OR FLEETING FLAME.” Seamus
Taylor, “Standing up for Gaelic culture,” Celtic Heritage, (June/July 1997): 5.
353

Taylor’s position is not unique. At least by outsiders to the Cape Breton community who
identify Cape Breton with a pure version of a “Gaelic” community that they desperately
want to defend. So encountering tourists or academics in Cape Breton who hold these
beliefs is not uncommon. However, Taylor’s position is rarely held be those within Cape
Breton. In fact, I have discussed this position with nearly every musician I have known
from Cape Breton, and not a single one finds a bit of truth within it. Though musicians
who travel to Cape Breton from elsewhere in order to learn how to play Cape Breton
fiddle music sometimes subscribe to this belief.
In response to Taylor’s submission, Cape Bretoner Alexander MacDonald placed a
follow-up editorial, debunking Taylor’s beliefs discussing the various different histories
of Celtic music (both Scottish and Irish musics) that Taylor misunderstood. Alexander
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musicians broke it. There are various beliefs concerning the ‘golden age’ of Cape Breton
fiddle music, but generally this conjures Winston Fitzgerald, Buddy MacMaster, and
Donald Angus Beaton, as the defining musicians of Cape Breton. Romanticists would
freeze Cape Breton culture in this golden age. Ignored here is that, prior to Fitzgerald,
MacMaster, and Beaton, the music was different, and Fitzgerald, MacMaster, and Beaton
changed it, as did the generation before them, and so on. The subtlety and nuance of
how musician’s have historically changed the music, whether it be through the
introduction of a new chord, or a new form of expression, allows romanticists to rely on
the illusion of the community’s unbroken continuity when arguing that today’s changes
will destroy the community. Cape Breton offers documentation of these changes,
though, as most of the influential musicians over the past 80 years have recorded
albums. This allows tracing when individual musicians introduced new ideas into the
community, and how these ideas were then carried forward by other musicians, until
these new ideas eventually become part of the community’s norm.

MacDonald, “The Gaelic in the Fiddle: Debunking the Myths,” Celtic Heritage
(August/September 1997): 5.
Taylor responded with numerous appeals to his own knowledge of history, various
references to 16th and 17th century arguments about the Scottish throne, and a nod to
Chomsky, all to justify that Gaelic music is pure. He concludes “If, as Mr. MacDonald
says, our culture must “Change or die” (a remark very akin to past English ultimatums
and ‘Robber Baron’ laissez faire Capitalism), then perhaps that would be the better
alternative. For if we become them, why bother to exist? And thus my original point:
stand up for the Gaelic!” Seamus Taylor, “…in which we learn more of Gaelic music,”
Celtic Heritage (December 1997/January 1998): 5-6, 26-28.
Please see Taylor’s biography at “Seamus Taylor – Yachats Celtic Music Festival,”
Yachats Celtic Music Festival, last visited May 24, 2015,
http://rainspout.org/ARCHIVE/2012%20Archive/seamus.html. It is not atypical to see
people with similar tribal sartorial ideology stroll through various Celtic music festivals.
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The Cape Breton musician operates within a system of everyday practices, where
through manipulating sound, they are able to create communal effects. Understanding
the community requires understanding the boundaries of the community expectations,
as well as the various spectrums of acceptability that exist within these expectations. The
Cape Breton musician manipulates this system through embellishments, chord selection,
or the choice of tune and tune type. The adept Cape Breton musician does not see these
boundaries as rigid and solid, but understands how to play with the borders in order to
create effects. So while fifty years ago it might not have been seen as acceptable to follow
a jig with a strathspey or reel, a musician today might see potential in manipulating the
expectation that a jig will be followed by a jig. It is through these manipulations that the
communal judgment shifts, thus shifting the range of possible actions acceptable within
the system.
7.2. How Cape Breton Musicians Learn Music
When the Cape Breton musician begins learning how to play music, the musician
is not only learning the physical requirements of eliciting a sound from their instrument,
they are also learning the community’s boundaries of acceptability. When the musician
learns to perform, they are learning the background processes that inform each musical
performance, and gaining the rhetorical judgment of how to interact within the
community. This is not to say that simply in acquiring this understanding, all musicians
become equally rhetorically adept. On the contrary, rhetoric—even vernacular
rhetoric—is an art, and likewise musicians’ talents in navigating the community’s
expectations will vary. In the next section, I will outline how musicians learn their
instrument, and how this affects the community’s vernacular rhetoric.
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The way that Cape Breton musicians learn their instrument is an important part
of the community’s everyday background. The distinction should be made between
learning how to play the instrument and how to play a tune. While often in tandem, the
two are different processes, as learning an instrument concerns learning the skill of how
to elicit particular sounds and learning a tune concerns the memorization of a particular
melody.354 Learning how to play the instrument within Cape Breton straddles the line
between formal and informal learning. Most musicians who perform at the various
venues also teach at workshops, camps, and private lessons. Taking lessons to learn how
to play the instrument is a relatively new trend in the Cape Breton community. Fiddler
Stan Chapman is said to have taught the first workshop on the island, attended by
students Natalie MacMaster, Ashley MacIsaac, and Wendy MacIsaac.355 Most of the
musicians in this workshop came from families active in the Cape Breton musical
community, so they also were exposed to the music at home. The other common way of
learning the instrument occurs when an aspiring musician watches other musicians play
and attempts to mimic them. One Cape Breton piano player remarked on how he
learned: “Nobody showed me how to play. My sister Alice took piano lessons from a
nun at the school. She'd leave the piano and I'd go play what she'd play.”356 These two
modes of learning show the two poles of a spectrum. Most Cape Breton musicians

Compare this to learning how to sing, and learning the words of a song. The two go
hand in hand, but are different processes. The skills gained in learning a new tune can
be applied to other tunes, so ultimately advance the goal of learning the instrument. But
they are different processes.
354

355

Doherty, Paradox on the Periphery, 100.

356

Confidential Respondent, interview by Greg Dorchak, December. 2010.
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learning their instrument straddle this line, having taken lessons in some form and also
learning on their own through observation.
The influence of teachers affects the musicians’ styles in ways that previously
only musical performances might have. While often, the same musician who performs is
the teacher providing lessons, in the lessons themselves these musicians are articulating
their own understanding of when and how to make a particular judgment. Generally
these lessons involve the teacher teaching the students a tune, and through teaching the
tune and the ways that the tune can be performed, also teaching the principles of
musical expression. Teaching is a relatively recent addition to the Cape Breton musical
community having affected two to three generations of musicians.357 In altering the way
that musicians acquire the community vernacular, the teaching of music has altered the
vernacular itself:
“Things have changed more since the teaching has began. I don't know if it’s
from the teaching, but because other influences are more readily available. CDs,
Cassettes, so people are listening and breaking down more. Just when you're
exposed to more, you can mess around with it.”358
This musician hints at the multivariate approach in how musicians learn. Not only are
musicians taking lessons, they’re using computers to slow down recordings, they’re
listening to more influences both past and present.
In learning how to perform, Cape Breton musicians don’t only take lessons from
other Cape Breton musicians. It is also increasingly common for them to take lessons
from classical musicians. The goal of learning from classical musicians in addition to
Cape Breton musicians, is to gain a better understanding of the instrument, which
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See Doherty, Paradox on the Periphery, 99-102.
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would allow the musician to play more advanced tunes requiring difficult techniques. In
doing so, the musicians demonstrate an understanding that the knowledge of the
instrument is distinct from the knowledge of performing within the community. While a
fiddler might learn a Bach gigue from their classical music teacher, they have the
understanding that the community would not accept a performance of this composition
at a Cape Breton dance. The prevalence of musicians who have taken classical courses
has created a divide between those who do incorporate classical technique, and those
who don’t. Whether a musician has classical technique can be seen in how the musician
holds their instrument, with the classically trained musicians keeping the wrist down
and straight on the arm that supports the instrument.359 It is more likely for nonclassically trained musicians to have their wrist bent.360
“I teach beginners, and I like that better, taking them through string builder.
When it comes to trad. stuff, I just try to explain - this is what I do, and this is
why. I play with my wrist down, here is why. There are plenty of players who
don't. If you just give people the information, then sometimes that helps. I
remember the first time I was teaching, teaching that wrist, it seemed like you
were insulting people, you know. They'll say "Buddy plays with his wrist up,
and he does fine" and I'll say, "yes he does, and he does fine". It's not even that,
I'll just say, if you want to play for awhile, here are some tips. If you're trying to
water your garden and your hose is going around the corner… How can you
argue with that.”361
This illustrates a fear here that, some Cape Bretoners see the influence of classical music
technique on Cape Breton music as an indictment against older players who lacked
formal training. This indictment doesn’t seem to be expressed by the established

My own classical teacher threatened to tape a thumbtack to the neck of my viola in
order to make sure I was never lazy.
359

Many traditional musicians also hold the instrument without their wrist bent,
however many don’t.
360

361
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musicians, even amongst those who lacked classical education. These musicians
expressly admire the abilities of the classically trained fiddler. The anti-classical
mentality is expressed more from the aspiring musician looking to learn the tradition, or
from the non-musicians. This perceived fear does not translate into a lack of popularity
for those fiddlers with classical training, though, as some of Cape Breton’s most popular
musicians have such training.
It is not uncommon for a musician learning to play the piano to already play the
fiddle. Many of the musicians on Cape Breton play both instruments. In fact, many Cape
Breton musicians play the fiddle, play the piano, and stepdance, with some also playing
the guitar. It is not uncommon for fiddlers and piano players to switch spots during a
dance or at a concert.
“It helped knowing the tunes to learn to play, but I think what helped more, I
think because I was so interested in everyone that was playing with me, that I
really started, while I was playing, I would pay a lot of attention to what they
were doing, and listening to their different styles and everything, and I didn't try
to play like anyone when I started playing, I just wanted to get the right chords,
and hopefully get the right beat, and my main concern was always timing.”362
Here the musician is acknowledging the difference between understanding the
technique of performing the instrument, and understanding the musical vernacular of
the community. The musician already had a solid understanding of how the music
worked, and what was important, which allowed her to focus on learning technique
when learning the new instrument.
In addition to teaching, musicians also learn by listening to other musicians.
When someone learns by ear, they pick up the tune through trial and error. The ear
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recognizes the relationships between notes, so if a note was a full step, such as the
difference between a G and an A, or two steps, such as the difference between a G and a
B, the musician hears that relationship. The musician also hears the tunes as phrases.
Tunes usually share a similar construction. A single tune is divided in half, as an A part
and a B part. The A part can further be subdivided into different 'phrases'. If you make
the analogy that a tune is like a set of two paragraphs, the 'phrases' of the paragraphs
would be the equivalent of a sentence. They are part of a greater whole of the paragraph,
which carries meaning itself, but internally, the sentence can be seen as complete with its
own conclusion. Likewise, the words would be the equivalent of single notes.
Understanding the rhetorical properties of individual notes requires the viewing the
note in the context of the notes surrounding it, as words too require context of the words
around them. So the important part of learning a tune by ear, is paying attention to the
phrasing of the tune. If I were to ask someone to memorize the text of four sentences
repeated out loud, it would be difficult for the person to do so by focusing solely on each
individual word. But when the person listens to the words together, and grasps the
meaning of the sentence, then the person is more likely to commit the sentence to
memory. Phrases make the ideal analogy to sentences, because they are mini-melodies
that resolve themselves.363 The musician listens for these phrases, and through trial and
error, plays along. As musicians do this more and more, it is easier to pick up a tune by
ear. When you listen to enough tunes, you begin to pick up patterns in how phrases

If you think of the nursery rhyme, hickery dickery dock, those three words
themselves are a musical phrase: hickery dickery dock. The phrase's melody repeats
itself with: "the mouse ran up the clock." Then the next section is a separate phrase, and
so on.
363
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work and resolve. It is possible for musicians to immediately discern whether a tune is
an Irish tune, a Scottish tune, or a Cape Breton tune based on the vernacular patterns
existing within the composition.
More and more musicians are learning how to read music, but not as an
exclusive way to learn music. Reading is supplemental, not fundamental. For many of
the musicians who read music, unlike a classical orchestra where the musician reads
during performance, the fiddler reads the music as a method of hearing the tune to learn
it. It is not the notes on the page that help commit the tune to the musician's memory,
but hearing the notes that the page guides the musician to play. In the case of a tune that
they might be familiar with, reading the music also helps to fill any gaps where the
musician is unable to discern aurally.
Most Cape Breton fiddlers will learn a tune by ear. The fiddler listens to a tune so
that they learn how it should sound, and have the skill to translate this to the fiddle
itself. There doesn’t need to be much trial and error, because the skill gives the fiddler
the ability to sense relationships between notes, and also the prevalence in patterns and
stylistic tropes within the music makes tunes predictable for the musician familiar with
vernacular patterns. But the tunes don’t need to be transmitted from fiddle to fiddler. It
was common for tunes to be passed from mouth to fiddle through Gaelic mouth music.
Here the Gaelic speaker would “lilt” a tune by singing non-sense words that make the
sounds that mimic tunes a fiddle would play, which the fiddler would replicate on the
fiddle. This tradition of Gaelic singing is called ‘puirt à beul.’364 When Cape Breton was a

Sometimes translated as music of the mouth, or mouth music. See, for example “Puirt
a beul, Scottish Mouth Music, Quadriga Consort, Elisabeth Kaplan, Laurenz
364
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predominantly Gaelic speaking community, it was common for mothers to sing these
tunes to their children, so that when the children would learn the fiddle, they would
already know the tunes.
The Gaelic influence on the fiddle is not as strong as it once was. When Gaelic
was actively spoke on the Island, there was a living relationship between Gaelic and
fiddle tunes. Romanticists point to the lack of Gaelic speaking on the island as a sign that
fiddlers are not playing tunes ‘correctly’ anymore.365 The argument they make is that
some tunes were originally Gaelic tunes with Gaelic words, not fiddle tunes. As such,
they argue, knowing where to place the ‘correct’ emphasis on notes, or how to ‘correctly’
embellish a tune, requires knowledge of how the tune would have sounded in the Gaelic
language. Fiddler Glenn Graham shows how these Gaelic-philes argue that the chicken
always came before the egg, when in fact Gaelic words are just as likely added to tunes
written for the fiddle as vice versa. He makes the argument that because fiddlers today
learn these tunes from fiddlers who might have learned them from Gaelic singers,
today’s fiddlers aurally pick up nuances of musical expression from the Gaelic singers.366
Transmission of tunes also occurs between bagpipes and fiddle. The main
difference between the fiddler and the piper, is that the piper only has access to eight

Schiffermüller,” YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ovhNIBnH9es.
Dr. John Shaw, of the University of Edinburgh has advanced this theory in both
academia, and amongst Cape Bretoners. Shaw drew from Gaelic speakers who were
formerly active within the Cape Breton music community but lost touch to argue that
knowledge of Gaelic was essential for properly playing fiddle tunes. The result of a loss
of Gaelic in younger fiddlers, Shaw describes as a “post-Gaelic” sound that has “the
character of an invented tradition with aesthetic and social points of reference
increasingly distant from the region…” John Shaw, “Language, Music, and Local
Aesthetics,” 43. See my discussion of John Shaw’s work in chapter 5.
365

366

See, Graham, Cape Breton Fiddle Music, 9-13.
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notes. So while a fiddler can put their fingers on a string and literally play any tone of
note, including all of the spaces in between, the piper is limited to the holes that their
chanter allows. Generally, a piper is restricted to tunes in the key of A (and some in the
key of D). But the key of A that the piper plays in is not the standard A major scale most
are familiar with.367 This scale of pipers is called a mixolydian mode, as the seventh note
of the scale is lower than the seventh note of a major scale.368 Rather than a G sharp,
which is in the A major scale, the pipe scale has a G natural. But that's not completely
accurate. The G natural played by pipes is somewhere between a G natural and a G
sharp. It's not a note available on a tempered scale.
This point about the G natural on the pipes being somewhere the G sharp and
the G natural is important when talking about the everyday Cape Breton music
community, especially for older members of the everyday Cape Breton music
community who would have been more likely to learn tunes from pipers. When the
fiddler might learn a tune from a piper, if they are mimicking the sound of the piper,
they would play the same note, somewhere between the G natural and the G sharp,
rather than playing the G natural. There are stories of these fiddlers being criticized by
people from outside the community, for playing out of tune. Most Western music is
built upon the same fixed scale found on the piano. But this fixed scale is hardly the only
possible scale, and while it is currently the most familiar musical scale in the Western
music’s everyday, Cape Breton’s musical vernacular carries remnants of an alternative
scale. When Cape Breton fiddlers learned tunes from pipers, the flatted seventh note
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The standard scale here being the common solfège “do, re, mi, fa, sol, la, ti, do.”
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So using the solfège from the previous footnote, “ti” would be a half step lower.
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was not out of tune to their ears. The note was part of their everyday. Outsiders who
heard the note, and heard it as out of tune, judged the note according to the outsiders’
everyday conception of what and how music should sound. This demonstrates how
individuals can make a value judgment within a community without recognizing that
the values they are placing upon the community contrast with the values of the
community they judge. If it was tourists from away, whose only familiarity with music
was classical music, or any other Western music based on a tempered pitch tuning,
nothing would indicate to these individuals that, when they were judging a musician to
be out of tune, that musician was judged by some in his community as being precisely in
tune.
Because Cape Breton fiddle music shares a large repertoire of tunes from tunes
originally written for the bagpipes, the keys of Cape Breton tunes are commonly in the
key of A. This is a contrast from the everyday Irish session where tunes are often in the
key of D or G, or Bluegrass music which is often in E or B. This distinction contributes to
the everyday of these communities. When leading a session in Amherst, Massachusetts,
the majority of musicians who would play with me identified with American-Irish or
New England musical communities. Some of these musicians would become frustrated
that our session played so many tunes in the key of A. It was not that these tunes were
new tunes that they needed to learn that caused frustration, but that the tunes were in
the key of A. The key of A was a familiar part of the community that I identified with,
and thus was the key for most of the tunes in my repertoire, while it was less common
for the communities of these musicians. It is a subtle distinction about the everyday that
sits in the background, and comes to the surface when contrasted with other traditions.

193

7.3. The Cape Breton Square Dance
At this point I should explain the dance, since the Cape Breton square dance is
one of the central focal points of the Cape Breton community, and informs how the
music is played. A square dance is made up of many square sets, with set each lasting
anywhere between 15 minutes and 25 minutes. The set is comprised of three different
figures.369 The first two figures are dances where the fiddler plays jigs, and the final
figure is danced to reels. The dance must have at least four couples, but can
accommodate many more. The first figure begins with everyone holding hands. For a
majority of the dancing that takes place in the first figure, you dance with your neighbor,
not your partner. This can encourage conversation, or at the least a create an ice-breaker,
since you have to physically hold the other person. The fiddler will string together a set
of jigs for three or four minutes.370 After the first figure there is a break of a for the
musicians and the dancers to rest, before the second figure begins. Everyone socializes
during this break. For the second figure, the fiddler again plays a set of jigs. The second

This is called the ‘West Mabou’ set. The ‘West Mabou’ set by far the most common
dance performed on the island. The dances in Sydney sometimes feature other types of
figures, but Sydney does not hold regular dances, and does not have the active dance
culture that Inverness County on the west side of Cape Breton has. But the regularity of
the West Mabou set of dance is a recent phenomenon, relatively speaking. Dances in
Boston are more and more scarce, because the number of Cape Bretoners from Cape
Breton is dwindling. But it was once an extremely active community. The dances in
Boston feature an older crowd of dancers, and these dancers typically dance sets other
than the West Mabou set. They will dance the West Mabou set, but they will dance other
sets as well.
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See, for example, “Cape Breton square dance Inverness Co figure 1” YouTube, last
visited May 24, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hg-rdvAsGw8.
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figure is a little more crowded than the first figure because some couples sit out of the
first figure if they don’t feel like dancing with someone else.371
For the final figure, the fiddler will string together a set of reels, and this could
last ten to fifteen minutes.372 Such a long set is demanding on both the musicians and the
dancers. In the final figure, the couples will begin in a circle. Couples will split up and
dance away from each other forming two circles. One ring of dancers dances clockwise
while the other ring dances counter-clockwise. The dancers in one circle interact with
dancers in the other by alternating between offering their right hands and then their left
hands, as they move past a dancer coming the opposite direction. Essentially you’re
shaking hands with people who are coming at you, switching hands with every person.
This is called the ‘grand chain’. Eventually, you’ll encounter your partner, where the two
of you will join hands and ‘swing’ around a few times373. When the spinning subsides,
the partners split again, heading back the way they came, again dancing the ‘grand
chain’. Again the dancers will encounter their partner, and this time they will
‘promenade’ where the couples will walk in a line, one couple after another.374 This line
will straighten from a circle formation, and form a long line, combining with couples
who have been dancing in other sets throughout the hall. Eventually every group

371See,

for example, “Cape Breton square dance Inverness Co figure 2” YouTube, last
visited May 24, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N-PVQgTRcRU.
See, for example, “Cape Breton square dance Inverness Co figure 3” YouTube, last
visited May 24, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sQ_9xBZ_U-4.
372

The speed of this swinging ranges greatly from those who spin their partner intent on
making them dizzy, to those who spin their partner intending to be gentle. There is
room for play here.
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This has been confusing so far. And it is. When dancing this for the first time (and a
few times thereafter) newcomers are told to “follow the person in front of you”, because
the dance makes no sense. Review the source in footnote 372.
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dancing in the hall will form one long line. The lead couple followed by those couples
following will split through this line running down the hall, forcing couples to split
apart. Visually this looks impressive when there are fifty couples splitting apart. Every
couple will in turn take a part of this running through the middle until there are two
lines of dancers—typically a line of men and a line of women—holding hands with each
other, and facing their partner. Here the dancers are dancing a basic ‘reel step’ to the
music.375 Eventually this line of men and line of women will drop hands, and each
dancer will dance over to their partner. The original circle will form again, and the
process will repeat. This cycle occurs four times, and then at the end all the couples join
hands before clapping in time with the music to signal to the fiddler that they’re
finished.376 After this set, the musicians will take a few minutes break, and the process
will then repeat.
At most dances, in between sets, the dancers form a circle, and the musicians will
perform the ‘step-dancer’s queue.’ The musician strings together a group of strathspeys
and reels, and step-dancers will take turns dancing in the middle of the circle, where
they will show off their steps.377 Eventually the night winds down, and the crowd thins
until the dance is over. At family dances, soda and water can be bought at the hall’s
canteen, along with snacks. At adult dances, you can also purchase alcohol. At a family
dance, the alcohol is consumed in the parking lot outside the hall. Conversation takes

When the couples have all joined hands, it’s common for a few dancers to pull the
circle in together, ‘whooping’ as they do. This happens after especially lively dances
where everyone is in good cheer and excited.
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See, for example, “Step dancing at Brook Village Dance, Cape Breton” YouTube, last
visited May 24, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-oI9da2jhFQ.
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place between the sets. Conversation takes place as dancers retreat from the sweaty heat
of the hall to the fresh cool air of the Cape Breton nighttime. Conversation takes place
between regulars, newcomers, and any combination therein. One of the effects of a
newcomer participating in a dance, is when they are later encountered in the
marketplace or at the restaurant, they might also be greeted with conversation. Some
regulars are fussy about who they dance with, and may be annoyed if a newcomer
disrupts a set by participating, assuming that they will not pay attention or overly
disrupt the routine of the dance. But generally, newcomers are both welcome and
encouraged to participate. It is not atypical to see a regular in need of a partner to drag a
newcomer, who had seemed resigned to watching, onto the dance floor.
7.4. The Cape Breton Spaces of Appearance
Thus far in this chapter I have focused on Cape Breton's communal expectations
in relation to the actions. I conclude this section by discussing the various spaces of
appearances in Cape Breton where this action takes place. Members of the Cape Breton
community see these spaces as having the potential for musical action, whether it be
planned or spontaneous. While venues such as dance halls are more inclined to planned
action, venues such as the Red Shoe pub have the potential for spontaneous action at
any time. At any time, patrons of the Red Shoe Pub expect that any of the various
musicians in the audience will set up and perform.378 Musicians who go here, know that
they will be appearing before others, and that there is the potential that they will be
asked to perform. Individuals are also expected to perform at the various house parties

See, for example, “Ceilidh at the Shoe” YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3CxOvwpd4A8.
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that occur on the island. Again, by virtue of attending the parties, musicians understand
that they will potentially perform.
During the summer months, a dance takes place five nights a week in
community and church halls throughout the Island. In the winter months, a dance takes
place usually only on Saturday nights in West Mabou. While each of the dances is the
same, in that the same dances are performed, and that each has the same general setup,
these dances are experienced differently. To the community, the background practices at
West Mabou are slightly different from the background practices at Glencoe Mills. On
Mondays, the dance is at Brook Village Hall (an adult dance, so alcohol can be
consumed in the dance hall). On Wednesday nights, the dance is at Scotsville (a family
dance, so alcohol can be consumed in the parking lot). On Thursday nights, a family
dance is held in Glencoe Mills. On Friday nights, and adult dance is held in Southwest
Margaree. And on Saturday nights, a family dance is held in West Mabou. I have earlier
discussed the action that takes place here, whether it be music or dance. When I say that
the background practices are slightly different at each location, I refer to the habits that
form within the community at each location. For example, certain cliques routinely sit in
certain areas.379 At some locations the crowd congregate in different areas outside to cool
off. Different refreshments are expected in different locations, and so on. For example,
because one must drive down a dirt road through the forest for a half hour in the dark in
order to get to Glencoe Mills, before arriving at the idyllic view of what looks like an old
19th century wooden church hall, the dance draws a disproportionate amount of

For example, Brook Village can get warm fast, so the crowd will try to congregate
under fans--in fact, at Brook Village, I have seen some couples attempt to guide their
dancing so that they maximize the amount of time they are under ceiling fans.
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tourists. Yet the one room hall is quite small, and can't fit as large a crowd as other dance
halls. So unless the hall will feature a particularly exciting set of musicians, it tends to
draw a smaller local crowd, since the quality of the dance is decreased by the tourists.
This is the type of nuance that locals understand when thinking about each dance hall as
different.
The places where the Cape Breton community appears together features a
regular, but evolving, set of faces. It is not uncommon to see the same people at nearly
every dance in any given week. But it is also not uncommon to see new faces begin to
attend next year, while other faces are no longer seen. Given that dances begin at 9:00
p.m. and continue until midnight or 1:00 a.m., one needs endurance to attend every
dance in a week while also maintaining a work schedule during the daytime. Some
attend the dance for the sake of the dance itself, and will never miss a dance, while
others decide on attending based on the fiddler scheduled to perform that dance. The
fiddler for any dance is scheduled sometimes weeks in advance. The fiddler then has to
find a piano player to accompany. The piano player might be advertised alongside the
fiddler, but acknowledging the accompaniment here is sometimes done last minute,
since the fiddler might not find a piano player until the day before.380 At each dance, the
fiddler will perform for about two and a half to three hours of actual music, maybe
more.

While the dancers might decide on whether to go to a dance based on the fiddler
playing, the fiddler’s focus is finding a piano player that they work well with. If a fiddler
has the chance that piano player X might be able to accompany them for a particular
dance, they will wait as long as possible in the hopes that piano player X might
eventually commit.
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The routine of the summer dance is supplemented by routine ‘ceilidhs’ which are
essentially informal sit down concerts at halls or pubs, where alcohol, tea, and food is
usually served. These take place on Sundays at both the Red Shoe Pub in Mabou and at
the Celtic Music Interpretive Centre in Judique. The Doryman’s Tavern in Cheticamp
has also featured ceilidhs, as have various other locations throughout the island. In
additional to the public informal ceilidhs, there are also the various house parties held
throughout the year by members of the Cape Breton music community. These house
parties feature smaller and limited crowds, but some of the more notorious yearly
parties feature crowds that far exceed the most packed dances. At these ceilidhs, people
sit to listen to the music, but there is the usual general din of background noise that
might accompany any restaurant. People are having quiet conversations, ordering food,
and drinking. It is common to hear many musicians at the Ceilidhs, not only the ones
advertised to perform. Musicians who are not playing elsewhere are likely to also be in
the audience to listen, and it is common for musicians to ask each other to take their
place so that they might take a break. It is also common for a ceilidh to be advertised
from noon until four, but to continue until hours later.381
In addition to the dances, ceilidhs, and house parties, the Cape Breton
community will sometimes appear together at a festival. Each of the villages in
Inverness County have a weekend festival, featuring golf tournaments, lobster dinners,
family picnics, and day-long ceilidhs. The main music festival in Cape Breton is Celtic
Colours. Taking place for a week in October, Celtic Colours is an international Celtic

One of the first weeks that the Red Shoe Pub was under operation of the Rankin
family, I was at the pub from 10am until after midnight, and the music did not stop
once. Upwards of fifteen musicians performed that day.
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music festival with venues all over the island. It features several concerts each night,
each featuring Cape Breton musicians alongside traditional musicians from around the
world.382 Every night, after the concerts end, the Gaelic College at St Ann’s, holds the
Festival Club, which is a series of impromptu musical sets featuring any of the
musicians in town for the festival, both locals and from abroad.383 Rather than a formal
concert, this Festival club is more like an informal ceilidh.384 The audience is either
seated at shared long tables, or standing along the walls, and alcohol is served. Behind
the scenes here, is the ‘artists-only’ set of back rooms, where smaller sessions take place
for the musicians. Here musicians might meet and perform together for the first time,
and immediately take their newly discovered musical partnership to the great hall for a
slot on the Festival Club stage. These performances, especially backstage continue past
sun-up.
Celtic Colours is a major tourism draw, as it pairs Cape Breton’s prime Fall
foliage for tourists in the daytime, with major Celtic music concerts in the evening. This
event also marks the general season’s end for summer music events on the Island.
Except for the year-long West Mabou square dance on Saturdays, the rest of the Island’s
dances would have ended, as would have the local pub ceilidhs. Some of the Island’s
restaurants will close up shop for the winter, as they are exclusively tourism based. The

Here Cape Breton musician J.P. Cormier plays a set accompanied by Scottish
musician Tim Edey, “J.P. Cormier & Tim Edey – Celtic Colours Guitar Summit 2010”
YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v8W59k3UPEQ.
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See, for example, “Brenda Stubbert & Howie MacDonald – live @ ECMA 2010 – Celtic
Colours Festival Club Stage” YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5yLNK3jmB7Q.
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audience at Celtic Colours features both local Cape Breton regulars alongside tourists
from off the Island who come solely for the festival.
7.5. The Cape Breton Community: Final Thoughts
The Cape Breton musical community features diversity within its judgment. The
commonality here is that community members often share judgment about the focus of
import, though they differ in opinions over this focus. So the importance of Gaelic, or
whether a musician should shift in keys, are agreed upon topics of debate, but each topic
allows for a spectrum of thought, and this spectrum can occur in the background. There
is no set demographic that molds whether someone will be for or against change. Some
differences are generational, but age alone does not explain where members of the
community stand. These differences are not downplayed though, and are acknowledged
by musicians.
“There are some who don't appreciate us. And there are a whole host of reasons,
probably. And I’d be lying to say I knew what they were. Maybe they just feel
like the music is changing, and maybe they see the new accompaniment as part
of that reason. Or maybe they see that they're being left behind, so there's an
animosity. And they're not interested in putting the time in. I don't know.”385
This point raises the question of how the community is maintained, and how
community relates to the vernacular. Clearly the members of the community do not
coalesce over a common idea of a 'right way to play.' When this musician notes that
some don't appreciate the younger musicians for how they sound, the argument
concerns the music. While the sides might disagree over how the music should sound,
they agree that the music itself is a place of contention. This shared judgment indicates
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where the conversation of community exists. But this musician's comment hints at
something else. This musician's concern is with the members of the community who still
engage with the community: they attend ceilidhs, they go to dances, but they don't like
what they hear. It is through this engagement that the community member maintains
touch with the vernacularity of the community. The background conversations are ever
shifting in contrast with the illusion of continuity. Those who have disengaged with the
community and voice an opinion outside the community have lost touch with these
shifts.386 When a member of the community stops participating in the conversation, and
yells from the sidelines, they have stopped being a part of the community because the
conversation of community has already changed.
The community makes common judgments over the boundaries of expectations.
Through the spectrum of opinions, the Cape Breton community allows for change. This
change is rhetorical, and is accomplished musically. Musicians understand these
expectations, and understand the system of the community. Through understanding this
system, musicians gain the ability to manipulate this system, which presses the
communicative nature of community. In manipulating the system, these musicians are
changing the community’s conversation. Musically, these musicians alter the
background rhetoric of what it means to be within the Cape Breton community. They
have altered the expressive nature of the music through changing communal
expectations of embellishments, of chords, and of arrangements. Through this

See my discussion of vernacularity on page 41. Abrahams introduces the term to
recognize both the most recent slang, and the most archaic turns of phrase. Staying in
touch with the most recent slang and the possibilities within the community requires
constant interaction with the community.
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vernacularity, they have shifted the community’s understanding of what it means to be
part of the Cape Breton community, so that a time traveler from fifty years ago would
not easily comprehend today’s Cape Breton musician, nor today’s Cape Breton musical
rhetoric. Those individuals that disconnect from the conversation are such time
travelers. They hold onto an ideal formed by the illusion of continuity, when in fact their
community has always changed and will always change. But they key to understanding
the community’s change requires more than understanding the community’s
expectations. It requires understanding how individuals act within this system and
manipulate it, and through this manipulation, shift the boundaries of acceptability. So
now I will turn to the individual.
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CHAPTER 8
THE INDIVIDUAL IN CAPE BRETON
Now that I have given an overview of the Cape Breton musical community’s
everyday, in order to complete an outline of a Cape Breton aural rhetoric I will focus on
the individual. To understand the community requires understanding that the
community is made up of individuals, each acting upon one another. In this section I
will focus on how individual musicians act upon the community. This will require
discussing how individual musicians make decisions that can affect and influence the
community. This is a community made up of individuals who act together seeking to
influence each other and distinguish themselves amongst one another. They perform to
make a name for themselves, so that the community will recognize them as not only a
competent musician, but as an influential musician. They want to excel in their
performances. They want to sell albums, be asked to perform at venues, and draw large
crowds. They want to be musicians that other musicians point to and talk about for
influential qualities. They perform in this way as part of their everyday. In order to focus
on the individual, I will develop how the Cape Breton musician understands situations
and make decisions. I will explain how the conventions of performing Cape Breton
music, and explain how the individual takes the community into account when making
decisions within these performances.
8.1. The Cape Breton Musicians’ Understanding
The decisions made by Cape Breton musicians occur within a system of practices.
The Cape Breton musicians understand this system in a particular way that allows them
to act by manipulating the system in order to achieve effects. When explaining this, I am
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not outlining a set of rules that the musician applies to achieve a given effect. Cape
Breton music does not work as a program of rules. In order to avoid this, I will explain
how the musician’s understanding of particular elements of the music informs the
musician’s judgment. I am focusing on explaining ‘good’ judgment. But understanding
good judgment also requires explaining the system as if it were constantly evolving and
changing, because it is. Musicians’ acts within the community can change communal
standards for good judgment. I will also explain the flux of this system, and how
individual acts change it.
Understanding Cape Breton music is only somewhat distinct from
understanding the Cape Breton community. Understanding how to be a musician
requires more than just understanding how to make an instrument produce sounds, it
also requires understanding how those sounds affect the community.
“Yeah, at first you have to learn the chords and technique, but then you realize
that there's a way you want to say something on a particular tune to sound.
Certain chords evoke certain effects, and you can't explain it, but it gives the
music a different perspective.”387
To inform the musician's judgment of when and how to use a particular effect, the
musician needs to understand the possibilities of the sounds that can be made. Then the
musician has to understand the links between these sounds and the movement of
individuals within the community. So while the use of one chord in a particular
situation moves audience members from mood x to mood y, another chord in that
situation might move the audience from mood x to mood z.
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When musicians begin to learn the community’s music, they often come to the
table already having favorite sets recorded by other musicians. The musicians who have
recorded these sets are usually musicians advanced in skill, and this favorite set is
representative of this advanced skill. It is typical for a musician who is only just learning
to want to perform these sets requiring this advanced skill even though they are a
beginner. When accompanying, the advanced skill isn’t the ability to play a chord or a
bass line. The advanced skill is the ability to know when to play a chord a bass line. As a
result of the desire to play advanced chords early on, the beginner musician overlooks
the fundamentals of understanding the music’s basic accompaniment foundations.
“From what I’ve heard from them, it seems that they're not using the basic
chords first. They're using a chord that's not standard. They're using it, and not
knowing that it's subbing388…Not that you have to theoretically know, but you
have to know how to work from the basic.”389
This musician isn’t making the point that the beginner musician is wrong in playing the
chords that they played. It’s rather that the musician didn’t understand why they played
the chords that they played. Knowing how to perform the music isn’t knowledge of how
to mimic a sound, or even how to make a sound. The importance lies in understanding
why and when to make a sound.
The emphasis here is that the musician makes decisions based on the sounds that
they think should be performed. Not on the skills they need to use in order to elicit the
sound. The skill of how to elicit a sound from the instrument drifts into the background
as the focus shifts to the mood or effect they wish to elicit through using a particular

Subbing here refers to the playing of a ‘substitute chord.’ These are chords that
deviate from the basic three-chord chord progression, and represent places within the
tune where the accompanist can make a choice as to which chord to use.
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sound. While this requires knowing how to elicit the sound, for the musician, at some
point the skill becomes a reaction, and the communication the focus.
“That's just it - you have to get the skills first. But it's like, if I'm bowing
something teaching, it's entirely different. Then you get all these techniques, and
I try to explain after you play long enough - you think of how you want it to
sound. It's like when you speak, you don't think that my tongue has to hit the
roof of my mouth for that. You just think of a sentence and it comes out. You
don't even think of words, but a phrase.”390
Understanding this is essential to recognizing music as aural rhetoric. Even more so than
visual rhetoric, for the musician, the instrument is able to become an extension of the
body during a performance. And like the sound generated by the tongue becomes an
unconscious reaction as the speaker seeks to create a sound, so too does using a musical
instrument become an unconscious reaction for the musician to create a sound. For the
speaker, the sounds become words which convey a message that seeks to affect the
listener. For the musician, the sounds become notes which convey a message that can
affect the listener.
8.1.1. How the Cape Breton Musician Understands Musical Structure
Musical structure works in a way similar to a grammar, with the use of chords
similar to the use of words. Some musicians with formal training come to understand
the theory behind the music, but this knowledge is not enough for understanding how
to act within musical performance. Simply because a person might understand the
theory behind why a particular chord works and can elicit a particular effect within a
tune does not mean that the person has the ability to judge when to use the chord within
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a tune.391 “It’s only really necessary that you know the sound. You don't need to know
the theory behind it.”392 Some Cape Breton musicians' had formal training, studied jazz
or classical music at university, and understand the theory behind the music—many
don't. These musicians have an embodied knowledge of the music, based on
understanding the sound that they want and expect to hear.
Though I talk about the music as being embodied, this does not mean that the
musician simply unconsciously understands how to perform a tune, and lets the body
guide it. The musician’s relationship with a tune evolves as the musician encounters it.
Initially, the musician needs to listen and think through the constraints of a particular
tune in order to decide what sounds they want to make within each tune. Eventually,
the musician becomes familiar with the tune and no longer requires to spend time
weighing decisions.
"When you're trying to figure something out, you're bringing all of your tools to
play. I don't think you're - there's anything unconscious. If I've figured it out
already, that's when the unconscious kicks in. Then I might consciously feel,
though, oh I might change that to this or this, because I know it might work. But
if it's for the first time, or you're not comfortable with it, then I think you're very
conscious about how you approach it.”393
The musician who performs well understands the sounds needed in general situations,
and this is informed by the community. The musician then takes this general
understanding and applies it to particular situations within particular tunes. It might be
that part of one tune sounds like part of a different tune, so the musician is informed by
this other tune. After playing this particular tune for awhile, the musician becomes
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In a similar vein, not all professors of rhetoric are great public speakers.
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accustomed to the needs of the tune and no longer consciously thinks through its needs.
The knowledge of the needs of this tune then filters into understanding the needs of
other tunes and so on.
This understanding of the needs of a tune changes, not only based on one’s
familiarity with the tune, but also depending on the relationship between the musician’s
role and the tunes. A fiddler might understand a tune differently than an accompanist.
Cape Breton features many musicians who perform in both roles, but one Cape Breton
piano player explained this relationship thusly:
“If I played the fiddle, I don't think it would change my style, but it might
change my approach…I hope I have the chords I need to have. But maybe there'd
be some tunes in there, and learning the melody much more intimately, I’d be
able to see, a five [chord] would sound better there. Although it works with what
I’m doing, and it's not wrong, but it might just, maybe if the melody is calling for
something that I perceived.”394
This accompanist knows the tunes, but acknowledges that the particular relationship
that a musician has with a tune affects how the musician understands the tune. This also
would affect the musician if they were a dancer. When the musician is a dancer, they
would understand the nature of musical timing, and the placement of accents in a way
differently than the musician who doesn’t dance.
8.1.2. How Listening Informs the Cape Breton Musician’s Understanding
Listening is the essential skill needed for a musician to understand how the
music works, how the community works, and how other musicians perform. Listening
is essential to understand a tune. It is essential to understand the audience. It is essential
to understand the community. Listening is quite possibly the most important skill for a
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musician in order to properly understand the needs of a situation and the needs of the
performance.
“[Knowing how to play the fiddle] helped knowing the tunes to learn to play,
but I think what helped more, I think because I was so interested in everyone
that was playing with me, that I really started, while I was playing, I would pay a
lot of attention to what they were doing, and listening to their different styles
and everything, and I didn't try to play like anyone when I started playing, I just
wanted to get the right chords, and hopefully get the right beat, and my main
concern was always timing.”395
This musician was a longtime fiddle player, but had only played accompaniment for a
short time. Despite her short time on the piano, she was a trusted accompanist who was
asked by many fiddlers to play piano. While her understanding of the tunes helped her
transition to playing accompaniment, so too did her ability to listen. By listening and
attuning herself to the piano players that accompanied her when she played fiddle, she
gained an understanding of how piano players approach accompanying tunes.
The accompanist and fiddler need to listen to each other during a performance in
order to react appropriately. While musicians do not usually speak to each other within
a performance in order to coordinate the music, they extend non-verbal musical cues to
one another. Of primary concern here is timing. One musician emphasizes that “[t]he
most important thing is to pay attention to timing.”396 Another musician reiterates this
when stating her goals within a performance: “I try to listen to, first of all, their gate,
their timing, their swing. And then the melody of the tune. They're kind of the two
priorities. Then I just try my best to match what they're doing.”397 The fiddler would
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generally be more likely to establish the timing than the accompanist. But the two
musicians can push each other and feed off of one another’s energy. I have heard one
accompanist state that his goal is to push the pace of the fiddler to the edge of their
ability, depending on the tune type. Knowing that a particular pace is the edge of a
musician’s abilities would require paying attention to the musician’s performance, and
attuning oneself to whether that musician is thriving within the given performance at
the given speed. The musicians ideally listen to each other to understand each
musician’s comfort levels, and to adjust accordingly.
Listening's importance to musical performance cannot be stressed enough. It is
essential for the musicians to develop a more intimate understanding of the
community's expectations for acceptability, of a tune's needs for chords or
embellishment, and of the other musician's acts when performing with another
musician. However musicians don't usually realize listening's importance at the outset
of performing. “Listening is the most important skill. When people start out. They know
their three chords. And for awhile what happens is that we might be playing at the same
time, but I’m changing chords, but it takes awhile to learn that you have to listen.”398
This last statement is important. Not every musician realizes the importance of
listening—yet the musicians who are seen as the tradition-bearers and who are routinely
cited as the best musicians on the island point to listening as "the most important skill."
Listening directly affects understanding. Its status of import for the better musicians
illustrates how in Cape Breton, a musician's abilities directly relate to a musician's ability
to make decisions. Listening informs understanding, which in turn informs decision
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making. Beginner musicians, or musicians who don't focus on listening, conceive of
musical performance as musical production. They perform each note uninformed by the
situation or by context.
Listening can allow the musician to excel within a performance, because it allows
them to easier understand and acclimate to the unfamiliar. A musician adept at listening
can react to fit the needs of the situation, as well as adapt to the nuances of the musicians
they are accompanying. One Cape Breton musician describes what it is like to perform
with such a musician:
“[Like] Dave [MacIsaac]399. I played with him and Troy [MacGillivray]400 at the
ECMAs. And he immediately got me, musically. And he immediately could tell
where I was going to go with certain things and I guess knowing that I don't do
too many things far from the basics. And he would catch on, and sense when I
was doing an up-run or a down-run, and I do more ups than downs. But then
sometimes we'd have a little moment where he'd guess something and it would
be dead on, and we would laugh. But for me it's exciting because I never have
that extra filler when I'm playing and they fill in all the little bits.”401
Because the musicians in question listen, they are able to understand and anticipate the
musical actions of the musician quoted. Their ability to listen informs their decisions as
to how and what to perform, and when to perform it. Because both musicians are open
to the situation, they feed off of each other’s musical decisions, constantly reacting to

See footnote 325 for discussion of Dave MacIsaac. Including in that footnote is also an
example of MacIsaac on the guitar.
399

For an example of Troy MacGillivray on the fiddle, see “Shetland Folk Festival 2007:
Troy MacGillivray” YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mYv5CGeQSLU.
400

For an example of MacGillivray on the piano, see “Andrea Beaton and Troy
MacGillivray Nova Scotia Fiddlers #2” YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VdGaymrzclI.
401

Confidential Respondent, interview by Greg Dorchak, December. 2010.
213

each other, aurally communicating with each other, and anticipating the acts of each
other.
This begins to paint a more communicative, conversational understanding of
aural rhetoric in Cape Breton.402 During the ideal musical performance, all of the
musicians are listening to one another, and reacting to one another. There is a genuine
openness in this dialogue.403
“Many's the dance I’ve played with Dave [MacIsaac] and at the end we'll have a
laugh because I'll have been chasing him, and he'll have been chasing me. It's
that interchange again. It's reaction. I’m going to try to find where he's going and
he's going try to find where I’m going. So we're cat and mouse all the time.
Granted we're always in the same ballpark. Same with Patty Gillis,404 he'll try
something I’ll pick up next time.”405
Unique within musical conversation, is that while the musicians are engaging with one
another, and reacting thereto, they are also listening and reacting to the audience, and
listening and reacting to the community. Within their musical conversation, the
musicians are acting rhetorically towards both each other, as well as towards the
audience.
The coordination of the conversation between musicians is essential to a good
performance. This is especially compounded when there are multiple accompanists. Not

In the ideal musical performance, this is similar to Gadamer’s development of the
conversation. The musicians are guided by their subject matter, the particular tune, and
rather than one musician dominate where the performance goes, the musicians are open
to one another as they constantly test the other’s position. See my discussion of
conversation beginning on page 92.
402

In no way assert that this is the norm, nor that all musicians are listening in this ideal
way. Just that listening and openness is the ideal that good musicians aspire to, and that
these musicians recognize as part of the ideal musical performance.
403

For an example of Patty Gillis, see “Beloach – the Schooner Lane Set” YouTube, last
visited May 24, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=INlQoxWSRxw.
404
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only does an accompanist have to listen and react to the fiddler, but the accompanist has
to react to the other accompanist. The goals for the musicians is to create a cohesive
whole and work to support each other, but if the musicians don't listen and pay
attention, they could clash and rather than enhancing one another, could work against
one another.
"It's a combination of following the fiddler and the piano player. You can't have
two people taking it their own way. Especially in accompaniment. If there's one
person accompanying, they can do whatever they want. As soon as you have to
follow another accompanist, you have to take that into consideration.”406
The potential for clashing is especially strong with guitarists who don't adapt to the
accompaniment of the piano player. If the guitar player were to apply rhythms from
Irish music into a performance that also included a piano player, the end result would
likely clash, given that structurally, the piano cannot mimic those guitar rhythms. Dave
MacIsaac is one of the pioneers of Cape Breton guitar playing, and established a guitar
style that compliments the guitar. This particular style is built upon MacIsaac's ability to
listen.
I’m bad at working with a guitarist, with the exception of one guitar player
[MacIsaac]. Maybe we've played so often that we just unconsciously go in the
same direction. I really dislike playing with guitar players unless it's rehearsed.
But that's completely different. It's the same concept of you're not together. And
sometimes there's that clash of rhythms, or they go off on a different way, and
you lose being in the moment. And I think I end up listening to him, because I
trust him, and he gives me hints of where it's going to go, but otherwise I find it
very difficult [with other guitarists].”407
MacIsaac’s ability to listen to, adapt to, and communicate with his fellow musicians
influence them to trust him musically. This trust of MacIsaac’s decisions affects the

406
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musician’s decisions, since, in having faith that MacIsaac won’t fail them, they might feel
more flexible to make riskier choices.
How musicians listen to, communicate with, and follow one another influences
their performing decisions, which in turn can change a musician’s style—for at least that
moment. This change might not be obvious or conscious, even to the musician in
question. But musicians who listen, adapt to suit the needs of the musicians they are
performing with. It is in this adaptation where style can change.
“Who I’m playing with for accompaniment does not change how I play
consciously. But I can tell if I’m playing a dance with Howie [MacDonald]408
versus Kinnon [Beaton].409 Other people might not be able to tell. I can't tell right
away, but I’ll be accenting different things. And it’s just that interchange that
happens - they spur you on to do something different. So yeah, I don't
consciously play different. It's all reaction based.”410
In this community, ideally a musician’s musical decisions are not programmatic and
blueprint based. At each given moment of crisis requiring a decision, a musician might
have a repertoire of choices to make, even within that musician’s own stylistic
preferences. Playing with musician X might result in the musician being steered towards
certain choices, while playing with musician Y might result in the musician being
steered towards a different set of choices. While the musician might make different
choices than they usually would make, these choices are not outside of what they
consider acceptable. Musicians makes decisions based on their understanding of

For an example of Howie MacDonald, see “Howie MacDonald & Mac Morin”
YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TjyHur3_GdE.
408

For an example of Kinnon Beaton, see “Andrea & Kinnon Beaton Set – Part One”
YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VfazypdZhpU.
409
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possible choices—not of a single choice—even though more often than not they might
make a particular choice. Listening to other musicians shifts this understanding and
filters the how they make particular choices.
When musicians listen to other musicians it also opens up their understanding of
possibilities. While the Cape Breton musicians each operate within a spectrum of
expectations, they learn these expectations and possibilities by listening to the other
musicians in the community. The better musicians in Cape Breton devour listening to
other musicians.
“I think that I've listened to so much of them, and I know the bits that I love out
of everyone of them. Like Joel [Chaisson]'s lift,411 I want to have that when I play,
but I don’t know if I can do it, but I think subconsciously I try to be a little
bouncy. And Betty Lou [Beaton]’s412 accurate chords, I want to have an ear like
hers. And you know I'd love to be able to do some of the diddles that Tracey
[Dares]413 does. John Morris [Rankin]414 was my hero, he's the one that I love and
Troy is a friggen monster.”415
Being able to identify who a musician is through listening alone is a point of pride for
some Cape Breton musicians.416 But it is through this listening and absorption, that

For an example of Joel Chaisson’s piano playing, see “VIDEO 1 Andrea Beaton
Wendy MacIsaac Joel Chaisson Pat Gillis Governors Pub July 2 2014 1” YouTube, last
visited May 24, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GGO17rSU6Go.
411

For an example of Betty Lou Beaton’s piano playing, see “Kinnon & Betty Lou Beaton
Clogs and Reels PH Ceilidh July 15 2014” YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lRHdyt3Jr1k.
412

For an example of Tracey Dares’ piano playing, see “Cape Breton Fiddle : Natalie
MacMaster ii” YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xF5gzxUjKRk.
413

For an example of John Morris Rankin’s piano playing, see “Ashley, John Allan,
Stuart, John Morris Rankin” YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p1ytBSAG4wo.
414
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In Ashley MacIsaac's album, Fine, Thank you very much, he mimics a different fiddler
and piano player on each track. MacIsaac, one of the Island's virtuosos, purposefully did
416
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stylistic nuances of one musician make their way into the performance of another
musician.
To be clear, not all Cape Breton musicians listen. The focus in this project is on
musical vernacular rhetoric. Romantic views of vernacular rhetoric or of folk traditions,
might focus solely on the folk practices, with the discussion ignoring that within a
particular practice some individuals excel while other individuals are not as proficient.
But this should be a tenant of rhetoric; some rhetorical attempts absolutely fail.
Understanding a rhetoric requires understanding where these failures originate. In Cape
Breton, one musician succinctly puts that if a musician fails within a performance,
usually it’s because, “they're just not listening or paying attention.”417
When an accompanist doesn’t listen, then they won’t adapt to the fiddler’s
intended musical path. They will likely miss any cues that would attune them towards
appropriate decisions. When the fiddler transitions from one tune into another, the
accompanist doesn’t know what tune will come next. The fiddler will at most shout out
the tonal center of the tune, so for example the fiddler might yell “A” if the fiddler is
planning on shifting into A major from G. This is what the fiddler would yell if they are
shifting into A minor from G as well. But the fiddler won’t yell out a key change if they

so after he received some criticism from the Island's community for his earlier album Hi,
how are you today, which split opinion on the Island. Hi, how are you today features fuses
the traditional Cape Breton fiddle tunes with contemporary rock-inspired arrangements.
Some of those resistant to innovation on the Island criticized MacIsaac for not playing
'traditional' music. His response was Fine, thank you very much, where he demonstrated
that he understands traditional music as much, if not more, than anyone in the
community, by mimicking the likes of fiddlers Winston Fitzgerald, Buddy MacMaster,
etc, along with the community's well known piano players. Anecdotally, locals tell me
stories of when the album first came out, how they would fool people into having them
guess the wrong musician.
417
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are shifting from A major to A minor, or any other variation within a tonal center.418 The
accompanist has to listen for the tune and respond accordingly with the chords required
for that new key. If the accompanist has previously chorded to a given tune, then they
will be able to quickly adapt to the chords needed; if they haven’t, then their only
recourse is to listen to the tune as they chord, and adapt to suit the needs of the notes
that they hear. There is an expectation that if the accompanist doesn’t respond as needed
the first time through, they will use appropriate chords the second time through. The
only way that an accompanist can respond as expected is if they listen. But this isn’t
simply listening for the sake of listening, this is listening for the sake of anticipating and
informing immediate action. “I one hundred percent believe that people who play
inappropriate just aren't listening to the tune. I feel like I hear two instruments
fighting.”419 The instruments would be heard to fight if the accompanist plays a chord
that doesn’t match with the notes of the tune. The instruments would also be interpreted
as fighting if the musicians aren’t paying attention to one another’s tempo or timing, etc.
This describes the issues that could occur when a single accompanist isn’t
listening to the fiddler. When there is a second accompanist, an extra layer of listening is
added. Each accompanist must listen to the other accompanist as well as the fiddler, and
react and adjust accordingly. Ideally, the accompanists will give each other room to
make decisions, but it becomes complicated for example, if the piano player might play
a substitution chord that the guitarist doesn’t expect. Even if the guitarist doesn’t expect

Musicians from other traditions can find this confusing, if it’s not expected. I have
played with musicians who expected being notified when going from major to minor,
etc.
418
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this chord, if they are listening, and anticipating the acts of the piano player, they will be
able to react accordingly.
“It's a combination of following the fiddler and the piano player. You can't have
two people taking it their own way. Especially in accompaniment. If there's one
person accompanying, they can do whatever they want. As soon as you have to
follow another accompanist, you have to take that into consideration.”420
This also extends beyond chords, and applies to timing and rhythm as well, even more
so than if there was a single accompanist having to listen to the fiddler. The guitar can
apply a variety of rhythmic strumming patterns. Some of these patterns suit a
partnership with the piano, but some don’t.421 If the guitarist wasn’t listening, they
wouldn’t adapt their rhythmic patterns as needed, and the result would be a clashing
cacophony of sound.
Listening informs the understanding of many elements that the musician has to
factor when performing. When making decisions within performance, the musician
judges all of the inputs of that moment and in relation to the musician’s understanding
of acceptability. Listening is often the only way that the musician can understand the
particular of that given moment. Listening also contributes to how the musician
understands the communal standards of acceptability. Musicians venting frustration
about the performance of newer musicians emphasize that the faults of these musicians
stem from not listening:
“Honestly, my experience that I’ve heard several times. And I’ve heard it less
and less, but when I did hear it, I found the kids weren't paying attention. They
weren't listening. They didn't put as much stock as important as I did. That you

420
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This is especially true of the more Irish-influenced guitar rhythmic patterns
mentioned previously. See my discussion of Irish influenced guitar in Cape Breton on
page 162 and an example in footnote 326.
421
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had to listen and make it work and be something pleasurable. They played
something that was wrong, and they didn't know it was going to be wrong. So
maybe they're not at the level that I thought they should have been to play.
Maybe in their own development, they're not in a place where they knew it was
going to be acceptable.”422
Here the musician establishes a rhetorical standard: that the music be something
pleasurable. The musician hints that to perform music pleasurable for the audience
requires the musician to pay attention and to make adjustments as needed. This is key to
recognizing music as rhetorical, and to recognizing music as action that requires
judgment. The skill that this musician emphasizes is not the skill with the instrument,
but the skill with the judgment—a musician needs the right approach in order to
perform pleasurable music. This approach is not one where the musician works from a
blueprint of chords and notes, but one where the musician adapts to the needs of the
moment. Understanding what is needed at a given moment requires that the musician
listen.
8.1.3. How Musical Roles Inform the Cape Breton Musician’s Understanding
Ideally musicians understand that, when performing together, they have a role
within the performance. This was hinted upon earlier when discussing listening, in
pointing out how musicians need to respond to each other and adjust accordingly. But
this listening can only inform a musician’s decisions about a role if they already have an
understanding of their role. At the basic level, there are two categories of roles: melody
and accompaniment.

422
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“…accompanying, even if you take it out of the traditional sense, there's a role
played. By anyone. You're there for support. Rhythm. Chord changes. You're
backing someone up. That's the fundamentals of it.”423
But this fundamental of the role of accompanists becomes more nuanced as additional
instruments are added. To illustrate this, I have once seen four Cape Breton musicians
play on a single piano. The musician on the highest range of the piano played the
melody and only the melody. The musician a few octaves lower played the main chords
to accompany the melody. The musician the next few octaves lower played additional
chords that worked to enhance the second musician’s chords. The musician in the
bottom range played only the bass notes. This was not a collaboration that would ever
occur on stage, and was only done for fun, but it illustrates the musician’s
understanding of roles. When each musician entered the performance (and this was not
something that was planned out, the musicians literally approached the piano one after
another) they decided the notes to play based on an understanding of a role for that
given time.
A musician’s understanding of their role informs the decisions that they might
make within a performance. So far I have mostly shown performance decisions in an
ideal world, where I discuss how musicians should respond to certain situations and
how these decisions should ideally made. However, even of the best musicians, not all
musicians perform correctly all the time. Some of the key decisions a musician makes are
how to clean up the mess when things begin to go wrong. Understanding their role
helps the musician to understand how to act within these situations.
“If I’m playing, I’m in a situation where… I’m playing a role. The piano player is
filling the chords. A bass player is doing [bass] kind of stuff. In that situation, I'm
423
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playing a little more rhythm, and the bouzouki,424 it's a drone thing, so I’ll play
the roots and pedaling more. Then there's situations where things are starting to
fall apart, I might push the rhythm a bit more, or back off if I think that's going to
help the situation.”425
So this is not a situation where the musician in question, in playing the bouzouki, thinks
only, “I play the bouzouki for accompaniment, and the bouzouki for accompanist plays
these chords in a certain way.” Instead, the musician understands that in playing the
bouzouki for accompaniment, he has to pay attention to maintaining the rhythm, and
that if things begin to fall apart in rhythm he has to act one way or another way,
depending on the situation. While listening to the fiddler, his concern is not the melody,
but in making sure that the fiddler is within the proper rhythm, same with the piano,
and the guitar. He will listen to all of the other instruments, and try to musically
communicate with each other musician in order to establish a consistent proper rhythm.
This is a key distinction between the role of the fiddler and the role of the
accompanists. Generally the fiddler’s concern is the melody and keeping up with the
accompanist’s timing. The accompanist has to make sure that the timing they establish is
comfortable for the fiddler. If the fiddler begins to miss things or seems rushed, the
accompanist has to adjust the rhythm accordingly. A piano player also has to focus on
both the chords and the bass line.
“There’s absolutely more to learn on the piano than the fiddle. It's so much
harder. And trying to keep track of where one hand's going and where the other
hand's going. With the bow you're going up or down. But with the hand there's
chords, and notes and rhythms that you have to do. And the left hand is doing
the same thing, so sometimes I catch myself as more natural on the left hand. To
play bass lines. Because I think in bass lines and not chords. So sometimes when I
A bouzouki is an instrument sometimes heard on Cape Breton but is a Turkish
instrument that is more likely to be seen in Irish music.
424
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get lost I realize my right hand is stopped. And my left hand is still doing the
bass line. Then I realize it and my right hand has to catch up.”426
This musician was relatively new to the piano, though had played fiddle for a long time.
The musician understood the music as a fiddler, so in switching to the piano, the
musician had to learn a new understanding of the music. The notes of the tunes were the
same. Adjusting to the new role required more than understanding what chords to play
to the tunes that the musician already knew. Adjusting to the new role required
developing a better understanding of a new approach that focused on multiple elements
of the musical performance.
In addition to the various musical elements of the performance, the accompanist
also has the role of attempting to make the fiddler sound better. Cape Breton music is
driven by the name recognition of the fiddler, and while fiddlers might understand that
the nature of their own success within a performance is in many ways controlled by the
accompanist, the community comes out to see the fiddler. The fiddler is the individual
that venues book to perform a given show, and is the individual that headlines any
advertisement for the musician. As such, the fiddler makes the decisions about the tunes
to perform, and acts as a sort of ‘producer’ who coordinates the other musicians. One or
two accompanists on the island reject this community practice, interpreting it as making
them a side show, and will try to book shows on their own. I have been in the presence
of one venue coordinator when a younger accompanist attempted to book a show with
the promise of finding a fiddler. The coordinator told the pianist that “we don’t do it
that way around here.” Another long established piano player has a reputation for
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thinking himself as a priority over the fiddler. “He does not think of himself as an
accompanist. He thinks of himself as the main show, and the fiddler is on the side.” This
piano player has burned his bridges in not aligning to the established community roles,
and is not usually asked to perform as an accompanist unless the fiddler is desperate. A
fiddler wouldn’t ask such an accompanist to perform, since the accompanist’s goals are
not aligned with the fiddlers. The usual accompanist, in understanding their role of
helping the fiddler, and therefore helping the whole musical performance sound better,
makes decisions that help the fiddler. This other musician seeks to make himself sound
better. Since this informs his decisions, if there is an opportunity where he feels he can
draw attention to himself and in doing so, it clashes with the overall musical product, he
will make the decision that makes himself sound better.
When musicians engage the performance as if they were in a genuine
conversation with their partnered musicians, it influences stylistic decisions. This can
lead to stylistic reputations. If one fiddler always performs with a given accompanist,
then the community might coalesce around the idea that the fiddler has a particular
sound, when in fact the musician’s range of musical possibilities are much wider.
“There's a fiddler I’ve heard, that people claim who know the music, that he is
not a dance player, and I beg to disagree, and that same player came to a dance
where that fiddler was playing with Hilda [Chaisson],427 and they ate their
words, it was completely different. So depending on who you're playing with,
he's got a different energy.”428

For an example of Hilda Chaisson’s piano playing, see “Kristen Shaw and Hilda
Chiasson, Set 4” YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4faXQcE6-O8.
427
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There are dance musicians and there are ‘sit-down’ musicians,429 and then there are
those musicians known for both. The dance musicians are recognized for a driving
musical style that is excellent to dance to, while a ‘sit-down’ musician is recognized for a
musical style that might play some of the ‘fancier’ tunes not considered suitable for a
dance. The musician in question here was pigeon-holed by the community as a sit-down
player, and not a fiddler suited for the dance. Simply by performing with a different
accompanist, he was able to break from his stereotype because he was heard making
different musical decisions.
One of the key areas where musicians can influence and alter each other’s
musical decisions is in how musicians choose how they might express a note or phrase.
“If they are going to pedal, it might make me more intense, and make me do
something different than I wouldn't otherwise do. If they do a rip, I might do
something different. If they do a... something that makes you react. And make
you do something you're not expecting. Something small. Not even something
the audience would get. But to you, it's like, something, I might do a spicato bow,
I might just, that kind of stuff. If I'm present and I'm enjoying myself, I enjoy
where the piano player can just, feed off of that and they can feed off of you,
rather than just playing to an accompanist who is just there, the timing is fine,
the chords are there, but there's nothing to get excited about because they're not
going to do anything that's not going to make you perk your ears.”430
The decisions of one musician affect the decisions of another musician, and so on. These
musicians are not applying pre-decided musical elements to a performance. They are
listening to one another, and based on the acts of the other, reacting accordingly. There
is a rhetorical cycle here, in that one musician’s act might trigger a chain of actions and
reactions that otherwise wouldn’t occur. But they can only mutually influence each

A dance fiddler is valued for their driving rhythm needed for a dance. A sit-down
fiddler is valued for their more ornate playing suitable for the concert.
429
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other’s expressions if they are actively listening to the other, and reacting accordingly—
if they are in a genuine dialogue.
When in a dialogue with one another, musicians balance their own musical
desires with how they interpret their musical partners’ desires. Again, this is in an ideal
musical conversation between the musicians. When not in this conversation, musicians
are ‘talking at’ one another, rather than ‘talking with’; such a musician would not care
about listening or reacting to the other musicians.
“My purpose as an accompanist is to - when I play, I want to be as correct as I
can to make it as easy and on time - to make it easy for them to play. So I'm
constantly worrying, to be honest, about whether or not its good enough - to
make sure that it's what they want to hear. Or if I feel like. Like sometimes I'll
feel really excited, so I'll want to do loads of rips and stuff, but say I'm playing
with XXX and he's not in a really really, you know sometimes he's in a crazy
mood and he'll laugh his head off when I do that - and sometimes he'll be like
‘settle down.’”431
Here the musicians explicitly discuss how they want to adjust, but oral communication
is not the only way that musicians engage in this conversation. They also provide
non-verbal cues with glances of the eye, or shifts in body language. But they also react
through musical decisions. For example, if a fiddler thinks that the accompanist is
pushing the tempo too fast, they might emphasize the start of a phrase in such a way to
signal to the accompanist that a shift in speed is in order.
The ability of musicians also affects the possibility of musical conversation
between the musicians. Less experienced and less skilled musicians are constrained in
their possibilities. When these musicians perform, they already have a limited ability to
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adapt to the needs of a situation. They don't understand when they are playing too fast
or too slow because they usually have one speed.432
"And another thing is that when you have someone who can do anything, there's
no boundaries to what you are going to do. But if you're playing with someone
who does not know, you're constantly thinking ahead... not playing, but thinking
of what you can't play. You think of a tune, and you've got this whole
conversation in your head, and you're not with the music at all.”433
Here one musician's lack of ability places all of the responsibility for a performance on
the other musician. In this situation only the proficient musician can make adjustments,
so is at the mercy of adapting to the performance of the less proficient musician. The
inability to mutually react and musically communicate limits the possibilities of
performance.
Likewise, when one musician is seen as extremely proficient, then the other
musician will likely feel that they can take more musical chances and make decisions
they wouldn't otherwise make. This inspires confidence because one musician knows
that if they take a chance and make a decision to try something at the edge of their
ability, and if they fail, that the other musician has the ability to help recovery, and the
entire musical performance will not be affected. It will also lead the musician to venture
into areas of unfamiliarity without worrying. For example, the musician can play an

Counterintuitively, beginner musicians will generally perform too fast. They hear
established musicians play at faster speeds, they hear the exciting tunes at fast speed,
and so it's often that beginner musicians confuse the speed one can play with the skill
that one can play. So they will focus on setting the metronome to a fast speed, and
practice as fast as they can. At this speed, they will usually be able to hit all of the notes,
just not well. What is sacrificed here, is the phrasing and embellishment needed for a
good performance.
432
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esoteric tune that they know the other musician wouldn't know, because they trust in
that musician's ability to chord to it regardless.
"The difference between having someone who does know how to play, like XXX ,
and someone that does not, well you can play whatever you want. Someone like
XXX has such a range of tunes in his head that even if he does not know the tune,
he's played so many tunes that often these patterns have happened for him.
When you play so many, you just get used to making different changes. And it's
a wealth of knowledge. It just makes it so easy you don’t even need to
practice.”434
So while a lack of skill limits the possibility for conversation and communication, the
presence of skill opens up these possibilities. At the higher level of ability, musicians are
able to make musical connections that might not otherwise exist, because the musicians
are capable of being more open to one another. They achieve this openness specifically
because of their ability.
But the relationship and the ability to communicate can also be affected by the
familiarity between the musicians. When musicians are familiar with one another, they
understand each other's abilities, but they also understand each other's musical nuances.
One musician might already know that another musician excels at a particular speed, or
likes to be pushed, etc. This familiarity creates an openness that allows the musicians to
work with one another. But when the familiarity doesn't exist, musicians can feel
limited.
"People that I'm a little more nervous about, that I’m not used to, or I’m scared
that I'm not on their time, I'll be a lot more careful. I'll do less rips. I don't even
know if that's a good thing, because I probably won't play as well because I’ll be
holding back.”435
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This musician's decisions are influenced directly by their degree of familiarity with their
partner. Because they lack this familiarity, they consciously limit the possibilities of
choices that they will make. They also might not respond in the way that they think that
the performance needs. Their focus is less about creating a good musical product, then it
is in adapting and learning the musical abilities and nuances of their partner in an
attempt to achieve a conversation.
8.1.4. How the Cape Breton Musicians’ understanding affects judgment
A musician’s understanding of how to perform includes an understanding of
how making musical decisions within the community should be approached. The
accomplished Cape Breton musicians begin with an approach where they will vary their
decisions. They factor in their previous performance when making a decision about how
to play a particular part of a tune. So perhaps because they played a particular passage
one way the first time through, they will play it differently the second time through. Or
perhaps because they are usually heard to play it one way, they will play it a different
way. Likewise, because they might be expected to vary a particular passage, they won’t.
The purpose here isn’t to throw off the expectations of the audience purposefully. The
purpose is to make the performance unique. “I might not do it every time. But I might
do a variation of it, to somehow bring out and highlight the accented beat.”436 The
musician doesn’t approach the music as if it were guided by a blueprint. They will not
make the same decision every time. They might want to emphasize a particular element
or passage of the music, and use their understanding of expressive possibilities to do so.
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To be accomplished in the Cape Breton community, a musician has to approach
the music as if it is a medium to convey individual expression. This individual
expression rests squarely on the ability of musicians to make decisions. The alternative
would be the musician who sees the proper way to perform music as the ability to
execute a memorized replica of someone else's performance. Approaching the
performance as a memorized pre-arranged performance doesn't allow the musician to
adapt to the contingency of the situation. The musician isn't able to respond to the
audience, nor to the other musicians.
“Some accompanists these days, I just see that one thing people haven’t taken as
much, or placed as much importance on maybe as I have… I think it's really
important to listen to stuff, but be unique and individual and be flexible enough
to roll with the changes in the tune that other people have done. But some people
that I’ve heard, some of the younger people… they've heard somebody else
chording to a group of tunes and they'll play - they've memorized - that
approach. So if someone else is playing the tune, and changed the melody a bit,
or whatever, and they're playing this approach to a tune and it's not appropriate
to the tune, because the tune's changed. And they don't know that, because they
aren't listening. They just hear and say, oh I know how to chord to that tune.
Here we go. They just do it by rote.”437
It is precisely because the better Cape Breton musicians don't approach the music in this
manner that the music has evolved. More so, it is precisely because the better Cape
Breton musicians don't approach music as a memorized replica of a previous
performance that the musicians are each unique. Such an approach is caused be a rigid
and inflexible understanding of how the music is to sound. The better musicians
understand that there are certain moments within a performance where new
possibilities can be explored. They also understand an amorphous set of boundaries for
what is acceptable within these possibilities.
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When musicians make decisions, they are not making decisions simply for the
sake of making decisions. When they use a particular chord, it is because they intend
that chord to elicit an effect. The chord can’t just be used whenever the musician wants.
A particular chord that might elicit a particular effect can only be used when the
structure of the tune warrants it. It fits in a particular place, but not every place. The
musician needs to understand not only the relationship between the chord and the
effect, but also how the chord is used effectively. Understanding this speaks to the
approach of the musician. When a musician only understands the effect of the chord
without understanding the functionality of it, they are not informed by the music itself.
"There’s a problem with cool chords when they just don't fit. like XXX plays
chords that don't even follow what's going on, they're unrelated to the tune,
they're unrelated to anything. I don't even know how you can relate it back. Like
even functionally. I think it’s too much of too many sub chords.”438
So there is a balance needed in making these musical decisions. They cannot be
informed purely by desired effect. Nor can the musician approach the music through
pure rote memorization. The musician must understand the functionality of the
expressive elements, and understand how the musical decisions relate to both the effect
within the community and the music.
8.2. The Cape Breton Musician’s Sense of Self: Agency, Action, & Distinction
When the musicians act to express themselves, they are internally manipulating
the community’s system. Informed by their understanding, they act in order to achieve
effects within the community. In acting within their community, they act to distinguish
themselves within their community. Musicians want to perform well so that they will be
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asked to perform again. They want to be recognized as musicians capable of
contributing to the community, by being asked to play popular dances and drawing a
crowd. They want to be recognized by the community by recording albums that the
community buys. They want to be recognized by the community by recording albums
that others try to emulate. They have the audacity to desire this because they are a
phone call away from those that they themselves try to emulate. These Cape Breton
musicians see and interact with their own musical influences in an everyday setting.
Because of this, Cape Breton musicians understand the possibility of influencing the
community through their own acts by distinguishing themselves.
There is a link between action, judgment, and understanding here because a
musician’s decisions of how to express themselves musically distinguish musicians. The
difference between one musician’s decisions and another’s is determined by how the
musicians approach musical performance, and by how the musicians understand the
music. This distinction is possible through music because music is common to the
community. Skill is involved, but this is much more than skill in the instrument—there
is also musical skill within the decision making itself, in understanding the needs of the
moment, the desires of the audience, and the ability to act thereupon. The Cape Breton
community recognizes the differences between musicians based on their individual
sound, and that individual sound is individual because of musical decisions. This can be
heard in how the community talks about musicians:
“She has all the right chords, and the right rhythms, but she's not going to bring
the tune out a different way and bring it out well each time. And XXX does that a
little bit better. XXX is plain too, but her rhythm, there's something different
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about her rhythm than YYY’s rhythm. And XXX is more interesting. Her chords
are more interesting, even though it's not flashy, it's more interesting.”439
This musician isn’t being recognized for her skill in using her instrument. She’s
recognized by the community for her choice in chords. Her decisions in chord use has
given her a reputation for choosing “interesting” chords. Her identity within the
community is in part established through these musical decisions.
While each musician’s style would identify them as a Cape Breton musician,
because each style is individual, there is an internal diversity within the possible sounds
of a Cape Breton musician.
“The personal styles are all very different. Betty Lou is solid, timing is
impeccable, always plays the right chords, not over the top fancy, but she's
classy. Has the seven chords, plays really nice bass lines. Really classy, you can
always expect the best. But you're not going to be shocked - like with Troy
[MacGillivray] or Tracey [Dares].”440
This range of styles can include mixing and matching existing sounds of how musicians
make decisions, but it allows for the new. In some ways, the community embraces the
new stylistic elements that individuals introduce into the community.
“I’d say that there are some in that generation who appreciate what we're doing
in my generation. Like Betty Lou Beaton, she's not a flashy progressive player,
but she's got a style that's so, I’d lump her in with John Morris [Rankin] and
Tracey [Dares] and Maybelle [Chisholm McQueen]441 in that she's more
progressive than the people before her. Tracey and John Morris probably needed
Betty Lou to get to where they were.”442
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For an example of Maybelle Chisholm McQueen’s piano playing, see “Ashley
MacIsaac at the GAMS benefit July 24, 2011” YouTube, last visited May 24, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CV6ewFxdJLo.
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But this in no way assumes that the community uniformly agrees with each individual
musician’s musical decisions. As much as there is a diversity in musical styles amongst
the musicians, there is a diversity in opinions amongst community members over the
range of what is acceptable within the community.
“I think that within that shifting range of acceptable viewpoints are different. I
assume my range of acceptable is from here to here or whatever. And I assume
that that's the range of acceptable. But I can hear someone else do something that
I would completely think as unacceptable, but when I hear it, I think oh I like
that. And I've expanded my range of acceptable.”443
The vernacularity of this community’s rhetoric is diverse. Musicians distinguish
themselves as different from one another based on musical choices, and these difference
demonstrate a range of possibilities. As the last comment indicates, some within the
community can be persuaded to accept new ideas into what they consider acceptable.
Some in the community won’t.
When recognizing that new musical ideas are accepted by the community, it
needs to simultaneously be recognized that new musical ideas are accepted by
individuals within the community and these individuals include musicians. As such, the
individual styles of musicians evolve as they incorporate new ideas of acceptable
decisions. Their understanding of what is possible grows, and therefore their sound
evolves. Many musicians recognize this sort of evolution in the music of pianist Betty
Lou Beaton:
“Her beat and everything, she's 68, she's rolling with the times. She's one person
that when I listen back to stuff from the 60s, her left hand was somewhere
between older style, and as time goes on, she really listens, so you can catch her
trying to play like other people, and you can hear her do things the way she
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thinks people wants to hear them, and she's always complimenting all the young
people on how they play.”444
As I have previously discussed, listening is a key skill that influences one’s
understanding of possibilities. Also as previously discussed, the relationship between
one musician and another also influences one’s understanding of possibilities. This in
turn expands musicians’ understanding of how to express their own individuality, and
allows this expression to change over time.
“New things come about from the interchange, playing with other people. and
the influences that you carry into that. Like, I might have heard a good dance
tape of Howie [MacDonald] and John Morris [Rankin], and I might try
something just for fun, yeah, just borrowing it, then in filters into my acceptable
range.”445
New ideas can evolve a musician’s personal style as they make the conscious decision to
try something that they might never have tried before. This is different from the
argument that newness naturally enters into a style. Based on whether the musician
considers the result of the new decision to be success or not, that new decision might
enter their range of possibilities. Regardless of whether the decision was a success or a
failure, the musician’s understanding of the music would have changed, since it would
have been tested, and that testing would have revealed something new about the music.
Earlier I discussed how Abrahams notes that by participating in a community’s
everyday practices, one steps into a series of routines that took shape before one’s own
contribution to the practice.446 The previous generation contributes to the current
generation’s understanding of rhetorical possibilities. But the current generation’s
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See my discussion on page 52.
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understanding is not constrained to work only within the possibilities of the past. As a
building block, these past possibilities allow the current generation to conceive of new
possibilities.
“To be honest, if John Morris and Tracey were never exposed to the stuff that
came before them, that they would have filled that generation. I think that
Maybelle played the way that she did because she heard how the people before
her approached those things, and she had the ability to travel a little bit. It's an
organic progression. If Maybelle hadn't have been there, but Tracey was, she
would have influenced by the people before, but not the point where she sounds
today. because she never would have had what came before to build off of. She
would have been the building block.”447
In such fashion musicians establish the rhetorical possibilities of future musicians by
laying the groundwork for what the community expects and can possibly expect in the
future as well.
“We [pianists] needed the people who came before us. Just like the fiddling
tradition needed the Angus Chisholms448 and the Winstons. Winston was the
new thing then. And the Jerry Hollands. … In the beginning, that album with
him and Joey [Beaton], and Winston stuff, they're a little cleaner, and you can just
see that natural progression that evolution of players in the fiddle tradition. So I
firmly believe that had there not been Maybelle before John Morris, maybe the
stuff that he and Howie had done wouldn't have been as well received. I'm sure
of that.”449
This is an understanding of the change of community practices and communal norms
built upon the collective rhetoric of diverse individuals participating in a communal
conversation. It is contrary to an understanding of change that rests on the cliché that a
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For an example of Angus Chisholm on the fiddle, see this recording from the 1930s,
“Angus Chisholm Celtic 015 78 rpm Cape Breton Fiddle” YouTube, last visited May 24,
2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ophrjwLl4kk.
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community naturally evolves on its own. The difference being the recognition of the
actions of individuals acting within the community to express their individuality.
Cape Breton musicians embrace this potential to change the community’s
understanding of its music. They understand how others who they perform with have
changed the music, and this contributes to the understanding that they too can act to
change the community’s music.
“I don't doubt that I'm changing it, and it's not because I'm saying, oh look at
me. But, because I think that's only natural though, Tracey, John Morris, Betty
Lou all progressed it. I would hope to progress it a bit. Not to change it, but to
make it better. In making something better maybe that is changing it.”450
This musician believes that his actions and decisions can change his community. The
musician understands that this change happens by performing in a way that the rest of
the community appreciates, but also that this performance is individual—that it comes
from him distinguishing himself from others in the community. This belief is possible
because the musician understands his community as a set of individuals, and recognizes
the actions and influence of the individuals who came before him, and the individuals
who act alongside him. These are not faceless anybodies without distinguishing qualities
that move within an established set of systems. These are named somebodies who act
upon his everyday community. He recognizes these somebodies for the distinct
individuals that they are, and recognizes the effects of their actions.451
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See my discussion of Geertz noting that recognizing identity and agency within
community practices is important when interpreting the everyday, on page 54.
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8.3. The Effects of Good Action
Cape Breton musicians perform in a way to distinguish themselves. They make
expressive decisions and exercise their agency with the idea that through their
performance they can change the community. They seek fame and recognition within
the community through their performances. They seek this fame through performances
that the community recognizes as good. Not every performance is good. But that does
not mean that simply because a performance is not good that it is bad. Many
performances are marked by mediocrity, which is when the musician performs at a
standard that illustrates their competence with the music, but little more. Competence
does not set new standards, nor does it win the recognition that good performances do.
Good performances within the community establish the community standards that
others will later be judged by. But the occurrence of a good performance is not a unique
happening. The Cape Breton community expects the possibility that on any given night,
any given group of musicians can put on a performance that the community will
remember and will talk about for that month, that year, or years to come.
Music, including traditional music, is an art. Some performances are better than
others. There is a distinction between acting competently in a community and excelling
in a community, and much of this distinction is influenced by one’s ability to make
decisions.
“Reels are all straight eights, but it could accent in different spots. So sometimes
as a piano player you want to bring that out. You want to land on that, you don't
want to go over that. A good accompanist does not want to go over that. They're
not going to set the tempo for you. Some people will do that. A good
accompanist will let you, if you're strong. Which if you're a soloist you have that
responsibility, you can't be wishy washy, and if you're good at that then they will
follow you. So that's the most important thing. And then if they're really good,
they won't just play rhythms based on the tune type, but they'll play more
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rhythmically specific to the tune. Whether or not it's following the tune, or doing
some sort of counter rhythm to bring out in a different way. It's not something
anyone thinks about. It's all improvised. But if they're good, they'll do that.”452
Clearly, a good performance requires many decisions. Over time the decisions that make
a performance ‘good’ eventually establish the communal standard for basic competence.
In the 1960s, it wouldn’t have been uncommon to hear a Cape Breton piano player use
only three chords. As musicians introduced new standards of excelling at the music, and
began playing with more and more chords, the benchmark for competence changed. It
would now no longer be acceptable for a musician to chord within a concert or a dance
using only three chords. Understanding the distinction between good and competence is
something that explanations of vernacular rhetoric miss, which is odd given that
rhetoric is often concerned with the success and failure of rhetorical acts. Likely one of
the reasons that vernacular rhetoric ignores the good, is that it ignores the individual.
There is a thin line between good and competent. Good performances are
characterized by a musician’s skill in deciding how to subtly manipulate the community
standards for competence.
“The qualities that John Morris Rankin and Tracey Dares brought to the music
that you didn't have to work to find. Their timing was impeccable, but you didn't
ever notice. You just knew that, you took these things for granted because they
were so perfect. In all honestly, there was never a doubt that they added
something. You didn't have to work to appreciate what they were doing. Their
timing was just incredible. They added to the music so subtly. They didn't have
to play all these fancy things that they did, every once in awhile. They had this
style that just complemented the music in these subtle ways that you may not
pay attention to.”453
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Dares and Rankin are cited for their ability to exceed the community’s standards for
competence but without drawing attention to it. They were valued because they were
fundamentally sound in every way that the community desired, and in addition, they
did not make decisions to draw attention to themselves simply for the decisions’ sake.
They knew when to play these “fancy” chords, but they did not play these chords for the
chord’s sake, they played these chords when they felt that the situation called for it.
They understood how to ‘place’ a chord.
“What makes something tasteful is placement. Some people sit on an F chord in
Brenda Stubbert’s [reel]. But if you just use it as a very quick, almost like an
accent, it's a lot better and stands out more in some ways than actually going to F
and using a whole beat on it.”454
This musician presents a technical explanation of subtle placement. Understanding
where and when to sparingly use a substitute chord creates a more meaningful effect
than using the substitute chord at every possibility. Making a ‘good’ decision that leads
to an overall good performance requires the musician to understand when not to deviate
from the community’s understanding of competence.
Part of the difficulty in learning how to perform music is paying attention to the
distinction between good and competent. Listening is essential, as is paying attention to
the reason for rhetorical effects. The current progression of Cape Breton music is most
notable in the use of chords, specifically in the use of complex chords. The use of this
chord can create a powerful effect that generates lift. Plus a musician who can
demonstrate that they know this chord might feel as if they too are on the cutting edge
of the music’s progression. Yet paying attention only to the effect of the chord ignores
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that understanding how to use the chord requires understanding both when and when
not to use the chord.
“People who [use flashy chords] the whole time aren't concerned about taste.
They're just concerned about doing something cool. That's how I used to be. As a
kid, definitely. I thought "oh this sounds cool" and I didn't have a concept at that
time of what Dave MacIsaac really is.”455
This musician refers to guitarist Dave MacIsaac here in the same vein that the previous
commentator referred to piano players John Morris Rankin and Tracey Dares. These
musicians are set apart as especially influential because they understood how and when
to adopt newness. They understood that the timing of making musical decisions affects
the quality of performance. Because of this, when using the new chord sparingly, they
had a greater effect on the community’s understanding of that new chord. Newer
musicians mistook that a performance was considered good solely because of the use of
the chord, when the performance was good because the understood the appropriate use
of the chord. The musician would have understood that in other situations, using that
chord would have made a bad performance; the newer musicians would not have
shared this understanding.
In order to decide the proper place of using a chord, or of any technique that
might elicit an effect, the musician must think about more than just that moment of the
performance. They have to put that moment in relation to the entire set of music. For a
musician to express a tune to the level of good would be a decision that adds to and
compliments a tune without drawing from the tune.
“Un-tasteful is something that takes attention away from the tune as opposed to
something really cool that goes with the tune. You don't miss the tune, but you
say ‘Oh, that's cool.’ Something that brings out the tune that you don't expect. To
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me there's a line that Tracey [Dares] does, this little chromatic thing that she
does, it does not take away from the tune, but it's great.”456
This is not to say that there is a single method for a good performance. On the contrary,
each musician brings their own style to bear when making decisions. But there is a
commonality in the approach that these musicians make in that they seek to fit their
decisions into the music’s framework, rather than forcing their decisions into the music.
“My approach to something is one of simplicity. I like to be thought of as its
simple and I'll dress it up on the 'ins' or something. I would never want someone
to think that I play the fancy chords all the time. I don't think that fits the
music.”457
This musician echoes the importance of subtlety, but also highlights the audience
perception. If the audience perceived this musician to use “fancy chords all the time”
then his use of the chords, even if used sparingly, were used in such a way that
distracted from the music.
This also illustrates how, in order to make a good decision, one must consider
previous decisions. Some decisions, especially if the decision’s effect is considered good
partly because of surprise, will lose their effect if made again and again. In fact, this
could backfire, and destroy even the initial successful decision. “If I do it once, then
everyone's like, ‘oh that's cool.’ It builds intensity. But if you play it every time, it looses
its effect.”458 Musicians need to subtly vary how they approach the music, since by
making a decision once, they have altered the possible effect if they were to make that
same decision a second time.
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“Players like Mary Jessie, and guitar players like Dave, they play in a way that
enhance tunes, but in a way that was innovative. That followed the melody.
There's cool ways of subbing chords, but, appropriate. Say if you're playing G
minor, he would play a C7 chord. But every time you're going from G minor to F
you can't do that. Because that's too much. So incorporating it is great, and if it's
a long selection, then it's nice for something like that. But if the fiddle is not
doing anything different, then the rest can become confusing.”459
The emphasis here is that good decisions require the musician to consider the entire
event. Musicians can undermine their own decisions if they do not consider whether
they have overused a particular expressive choice. The musician must be attuned to how
a particular choice can be perceived, whether it is already considered fanciful, and
whether they can overindulge the audience’s desire for innovation to the point that the
choice becomes distracting and untasteful.
What constitutes a good decision within the community changes over time. In
order to keeping up to date with what constitutes a good decision, an individual must
maintain constant participation with the community’s conversation.460 Decisions don’t
fall out of favor solely because a new decision has taken its place. Much like overuse of a
particular decision will internally scuttle a single performance, overuse of a decision
over time by multiple musicians affects the quality of that decision within the
community.
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So when folklorists like John Shaw interview Cape Bretoners who haven’t attended a
dance or concert in twenty years, and takes their word as proof of the decadence of the
community’s current state of fiddlers, he bases his academic work on standards that
have long since evolved. This might be helpful for insight into the museum of Cape
Breton’s past, but offers no insight into or understanding of Cape Breton’s present. See
my discussion of John Shaw’s contribution to the academic discourse of Cape Breton in
chapter 5.
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“Seamus did something like that in his first album, and at that point it was much
more cool to me. For me I just got sick of the sound over time. Its distasteful as
well, to play through the whole tune. One and done.”461
The changing nature of what constitutes a good decision within the community is
masked by the illusion of continuity. Thus an individual can step out of the
community’s conversation for a year or more, then reenter without the perception that
anything has changed. But the conversation would have gradually evolved. Last year’s
‘hit’ tune might be seen as cliché, and performing it would have a different effect from
one year to the next. Some expressive elements might have gained popularity while
others lost favor. New albums might have been released introducing new tunes or new
concepts into the community’s repertoire. These changes come about from the exercise
of individual’s musical decisions which have rhetorical effects within the community.
These changes come about because of some musician’s good decisions being recognized
and adopted by the community. These good choices filter back into the community, and
affect how the community judges and understands these various musical decisions. As
the musician maintains contact with the community, the effects of these good decisions
also affect the musician’s own understanding. This constant reworking of what
constitutes a good decision within the community indicates the vernacularity within the
rhetoric of the Cape Breton musical community. To understand the rhetoric within it
requires maintaining conversation within the community.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this project was the develop the aural rhetoric of the traditional
music community of Cape Breton Island. In order to do this, I outlined and explained
the prejudices of the Cape Breton music community as they related to musical
performance. In explaining any aural rhetoric for any community adequately, it is
important to begin with the community’s prejudices, and to discuss how individuals act
within this framework. Specifically, musical rhetoric takes place when musicians act
within a community’s framework of understanding. Musicians make judgments based
on how they understand the community’s beliefs and expectations, as well as how their
own beliefs and expectations of musical performance are shaped by this community.
Thus the project of explaining an aural rhetoric is necessarily a critical hermeneutic
project. It requires a focus on the community’s understanding of practices. It requires
clarifying the conditions where community understanding, community judgments, and
community action takes place.
In the opening pages of this project, I introduced an anecdote about how some
classical musicians are attempting to learn traditional music as if it were the technical
application of rules, and about how this creates a clash between classical and traditional
musicians. The purpose of contrasting these musicians was not to say that classical
musicians lack the ability to make practical judgments, nor was it to disparage the
ability of classical musicians. It was to illustrate how the skill of performing a musical
instrument requires much more than understanding how to make the instrument
produce noise. Understanding how to perform music requires understanding how to
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make judgments. And these judgments depend on the understanding of the community
that the music is performed within. So when classical violinists attempted to play the
Cape Breton fiddle, they did so with an understanding of how to use the instrument, but
without the understanding of the community’s judgment. Nothing overtly indicated to
these classical musicians, though, that performing the new genre of music was anything
more than the reproduction of notes. Thus, this clash in judgment results in a friction. A
similar lack of recognizing communal judgment within musical performance that has
allowed musical rhetoric to flounder within rhetorical theory. Musicians make musical
judgments based on the standards of the communities these musicians act within.
Though ethnocentric inclinations often lead music to be mischaracterized as a universal
language, musical rhetoric is more often than not a vernacular rhetoric. As such, it
requires a discussion of prejudices and background practices.
I drew from Gadamer in this project, a theorist not usually identified with critical
theory. But then again, you might ask, “how was this a critical project?” This was a
critical project in that its goal was to expose prejudices, especially those prejudices that
might be informed by technical judgment at the expense of practical judgment. At the
outset of this project, I linked classical musicians with technical judgment. But
throughout, I identified other groups, both within the Cape Breton community and
groups that interact with the Cape Breton community, whose prejudices towards
judgment favored technical judgment over practical judgment.
First among these were the oft-labeled ‘romanticists’ who I repeatedly
mentioned. These are individuals both within the community and who are outside of
the community but believe that they have a stake in the community’s survival. These are
individual’s such as Seamus Taylor, who urges the community “to keep in mind that
247

this is NOT a malleable ‘world music,’ but rather the tribal music of our ancestors,
preserved and revered for many centuries.”462 These are individuals such as Dr. John
Shaw, who isolate Gaelic as the sole-defining feature of Cape Breton fiddle music that is
played “correctly,” referring to everything else as having “the character of an invented
tradition with aesthetic and social points of reference increasingly distant from the
region…”463 Taylor and Shaw ignore that the community’s local aesthetics have changed
subtly with every musician who participates. They have ignored that the music has
many influences, and that a musician has many decisions informed by many variables
when performing. Instead, they would find a ‘pure’ Cape Breton community,
unchanged since their unchanging Gaelic speaking tribal ancestors unchangingly played
their unchanging music for unchanging millennia.
Second among these are the musicians within the Cape Breton community who
don’t listen during a performance.464 These are musicians who don’t pay attention to the
musicians they are performing with, to the audience, or to the needs of the moment.
Rather than adapting and adjusting within a performance as they perform, they perform
informed by wrote memorization. These are also the musicians who play the ‘fancy
chords’ thinking that simply by performing a chord, they will elicit an effect, without
understanding that the decision of placing any given chord is contextual, and its success
or failure to elicit an effect is dependent on much more than the use of the chord itself.465
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Taylor, “Standing up for Gaelic culture,” (June/July 1997): 5. See footnote 353.
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Shaw, “Language, Music, and Local Aesthetics,” (1992/1993): 43. See chapter 5.

See my discussion of listening, specifically the musicians who don’t listen, in section
8.1.2.
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See my discussion of musicians who misapply chords, on page 226.
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This project is critical because it raises the prejudices of the community to the
surface. These prejudices were those that influence decision making concerning
communal performances. These communal performances also inform community
identity. When the community fosters practical decisions amongst these prejudices, this
needs to be acknowledged. When the community favors technical decisions, these too
need to be acknowledged. Of critical concern is when the prejudices informed by the
practical are threatened by the technical. By raising prejudices of judgment to the fore,
this project addresses this concern.
This critical project is also a rhetorical project; one of aural rhetoric, and one of
vernacular rhetoric. Raising the community’s prejudices to the fore allows for
understanding the effects of rhetorical decisions. Though vernacular rhetoric occurs
within the background of the community, the community still judges this rhetoric. Some
rhetorical performances are judged by the community to be better than others. In doing
so, the community’s understanding is affected by these rhetorical performances. The
community’s understanding changes. The community expands its understanding of
possibilities based on rhetorically adept performances. Cape Breton musicians
introducing new use of chords, new use of progressions, or new use of embellishments
affect the community. When the community likes these performances, other musicians
potentially adopt these new elements until they themselves become communal norms.
9.1. The Vernacular Rhetoric of Cape Breton Music
The Cape Breton community carries its own local knowledge, own modes of
argument, and own local rhetorical salience. This discourse extends to the community’s
music. Musicians acting within the Cape Breton community have to make a number of
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decisions in order to perform in a way judged acceptable by the community. Musicians
and the community acquire the understanding of this rhetoric, not through a single
performance, but through the background repetition of many performances. In Cape
Breton these performances are a part of the community’s everyday background
practices, and are more than one-off special events. These performances occur at the
nightly square dances, at community festivals, at house parties, at church, and at the
local restaurants. They have the potential to occur even when not planned, and such
spontaneity does not surprise the community.
Within these performances the musicians seek to move the audience. In the case
of dances, the musician seeks literally to perform in a way that excites the crowd and
motivates them to dance. The musician seeks to create a pensive mood in airs, and then
spring from this to the lighthearted jig or the exciting reel. The musician seeks to
musically move the audience to catharsis and does so by manipulating the community’s
expectations through musical choices. Their instruments become extensions of their
body as they act within the community’s everyday background practices. This
community’s local vernacular rhetoric is also musical.
This project was necessarily a hermeneutic project, because in order to
understand how rhetoric works within a community requires understanding how the
community itself understands.466 Understanding within any community is not static,
and is in a constant state of flux. New individuals, new actions, and new experiences
expand how the community understands possibilities of action. Musicians in Cape
Breton have consistently affected the community’s understanding of the possible, as
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well as the community’s standards for acceptability. Fifty years ago it wasn’t uncommon
to hear a piano player perform using only three chords. Now the community would
judge such a performance to be subpar. Pianists are expected to use substitute chords
and advanced bass lines. Musicians rhetorically introduce new possibilities in a way that
the community accepts and embraces. The communal standards shifted from three
chords to near unlimited possibilities because musicians have rhetorically pushed the
community’s understanding of the possible and change the community’s understanding
of the acceptable.
The ability of a Cape Breton musician to be open to expanding their own
understanding is essential to their success within musical performances. Cape Breton
musicians who are open to expanding their horizon listen to their surroundings. They
listen and are open to the acts of other musicians. They listen and are open to the
audience. And they listen and are open to the needs of the situation. This orientation
allows the musicians to adapt and act based on their understanding of the situation.
Conversely, musicians who do not listen will be acting based on a pre-conceived
understanding of musical action—essentially a blueprint. By listening, the musician is
able to expand their understanding of performance within the community. They can
learn new possibilities and they can test prejudices of performance. Musicians routinely
label listening as the key to musical performance, and this is because listening
contributes to and informs a musician’s understanding.
Music is intertwined with the everyday practices of the Cape Breton community,
both in the foreground and the background. Developing a vernacular rhetoric requires
developing these background practices, since it is where the background rhetoric occurs.
In Cape Breton, community members might attend events where music is the main
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purpose, such as the dance or a ceilidh. Or the music might exist in the background,
when at church or at a restaurant. But whether the practice be at the fore or aft of any
given community practice, it is a point of communal judgment. The community judges
and contributes to the community identity in deciding whose music they feature, whose
dances they attend, and whose style they emulate. The act of the restaurant manager of
the Mull Diner playing a Donald Angus Beaton album is a disclosure of communal
judgment. The act of attending a Howie MacDonald dance at Glencoe Mills is a
disclosure of communal judgment. A musician’s performance of a Jerry Holland
composed tune is a disclosure of communal judgment. Collectively, these disclosures of
judgment within communal practices shape the community’s understanding of
acceptable action.
Individuals engage with the Cape Breton community when they meet together in
these practices to perform their routine social actions. They come together at the local
dances, they come together at the local ceilidhs, and at the house parties. And when
here, they engage in a routine of practices, where there are certain expected actions for
musicians, dancers, and the audience. The musicians are expected to perform a
particular repertoire of tunes in an expected way. Fiddlers are expected to act in one
way, pianists in another, and guitarists in yet another. These individuals’ actions
performed both in acknowledgement of one another, and to distinguish themselves
from one another, establish the community’s social relations. Through these actions, the
community contests its common identity as the individuals simultaneously proclaim
their individual identity.
These venues where the Cape Breton community exists—the dance halls, the
pubs, the house parties, the concert halls—are places where individuals demonstrate
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that they are part of the community by exercising judgment. They appear together and
perform music, or dance, or react to music. In how they perform these actions, these
individuals exercise judgment. Like Arendt’s polis, these spaces for this community’s
judgment exists as part of the community’s everyday.467 These spaces allow for
musicians and dancers to act in ways that the community judges to be extraordinary.
Any given performance allows the potential for extraordinary performance, and because
of this, the potential for extraordinary performance is ordinary. On any given night, a
musician can perform for a dance that will be long remembered by those within the
community. These extraordinary acts are acknowledged by the community as part of the
everyday. It is in this way that the polis of the Cape Breton community exists within its
everyday—it is a place that allows the extraordinary to be ordinary. It allows
individuals to appear and act, both in an attempt to acknowledge others, but also in an
attempt to distinguish themselves.468 A vernacular rhetoric needs to account for
understanding the spaces of background appearances as part of the everyday, but also
needs to acknowledge for how these spaces allow for action that allows extraordinary
action to be part of the everyday.
Cape Breton musicians make their decisions based on what they understand as
appropriate sounds within their community. In doing so, the musicians hold themselves
accountable to the community.469 Musicians acknowledge that they will make decisions
on what tunes to perform or how to embellish tunes based on who they see in the
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See discussion of Arendt’s polis as being part of the everyday on page 88.

See discussion of Arendt’s development of the polis beginning on page 83; see also
discussion the Cape Breton musical venues as spaces of appearances in section 7.4.
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See discussion of accountability and appropriateness beginning on page 66
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audience. They also know that in any given performance, there are certain decisions that
would be inappropriate, such as an accompanist drawing too much attention to
themselves, a fiddler playing a tune more than once, or transitioning between keys too
many times within a set. The musicians understand that they can shift the community’s
understanding of appropriate decisions. They know that there is flexibility to introduce
new musical decisions that are within the community’s understanding of acceptable
musical actions. If successful, these choices influence other musicians and become part
of the community’s everyday understanding.
Understanding the Cape Breton community’s understanding of appropriate
actions is essential to understanding how musical rhetoric works within the community.
Musical decisions that are appropriate in Cape Breton might not be considered
appropriate elsewhere and vice versa. In Cape Breton, it is considered acceptable for a
fiddler to play a note that sits between G and G sharp. In many other communities this
would be considered out of tune and therefore unacceptable.470 But because the Cape
Breton community’s understanding of music is influenced by the bagpipes, and because
this note exists within the bagpiping scale, it is part of the community’s understanding.
This understanding changes over time, so in order for a musician to continue making
good decisions throughout their career, they have to listen to the community, and adapt
to the times.471 It is less likely to hear younger musicians play the G derived from
bagpipes, and it is possible that performing this note fades from the community’s range
of acceptability.

See discussion of the Cape Breton community’s understanding of the G sharp, and
the musical scale, on page 189.
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See discussion of vernacularity on page 41.
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Decisions that were once acceptable fade from the community’s understanding
because communal judgment is not unanimous, nor do all of the musicians in Cape
Breton make the same decisions. In Cape Breton, some members of the community
appreciate certain sounds but abhor others. Others might favor the opposite. Diversity
of opinions exist within the community over which musical decisions are better or
worse. But decisions that are acceptable in the community do not require that all
community members appreciate or agree on the decision. The rhetorical nature of these
decisions can shift the momentum of the community, so that proponents of a particular
musical decision dwindle and eventually fade from the community. This can be heard in
the community’s eventual movement away from the simple three-chord piano
accompaniment. This shift came about a single musician at a time, and was not
necessarily embraced by everyone within the community at first.
This project has focused on how the musicians of Cape Breton make decisions
within performance. Those musicians who are considered better musicians by the
community are considered better because they make decisions that appeal to the Cape
Breton community. They operate rhetorically by making decisions about how to move
their audience through musical action. But do not mistake this description as an
assertion that the better Cape Breton musicians are infallible in their judgment. These
musicians fail, but in the aggregate they succeed more. They understand how to appeal
to their community, and they understand that musical decisions that lead to this
rhetorical success cannot be made according to a script. Musicians from different
communities must make different decisions in order to appeal to their respective
communities. It is the judgment, not the skill with their instrument, that necessarily
distinguishes musicians from different communities.
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Thus, while I opened up this project by contrasting classical musicians and Cape
Breton musicians, it is not that classical musicians lack the ability to make practical
judgments. It is just that practical judgments are necessarily different in the classical
music community than in the Cape Breton music community. These differences rise to
the surface when the classical musician attempts to play Cape Breton music. Classical
musicians’ notes are determined for them on the printed score. Cape Breton musicians
use sheet music as a rough guideline. Embellishments used by classical musicians, such
as spiccato and vibrato, are used differently than embellishments by Cape Breton
musicians, such as droning and cutting. Learning when to apply these embellishments is
not as easy as learning a set of rules, but rather requires learning communal standards,
which itself requires understanding social relations.
The Cape Breton musician who makes good musical decisions within the
community understands how music moves individuals in the community. This requires
the musician to be attuned to the audience’s reactions, both when the musician performs
and when others perform. When performing at a dance, the fiddler attuned to the
audience might recognize that the crowd is simply going through the motions, so might
choose particular tunes that they think will generate excitement. At a concert, the
accompanist might understand that a particular tempo is too slow for the audience’s
desires based on the crowd’s reactions, so might choose to increase the pace. The
musician might learn this through his own performances, but also might learn what
works and what doesn’t work through watching the performances of others, and paying
attention to how the musical decisions of other performers affects the audience. The key
here is that the musician is not simply focusing on the music, but is attempting to
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understand the effects that the musical decisions have upon the individuals within the
community.

9.2. Cape Breton Music as Action
Cape Breton music prompts both debate and dialogue within the community.
The music itself is dialogue. Though art, this music is not performed by musicians for its
own sake. The Cape Breton musicians perform the music for the community, in
recognition of those within the community. The music is action within the Cape Breton
public sphere and generates communal opinion. This opinion is expressed in a
multitude of ways. It is expressed via attendance, with the message being that the
community will attend the events headlined by musicians they approve of, and will
forego attending the events of those musicians they don’t appreciate. Opinions are
expressed by the very act of inviting a musician to perform. Opinions are also expressed
at the gas station, the freshmart, and at church, each of which are locations where the
community discusses the merits of performances. Opinions are also expressed by
musicians musically emulating each other, either through performing another
musician’s composition, or adopting another musician’s musical idea.
While the Cape Breton musician performs in recognition of the community, they
also perform in order to reveal themselves. They do this through the way that they
express their music. Through musical action the musicians make decisions in an effort to
display their individuality. Accompanists make choices in chords or in bass lines or
rhythmic patterns. Fiddlers use embellishments or perform a variation of a given tune.
Through these expressive decisions, musicians distinguish themselves as unique.
Performing sets that are replicas of other musicians’ sets are frowned upon. Rather,
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these musicians feature a range of stylistic nuances that might be unobserved to the
outsider, but are readily apparent to the community member. So much so that many in
the Cape Breton community could successfully identify the identity of musicians simply
by listening.
Cape Breton musicians seek to distinguish themselves in order to be seen by the
community as one of the community’s better performers. There is a pantheon of current
and former musicians that the community recognizes for their elite ability. Musicians
from the community’s past like Winston Fitzgerald, Buddy MacMaster, John Morris
Rankin, and Jerry Holland, are remembered by the community for their virtuosity.
Musicians from the community’s present such as Natalie MacMaster, Ashley MacIsaac,
Dave MacIsaac, and Tracey Dares, are recognized for their ability to perform at this elite
level, and for their contributions to the music’s state. These are all musicians who have
influenced the community’s understanding of musical possibilities, and have altered the
community identity through their performance. Other musicians perform with the goal
of achieving this level of recognition within the community, and also influencing the
community through their action. The community expects this level of performance from
its musicians, and they attend events understanding the possibility that the musician’s
performance will rise to a level that will be talked about long after the performance.
This project contributes to vernacular rhetoric by acknowledging that vernacular
communities judge some vernacular actions as better than others. Not all products of the
‘folk’ are created equal—at least not to the folk themselves. Though these practices of
Cape Breton are in the background of the community’s everyday practices, the
community judges some performances as better than others. Vernacular rhetoric needs
to account for how the community judges these performances, lest it slip into
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romanticism by ignoring that the community can allow for some individuals within it to
be better than others. Vernacular rhetoric needs to account for communal norms, and
how communal arguments that exist within the background are won. Outsiders might
not even recognize that the argument exists. When a Cape Breton pianist performs a
new chordal pattern or a new bass line, there is nothing to indicate to the outsider that
something new was introduced to the community that will result in communal
judgment. But the community does judge these actions. The community does not judge
these actions with preset standards, and what might be a good performance today might
change tomorrow.
Vernacular rhetoric also needs to account for recognizing that not all vernacular
rhetorical performances are equal, neither are all vernacular rhetoricians. Though Cape
Breton musicians might have an understanding of the community’s rhetoric, this alone
will not make them exemplary musicians within the eyes of the community. Rhetoric is
an art, and musicians’ talents will vary. Treating vernacular rhetoricians as if they were
all equally adept at their community’s respective sites of rhetorical performance veers on
romanticizing the vernacular community and ignoring that the vernacular community is
made of individuals. Ignoring that the community is made up of individuals ignores
how the community itself recognizes its own background everyday practices, and
ignores how rhetoric within the community actually works.
In order for a Cape Breton musician to perform good, they must listen and be
open to others. They must listen and adjust to the musicians they perform with. They
must listen and adjust to their audience. They must have a genuine openness towards
these dialogues. But this also reveals the second side of recognizing that vernacular
rhetoric can allow for good performances: vernacular rhetoric can also fail within the
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community. Musicians who do not listen within a performance, or who approach
performance as if they are working from a blueprint will fail within the community.
Understanding a community’s vernacular rhetoric requires understanding the source of
rhetorical failures.
9.3. The Evolution of Cape Breton’s Communal Judgment
A Cape Breton musician must make many musical decisions in any given
performance. These decisions have the potential of affecting the community’s
understanding, and thus have the potential of changing the community’s rhetorical
practices. Musicians who enter this community, walk into a community that has been
shaped by musicians who came before them. These are not nameless faces, but are
musicians who are still remembered for their influence. Fiddlers recognize the affect of
Winston Fitzgerald, and pianists recognize the affect of John Morris Rankin. They
brought new routines that the community adopted. This contributes to the
understanding within the community that each new musician can also impact the
community’s musical expectations. Traces of these musical influences exist, so that when
listening to Troy MacGillivray, you can hear how his music was influenced by Winston
Fitzgerald and others. While when listening to Glenn Graham, you can hear how his
music was influenced by Donald Angus Beaton and others. These community routines
that Graham and MacGillivray perpetuate still have the traces of those musicians who
influenced them. Which in turn carry the influence of those musicians before them, and
so on.
Drawing from Arendt and Gadamer allowed me to explain community and
tradition as a dialogue between the individual and the group. By acknowledging that
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the community is a collection of individuals, my project highlighted how action,
judgment, and understanding are the ties that bind communities. Individuals judge how
to act amongst others who then pass judgment upon this action. Through judging this
action, the community’s understanding changes. In helping to flesh out action and
judgment, Arendt and Gadamer contribute to understanding the everyday and help to
explain the possibilities for vernacular rhetoric. As each musician enters into the Cape
Breton community, they act amongst a group that already understands their
community’s music in a particular way. When the musician performs to influence the
community, and simultaneously distinguish themselves, the community judges this
performance. This performance has the potential to alter how the community
understands its music. In this way, the musician alters the community’s understanding.
Over time, the collective performances of multiple individuals change the community.
This model of community evolution, driven by Arendt and Gadamer, differs from
notions of communal change that see the community to naturally evolve, as if driven by
the invisible hand.
In this same capacity, when the musicians act within Cape Breton, they act
politically. They act with the intent to influence the community’s understanding. They
act with the intent to establish new standards for musical possibility. In order to succeed
rhetorically, the musician needs to act within the constraints of the community’s
understanding acceptable action. But these constraints still allow for newness and can be
opened to allow for new possibilities. Cape Breton musicians understand their own
ability to change the music because they are surrounded by musicians who they
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recognize for changing the music.472 Musicians like Troy MacGillivray know the effect
that contemporaries like Dave MacIsaac and Tracey Dares had upon the community, so
he recognizes that he too can have a similar effect. In this way, Cape Breton musicians
exhibit political agency in attempting to shape the community’s identity.
In Cape Breton, the music has evolved because musicians have a practical
relationship with tradition. They are able to test the prejudices that inform their
understanding against something new, which then expands their understanding. So
when a musician hears a chord used in a way that they had previously thought would
likely be unacceptable, and they actually like how that chord works, their understanding
of how chords work has been expanded.473 Listening to the new chord is placed in
context of how the community has formed their existing understanding. The new chord
is understood to work because the musician has tested it—not because they have simply
tossed aside their previous understanding. Because they operate practically, the
musicians attempt ‘new’ acts because they think that the act might work. They might
gain new understanding of how an F chord works by performing a new tune, and then
test to see whether the F chord also works in an existing tune they perform. If they think
that the chord works, then they might attempt using that chord in public, and test to see
if the audience appreciates it. If the audience finds the chord acceptable, then it enters
the community’s understanding. If the audience likes the chord, then other musicians
might emulate it. The community’s standards change. The musicians are constantly
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See my discussion of agency within the Cape Breton community in section 8.2.
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262

testing, listening, and judging. They are not simply tossing their pre-existing
understanding aside for the sake of newness.
But the evolution of the music occurs at a pace that creates the illusion that music
in Cape Breton has been unbroken, or at least might make the appearance that the
community’s understanding of music has only changed recently, after having been
preserved for centuries. Time can hide the agency and the collective effects of all the
musicians who have participated in the tradition. But musicians within this community
have always been composing, and there have always been musicians who have stood
out within the community for their virtuosity—meaning that the musicians have always
been recognized for their unique expression.474 And tracing this pattern further back to
the music’s origins in Scotland, the same can be said. Ignoring the rhetorical affects of
the individual musician upon the community allows for romanticism. This also allows
for romanticists to define the community by a single element, in the case of Cape Breton
music, the defining element is either the Gaelic language475 or “tribal” ancestors.476
This project has developed the musical rhetoric of Cape Breton island by
focusing on how the community understands its everyday musical practices, and how
individuals act within this framework. The purpose of this project was not to provide a
technical manual that focuses on every single element of the Cape Breton musical style,
or how implementing certain techniques will elicit certain effects. On the contrary, such
a demonstration would be antithetical to my discussion of the vernacularity of

See Alistair MacGillivray’s chronicle of the biographies and stories of generations of
Cape Breton fiddlers. MacGillivray, The Cape Breton Fiddler.
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community, and would be out of date before it is defended. My purpose was to show
how musicians operate rhetorically by making decisions based on the standards of the
community, and also how musicians shape those very same standards. In operating
rhetorically, Cape Breton musicians act informed by practical judgment, having to
process many factors when making decisions. In making these decisions, while there is
no ‘right’ way for the musician to perform, there are wrong ways, and some decisions
are better than others. But whether a decision is better or worse depends largely on the
communal judgment. Thus to understand musical rhetoric requires first recognizing that
there is no single musical rhetoric, but that there are musical rhetorics. And to
understand one of these musical rhetorics requires understanding community
understanding as well as how the musician acts within the community.
A key theme throughout my project shows that the vernacularity of community
requires constant conversation with a community in order to stay up to date with the
community’s understanding. In Cape Breton, though subtle, the community’s standards
have changed over time. The community’s understanding of performance and
possibilities is different today than it was fifty years ago, and different still than fifty
years before that. Individuals who engage within the conversation of community and
then leave, will likely not share the same understanding as those who have continuously
engaged with community. Those in Cape Breton who have little participated with the
musical community for the past twenty or thirty years cannot speak to how the Cape
Breton community works, though they can speak to how the community worked.
Assuming that they can speak to a current understanding of the community is to ascribe
to a belief that social relations are static and likewise is to reify communal practices as if
they were things. But to participate with the Cape Breton community is not to ‘do a
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thing,’ as much as it is to act towards another. And to understand how these community
actions are understood within the community is to maintain the conversation of
community.
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